Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
Abstract
Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' votes. When parties influence how people vote by threatening to punish them for voting for another party, I call this accountability . I analyze the strategic interaction between machines and voters as an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with one-sided uncertainty. The game generates hypotheses about the impact of the machine's capacity to monitor voters, and of voters' incomes and ideological stances, on the effectiveness of machine politics. I test these hypotheses with data from Argentina.
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In many Latin American countries, electoral corruption returned or persisted after the secret ballot was de jure introduced.
“The issue is that electoral corruption returned or persisted in many countries after the secret ballot was de jure introduced.”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Stokes, 2005
The available quantitative evidence on the operation of vote markets comes from a handful of studies of particular markets and none of these consider the role of modernization.
“The available quantitative evidence on the operation of vote markets comes from a handful of insightful studies of particular markets and none of these consider the role of modernization.”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Stokes (2005)
Vote markets can operate under secret ballot, but with more difficulty than under open ballot.
“Stokes (2005) andCollier and Vicente (2012) show how vote markets can operate under secret ballot, but with more di¢ culty than under open ballot.”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Stokes (2005)
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- Authors
- STOKES, S. C.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Corresponding author
- STOKES, SUSAN C.
- ORCID
- STOKES, SUSAN C.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 315-325
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2168060994
- Cited by
- 1,586
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 85 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 104 · 2020: 169 · 2019: 184 · 2018: 125 · 2017: 89 · 2016: 89 · 2015: 85 · 2014: 71 · 2013: 73 · 2012: 56
- FWCI
- 70.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Politics and Society in Latin America
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Dynamics in Latin America
- Keywords
- machine politics, clientelism, political machines, secret ballot, electoral accountability, strategic voting, social networks, iterated prisoner's dilemma, political parties, Argentina
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