The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contracting around International Uncertainty
Abstract
International cooperation is plagued by uncertainty. Although states negotiate the best agreements possible using available information, unpredictable things happen after agreements are signed that are beyond states' control. States may not even commit themselves to an agreement if they anticipate that circumstances will alter their expected benefits. Duration provisions can insure states in this context. Specifically, the use of finite duration depends positively on the degree of uncertainty and states' relative risk aversion and negatively on the cost. These formally derived hypotheses strongly survive a test with data on a random sample of agreements across all four of the major issue areas in international relations. Not only do the results, highlighting evidence on multiple kinds of flexibility provisions, strongly suggest that the design of international agreements is systematic and sophisticated; but also they call attention to common ground among various subfields of political science and law.
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Cites
Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (2014) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9780801471292 · Cited by 4,627
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance
Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2000) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081800551280 · Cited by 2,812
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081801317193592 · Cited by 2,358
Self-citationThe Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations
Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899551048 · Cited by 2,113
National Interests in International Society
Finnemore, M. (1996) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9781501707384 · Cited by 2,008
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Kreps, D. M. (2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691202754.001.0001 · Cited by 1,592
Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results
Tomz, M., Wittenberg, J., & King, G. (2003) · Journal of Statistical Software · doi:10.18637/jss.v008.i01 · Cited by 1,432
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Kreps, D. M. (1990) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691215747 · Cited by 1,324
Rubinstein, A., & Osborne, M. J. (1990) · Cited by 1,270
National interests in international society
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-4739 · Cited by 1,047
Cited by
The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship
Shaffer, G., & Ginsburg, T. (2012) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.106.1.0001 · Cited by 346
Guzman, A. T., & Meyer, T. L. (2010) · Journal of Legal Analysis · doi:10.1093/jla/2.1.171 · Cited by 339
U.S. Treaty Making with American Indians: Institutional Change and Relative Power, 1784–1911
Spirling, A. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00558.x · Cited by 98
Dür, A., & Gastinger, M. (2023) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2022.2079708 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- KOREMENOS, B.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2005-10-31
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 549-565
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2082184403
- Cited by
- 381
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 69.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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