The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A leader's culpability for involving his state in a conflict affects both his war termination calculus and his domestic audience's willingness to punish him if he loses. I define a culpable leader as any leader who either presides over the beginning of a war, or comes to power midwar and shares a political connection with a culpable predecessor. Using a data set created specifically for this study, I find that culpable leaders are more likely than nonculpable ones to achieve favorable war outcomes. I also find that domestic audiences will be willing to punish culpable leaders who lose, yet spare nonculpable leaders who do the same. Taken together, my findings underscore the need to appreciate more fully the role individual leaders play in bringing their states to war.
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Citations
Cites
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Zaller, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818691 · Cited by 7,785
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 2×
“For them, first leaders are more likely than replacements to remain in a conflict because they are more prone to a variety of informational biases pivotal member of his or her winning coalition to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003a; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).”
BackgroundMethodMyopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
HEALY, A., & MALHOTRA, N. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990104 · Cited by 931 · cited 1×
“The responsibility attribution literature, although large, tends to examine the context of economics (e.g., Hibbing and Alford 1981; Peffley 1984; Rudolph 2003) and, more recently, natural disasters (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2002; Healy and Malhotra 2009; Malhorta and Kuo 2008).”
Background
Cited by
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations
Hafner-Burton, E. M., Haggard, S., Lake, D. A., & Victor, D. G. (2017) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818316000400 · Cited by 291
Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War
Wucherpfennig, J., Metternich, N. W., Cederman, L.-E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2012) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s004388711100030x · Cited by 284
Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons
PRESS, D. G., SAGAN, S. D., & VALENTINO, B. A. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000597 · Cited by 277
How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders
Horowitz, M. C., & Stam, A. C. (2014) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818314000046 · Cited by 253
Metadata
- Authors
- CROCO, S. E.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011-08
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 457-477
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2155010517
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 48.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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