The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China
Abstract
Spectacular economic growth in China suggests the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has somehow gotten it right. A key hypothesis in both economics and political science is that the CCP's cadre evaluation system, combined with China's geography-based governing logic, has motivated local administrators to compete with one another to generate high growth. We raise a number of theoretical and empirical challenges to this claim. Using a new biographical database of Central Committee members, a previously overlooked feature of CCP reporting, and a novel Bayesian method that can estimate individual-level correlates of partially observed ranks, we find no evidence that strong growth performance was rewarded with higher party ranks at any of the postreform party congresses. Instead, factional ties with various top leaders, educational qualifications, and provincial revenue collection played substantial roles in elite ranking, suggesting that promotion systems served the immediate needs of the regime and its leaders, rather than encompassing goals such as economic growth.
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Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H. S., & Rubin, D. B. (2003) · doi:10.1201/9780429258480 · Cited by 27,276
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation
King, G., Honaker, J., Joseph, A., & Scheve, K. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401000235 · Cited by 1,834
Some necessary conditions for common-factor analysis
Guttman, L. (1954) · Psychometrika · doi:10.1007/bf02289162 · Cited by 1,689
What to do about missing values in time series cross- section data
Honaker, J., & King, G. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00447.x · Cited by 966
State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective
Edin, M. (2003) · The China Quarterly · doi:10.1017/s0009443903000044 · Cited by 855
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POLITICAL SELECTION IN CHINA: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF CONNECTIONS AND PERFORMANCE
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Ghanem, D., & Zhang, J. (2014) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2014.05.003 · Cited by 564
Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market*
Chen, T., & Kung, J. K.-S. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy027 · Cited by 443
Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China
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Metadata
- Authors
- SHIH, V., ADOLPH, C., & LIU, M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2012-02
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 166-187
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2324620190
- Cited by
- 840
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 193.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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