The DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China
Open accessAbstract
We argue that interjurisdiction competition in authoritarian regimes engenders a specific logic for taxation. Promotion-seeking local officials are incentivized to signal loyalty and competence to their principals through tangible fiscal revenues. The greater the number of officials accountable to the same principal, the more intense political competition is, resulting in higher taxation; however, too many officials accountable to the same principal leads to lower taxation due to shirking by uncompetitive officials and the fear of political instability. Using a panel dataset of all Chinese county-level jurisdictions from 1999–2006, we find strong evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between the number of county-level jurisdictions within a prefecture—our proxy for the intensity of political competition—and fiscal revenues in most provinces but not so in politically unstable ethnic minority regions. The results are robust to various alternative specifications, including models that account for heterogeneous county characteristics and spatial interdependence.
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Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
Li, H., & Zhou, L.-A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.009 · Cited by 3,668
Ross, M. L. (2001) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011 · Cited by 3,409
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
Xu, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.4.1076 · Cited by 2,623
Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space
Henderson, J. V., Storeygard, A., & Weil, D. N. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.994 · Cited by 2,596
Levi, M. (2019) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520909540 · Cited by 1,653
The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy
SIMMONS, B. A., & ELKINS, Z. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404001078 · Cited by 1,611
Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China
Montinola, G., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1995) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1995.0003 · Cited by 1,328
Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China
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Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State
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Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style
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Cited by
Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market*
Chen, T., & Kung, J. K.-S. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy027 · Cited by 443
Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China
Distelhorst, G., & Hou, Y. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/690948 · Cited by 303
Metadata
- Authors
- LÜ, X., & LANDRY, P. F.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2014-07-18
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 706-722
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W3124692104
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 61
- FWCI
- 87.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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