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Cited by 186Names, Identity, and Discrimination ResearchElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 103 of the 105 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Does Electoral Competition Exacerbate Interethnic or Interpartisan Economic Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Market Price Bargaining

MICHELITCH, KRISTIN·2015·American Political Science Review
DOI 10.1017/s0003055414000628
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Abstract

Does political competition exacerbate economic discrimination between citizens on ethnic or partisan cleavages? Individuals often discriminate on group lines in ordinary economic activities, especially in low-income settings. Political competition, and thus mobilization of partisan and ethnic groups, waxes and wanes over the electoral cycle. This study therefore investigates discrimination over the electoral cycle in a commonplace yet consequential economic activity: market price bargaining. By conducting field experiments on taxi fare bargaining at three points in time around Ghana’s 2008 election, the research reveals that drivers accept lower prices from coethnics regardless of temporal proximity to the election. However, only at election time , drivers accept lower prices from copartisans and demand higher prices from noncopartisans. In sum, political competition affects commonplace economic transactions between citizens on the partisan cleavage. This study is the first to show evidence of interpartisan discrimination in everyday behavior and expands our knowledge of electoral cycle effects.

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Citations

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Show all 105 references

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Foddy, 2009, Whom Can We Trust?
  2. Tucker, 2006, Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and the “2nd Wave” of Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions, Perspectives on Politics, 53, 537
  3. Conroy-Krutz Jeffrey , and Devra Moehler . 2013. “Moderation from the African Airwaves: A Field Experiment on Partisan Radio Effects.” Midwestern Political Science Conference Paper.
  4. Gambetta, 2005, Streetwise: How Taxi Drivers Establish Their Customers’ Trustrworthieness
  5. Schattschneider, 1960, The Semi-Sovereign People
  6. Cooper, 2014, The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2
  7. Cook, 2009, Whom Can We Trust?
  8. Ferree, 2012, Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics
  9. Michelitch Kristin , and Stephen Utych . 2014. “Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship Salience: Global Evidence.” European Political Science Association Conference Paper.
  10. Campbell, 1960, The American Voter
  11. Tajfel, 1981, Human Groups and Social Categories

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Metadata

Authors
MICHELITCH, K.
Affiliations
Vanderbilt University (US)
Corresponding author
MICHELITCH, KRISTIN
ORCID
MICHELITCH, KRISTIN
Venue
American Political Science Review
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2015-02
Volume
109
Issue
1
Pages
43-61
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
DOI
10.1017/s0003055414000628
OpenAlex
W2112461603
Cited by
186
References
105
Citations by year
2026: 26 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 5
FWCI
49.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 30 d)
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
economic discrimination, electoral competition, price negotiation, ethnic divisions

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