The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States
Open accessAbstract
While previously polarization was primarily seen only in issue-based terms, a new type of division has emerged in the mass public in recent years: Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party. Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party's members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across party lines. This phenomenon of animosity between the parties is known as affective polarization. We trace its origins to the power of partisanship as a social identity, and explain the factors that intensify partisan animus. We also explore the consequences of affective polarization, highlighting how partisan affect influences attitudes and behaviors well outside the political sphere. Finally, we discuss strategies that might mitigate partisan discord and conclude with suggestions for future work.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
5 of 112 cited sources checked · 3 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8
Americans are averse to cross-partisan dialogue within their families, especially after the 2016 election.
“Behavioral data from smartphone activity confirms that Americans are averse to cross-partisan dialogue within their families, especially in the wake of the 2016 election (Chen & Rohla 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Chen & Rohla 2018 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8
Preferences against cross-party marriage are substantively larger than apolitical benchmarks, such as the 17-20% of people who would not want their child marrying a fan of an opposing baseball team.
“And these preferences appear substantively larger than apolitical benchmarks, such as the 17-20% of people who would not want their child marrying a fan of an opposing baseball team (Hersh 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Hersh 2016 source
The introduction says political ideology affects evaluations of potential romantic partners, but it gives no cross-party marriage rate or comparison with an apolitical benchmark. Searches for the baseball-team marriage question and the 17–20% figure found no passage addressing them in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Findingown data§ Figure 1 · p. 4
Out-party feeling has decreased dramatically, especially after 1990.
“Out-party feeling ( purple line ) has decreased dramatically, especially after 1990.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data§ Figure 1 · p. 4
Affective polarization decreased between 2012 and 2016 due to decreases in feeling toward the in-party.
“However, it is worth noting that affective polarization actually decreased between 2012 and 2016 due to decreases in feeling toward the in-party.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 3
Extremity in issue opinions is not a necessary condition for affective polarization.
“and that extremity in issue opinions is not a necessary condition for affective polarization”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
- Interpretationreasoning§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Partisanship is a particularly salient and powerful identifier.
“Partisanship is a particularly salient and powerful identifier for two main reasons.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Political campaigns recur frequently and last for many months (or even years) in the contemporary United States.
- Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Political parties often form along these lines precisely because group identities are so stable and significant.
“Political parties often form along these lines precisely because group identities are so stable and significant”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lipset & Rokkan 1967
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationcitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 3
Affective polarization is largely distinct from the ideological divide.
“Rather, we argue that affective polarization is largely distinct from the ideological divide”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationcitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Affective polarization is a natural offshoot of partisan group identity.
“From a social identity perspective, affective polarization is a natural offshoot of this sense of partisan group identity”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar & Westwood 2015 source
- Premisereasoning§ Survey Self-Reports · p. 3
The feeling thermometer has become the primary vehicle for measuring affect toward a wide range of groups in the electorate.
“but has become the primary vehicle for measuring affect toward a wide range of groups in the electorate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract · p. 1
Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party.
“Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. 2012 source
- Premisecitation§ Survey Self-Reports · p. 3
Other over-time measures of partisan affect show similar patterns.
“Other over-time measures of partisan affect show similar patterns”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pew Research Center 2017
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Partisanship is acquired at a young age and rarely changes over the life cycle, notwithstanding significant shifts in personal circumstances.
“First, it is acquired at a young age and rarely changes over the life cycle, notwithstanding significant shifts in personal circumstances”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sears 1975
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ Figure 1 · p. 4
Americans have become increasingly averse to the prospect of their child marrying someone from the opposing party.
“Iyengar et al. (2012) show that Americans have become increasingly averse to the prospect of their child marrying someone from the opposing party.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. 2012 source
- Interpretationcitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Individuals constantly receive partisan cues from elites.
“meaning that individuals constantly receive partisan cues from elites.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lee 2016 source
- Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Any in-group/out-group distinction, even one based on the most trivial of shared characteristics, triggers both positive feelings for the in group and negative evaluations of the out group.
“A vast literature in social psychology demonstrates that any such in-group/out-group distinction, even one based on the most trivial of shared characteristics, triggers both positive feelings for the in group and negative evaluations of the out group”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Billig & Tajfel 1973 source
- Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Group affiliation is essential to our sense of self.
“Homo sapiens is a social species; group affiliation is essential to our sense of self.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Brewer 1991 source
- cites Tajfel 1978
- Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
The more salient the group to the sense of personal identity, the stronger these intergroup divisions.
“The more salient the group to the sense of personal identity, the stronger these intergroup divisions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gaertner et al. 1993 source
- Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 3
In some settings, affective polarization can increase while ideological divisions shrink.
“Indeed, in some settings, affective polarization can increase while ideological divisions shrink”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levendusky & Malhotra 2016a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Ordinary Americans see the political world through a partisan prism.
“It is no surprise, therefore, that ordinary Americans see the political world through a partisan prism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2
Individuals instinctively think of themselves as representing broad socioeconomic and cultural categories rather than as distinctive packages of traits.
“Individuals instinctively think of themselves as representing broad socioeconomic and cultural categories rather than as distinctive packages of traits”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Brewer 1991 source
- cites Tajfel 1978
- Premisecitation§ Survey Self-Reports · p. 3
Affective polarization actually decreased between 2012 and 2016.
“and ( b ) affective polarization actually decreased between 2012 and 2016.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. 2012 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8
Marriages are much more politically homogeneous than one would expect by chance.
“Observational survey data have long found that marriages are much more politically homogeneous than one would expect by chance (Stoker 1995).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Stoker 1995 source
- Premisecitation§ Implicit Measures · p. 5
Approximately 70% of Democrats and Republicans show a bias in favor of their party on the IAT.
“Their results showed that implicit bias is ingrained; approximately 70% of Democrats and Republicans show a bias in favor of their party.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar & Westwood 2015 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
The median proportion of friendship groups that are ideologically discordant is only about 20%.
“Finally, Facebook data show that the median proportion of friendship groups that are ideologically discordant is only about 20% (Bakshy et al. 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bakshy et al. 2015 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
Prior to the 2016 presidential election, eHarmony dating profiles typically did not report political affiliation (24.6% of women and 16.5% of men).
“The dating website eHarmony reported that dating profiles typically did not report political affiliation prior to the 2016 presidential election (24.6% of women and 16.5% of men).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kiefer 2017
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisenone given§ Implicit Measures · p. 5
A major limitation to survey-based indicators of partisan affect is that they are reactive and susceptible to intentional exaggeration/suppression based on normative pressures.
“Amajor limitation to survey-based indicators of partisan affect is that they are reactive and susceptible to intentional exaggeration/suppression based on normative pressures.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Behavioral Measures · p. 5
Partisan cues exert strong leverage over nonpolitical attitudes.
“The scholarship study showed that partisan cues exert strong leverage over nonpolitical attitudes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Behavioral Measures · p. 5
Partisanship has bled into the nonpolitical sphere, driving ordinary citizens to reward copartisans and penalize opposing partisans.
“This work consistently shows that partisanship has bled into the nonpolitical sphere, driving ordinary citizens to reward copartisans and penalize opposing partisans, a point to which we return below.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation§ Figure 1 · p. 4
Social distance measures conflate partisan animus and a dislike of politics.
“However, Klar et al. (2018) show that social distance measures conflate partisan animus and a dislike of politics:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klar et al. 2018 source
- Premisecitation§ Figure 1 · p. 4
When people are asked about their child marrying someone from the opposing party, they assume that partisanship is a salient part of that person's identity.
“When people are asked about their child marrying someone from the opposing party, they assume that partisanship is a salient part of that person's identity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klar et al. 2018 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8
Republicans are especially sensitive to crossparty marriage.
“with Republicans especially sensitive to crossparty marriage”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. (2012) source
- Interpretationnone given§ Behavioral Measures · p. 6
The literature consistently documents an affective and behavioral divide between the in party and the out party.
“Regardless of measurement technique, the literature consistently documents an affective and behavioral divide between the in party and the out party.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8
People self-report being less comfortable with social relationships with out-partisans.
“Longitudinal survey data have shown that people self-report that they are less comfortable with social relationships with out partisans.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
Discordant partisanship decreases people's likelihood of being friends with someone even if they do not want a romantic relationship.
“Huber & Malhotra (2017) also find in their survey experiment that discordant partisanship decreases people's likelihood of being friends with someone even if they do not want a romantic relationship.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Huber & Malhotra (2017) source
- Premisecitation§ Implicit Measures · p. 5
Relative to implicit racial bias, implicit partisan bias is more widespread.
“Relative to implicit racial bias, implicit partisan bias is more widespread.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar & Westwood 2015 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8
The percentage of Americans who would be somewhat or very unhappy if their child married someone of the opposite party has increased by about 35 percentage points over the last 50 years.
“According to Iyengar et al. (2012), the percentage of Americans who would be somewhat or very unhappy if their child married someone of the opposite party has increased by about 35 percentage points over the last 50 years”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. (2012) source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
After the 2016 presidential election, eHarmony figures for reporting political affiliation increased to 68% of women and 47% of men.
“After the 2016 presidential election, these figures increased to 68% and 47%, respectively (Kiefer 2017)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kiefer 2017
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
Partisan matching increases the likelihood of a dyad exchanging messages by 9.5%.
“They find that partisan matching increases the likelihood of a dyad exchanging messages by 9.5%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Huber & Malhotra (2017) source
- Interpretationreasoning§ Figure 1 · p. 4
The critique by Klar et al. (2018) could not explain why these social distance measures have changed over time, unless the desire for political agreement has increased.
“However, the critique by Klar et al. (2018) could not explain why these social distance measures have changed over time, unless the desire for political agreement has increased.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klar et al. 2018 source
- Premisecitation§ Figure 1 · p. 4
When respondents are told prior to the question that the potential spouse is largely apolitical, their opposition falls sharply.
“When respondents are told prior to the question that the potential spouse is largely apolitical, their opposition falls sharply.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klar et al. 2018 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
Online daters usually do not advertise their political preferences.
“they find that online daters usually do not advertise their political preferences”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klofstad et al. 2013 source
- Interpretationreasoning§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8
Partisanship is used to screen social partners.
“Since partisanship increasingly signals core values and worldview, it is unsurprising that partisanship is used to screen social partners.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Partisanship increasingly signals core values and worldview.
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
Huber & Malhotra (2017) corroborate the dating-message finding with data from a survey experiment where partisanship is randomly manipulated in dating profiles.
“Huber & Malhotra (2017) corroborate this finding with data from a survey experiment where partisanship is randomly manipulated in the dating profiles.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Huber & Malhotra (2017) source
- Premisenone given§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8
Increases in unwillingness to have a child marry someone of the opposite party are much larger in the United States than in the United Kingdom.
“These increases are much larger in the United States than in a similar advanced democracy, the United Kingdom.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ Figure 1 · p. 4
Their opposition to same-party marriage rises when they are told the person frequently discusses politics.
“Similarly, their opposition to same-party marriage rises when they are told the person frequently discusses politics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klar et al. 2018 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
People self-report desiring to move to locations with fellow partisans.
“Indeed, survey data suggest that people self-report desiring to move to locations with fellow partisans (Gimpel & Hui 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gimpel & Hui 2015 source
- Interpretationcitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
Partisan sorting seems to be on a par with socioeconomic status as a basis for the selection of long-term partners.
“On the other hand, partisan sorting seems to be on a par with socioeconomic status, long considered the major basis for the selection of long-term partners.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Implicit Measures · p. 5
When explicit political preferences are weak, underlying implicit preferences drive political decision making.
“Ryan (2017) shows that when explicit political preferences are weak, these underlying implicit preferences drive political decision making.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ryan 2017 source
- Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11
Correcting misperceptions about party supporters reduces animus toward the other side.
“First, scholars have shown that correcting misperceptions about party supporters reduces animus toward the other side (Ahler & Sood 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ahler & Sood 2018 source
- Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 12
Emphasizing American identity reduces animus toward the other party.
“Using a set of survey experiments, as well as a natural experiment stemming from the July Fourth holiday, Levendusky (2018a) shows that emphasizing American identity reduces animus toward the other party.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levendusky (2018a)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
The partisan gap in economic perceptions narrows but does not disappear when survey respondents are financially incentivized to provide accurate answers about the state of the economy.
“The partisan gap in economic perceptions narrows-but does not disappear-when survey respondents are financially incentivized to provide accurate answers about the state of the economy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11
People typically hold negative views toward the other party's stereotypical groups.
“These biases matter because people typically hold negative views toward the other party's stereotypical groups (see also Levendusky & Malhotra 2016b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levendusky & Malhotra 2016b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11
Republicans were less likely than Democrats to enroll in health insurance exchanges set up by the Affordable Care Act.
“On the patient side, Lerman et al. (2017) leverage longitudinal data and find that Republicans were less likely than Democrats to enroll in health insurance exchanges set up by the Affordable Care Act.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerman et al. (2017) source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
In Panagopoulos et al.'s (2016) replication study done in the field, the effect sizes fell to about five percentage points.
“in Panagopoulos et al.'s (2016) replication study done in the field, the effect sizes fell to about five percentage points.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Panagopoulos et al.'s (2016)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
15-20% of participants in Panagopoulos et al. (2016) were less willing to accept a gift card from a company that gives PAC donations to the opposing party.
“Panagopoulos et al. (2016), in contrast, find evidence of out-group animus: 15-20% of participants in their study were less willing to accept a gift card from a company that gives PAC donations to the opposing party.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Panagopoulos et al. (2016)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 12
People dislike the other party in part because they inaccurately perceive it to be quite different from themselves and full of disliked groups.
“In essence, people dislike the other party in part because they (inaccurately) perceive it to be quite different from themselves and full of disliked groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
People tend to believe that economic outcomes are more favorable when their party is in the White House and more unfavorable when it is out.
“A seminal finding in political behavior research is that people tend to believe that economic outcomes (e.g., GDP growth, unemployment rate) are more favorable when their party is in the White House and more unfavorable when it is out (Bartels 2002).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bartels 2002 source
- Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11
When the typical American is asked about the composition of the parties, she tends to dramatically overreport the prevalence of partisan-stereotypical groups.
“Consequently, when the typical American is asked about the composition of the parties, she tends to dramatically overreport the prevalence of partisan-stereotypical groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ahler & Sood (2018) source
- Rests on an assumption: Most people think in terms of partisan stereotypes: Democrats are urban minorities and young people, Republicans are older, wealthy, or evangelical Christians.
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
The effects of copartisan seller interaction were even larger among strong partisans.
“The effects were even larger among strong partisans.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McConnell et al. (2018) source
- Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11
Respondents overestimate the prevalence of party-stereotypical groups by 342%.
“Looking across a range of party-stereotypical groups, Ahler & Sood (2018) find that respondents overestimate the prevalence of these groups by 342%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ahler & Sood (2018) source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11
When party control of Congress switches, consumer behavior changes along party lines in anticipation of changes in the economy.
“Gerber & Huber (2010) find that when party control of Congress switches, consumer behavior changes, and it changes along party lines, in anticipation of changes in the economy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gerber & Huber (2010)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
McConnell et al. (2018) mainly find evidence of in-group affinity as opposed to out-group prejudice.
“Unlike Gift & Gift (2015), they mainly find evidence of in-group affinity as opposed to out-group prejudice.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McConnell et al. (2018) source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11
After Democrats took over Congress in 2006, strong Democrats showed a 12.8% increase in holiday spending and a 30.5% increase in vacation spending relative to strong Republicans.
“After the Democrats took over Congress in 2006, strong Democrats showed a 12.8% increase in holiday spending and a 30.5% increase in vacation spending relative to strong Republicans.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gerber & Huber (2010)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
Revealed preferences concerning place of residence diverge from stated preferences.
“Mummolo & Nall (2017) show that revealed preferences concerning place of residence diverge from stated preferences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mummolo & Nall (2017) source
- Interpretationreasoning§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 13
Downplaying politics can help to mitigate partisan divisions.
“In an era of affective polarization, downplaying politics can help to mitigate partisan divisions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 14
Ideological polarization, sorting, and affective polarization are correlated.
“Recent work indicates that while ideological polarization, sorting, and affective polarization are correlated (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016, Bougher 2017, Webster & Abramowitz 2017), the relationship is weak, with sorting accounting for only about 5% of the variance in affective polarization (Lelkes 2018, Mason 2018a).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 13
Republicans assigned to the private website were 20 percentage points more likely to enroll in an insurance plan than Republicans assigned to the government website.
“Republicans assigned to the private website were 20 percentage points more likely to enroll in an insurance plan than Republicans assigned to the government website (see their figure 4 and the discussion on p. 764).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerman et al. (2017) source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11
Individuals' dislike for the opposing party encourages them to participate more in politics.
“Individuals' dislike for the opposing party encourages them to participate more in politics (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018 source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
The only significant differences occurred between the copartisan condition and the control group.
“The only significant differences occurred between the copartisan condition and the control group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McConnell et al. (2018) source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
Interacting with a copartisan seller nearly doubled the purchasing price of the gift card.
“However, interacting with a copartisan seller nearly doubled the purchasing price of the gift card.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McConnell et al. (2018) source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
People exhibited a willingness to accept lower compensation (by 6.5%) from a partisan-congruent employer.
“People exhibited a willingness to accept lower compensation (by 6.5%) from a partisan-congruent employer.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McConnell et al. (2018) source
- Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9
People are not moving for political reasons, largely because nonpolitical factors such as the quality of public schools dominate the decisions of Democrats and Republicans alike.
“mobility data suggest that people are not moving for political reasons, largely because nonpolitical factors-such as the quality of the public schools-dominate the decisions of Democrats and Republicans alike.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mummolo & Nall (2017) source
- Premisenone given§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
The correlation between vote choice and nonincentivized economic beliefs outstrips the correlation between vote choice and incentivized beliefs.
“Moreover, the correlation between vote choice and nonincentivized economic beliefs outstrips the correlation between vote choice and incentivized beliefs”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
Paying survey participants to be honest only results in an expensive version of cheap talk.
“suggesting that paying survey participants to be honest only results in an expensive version of cheap talk.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10
Perceptual biases about the economy seem most pronounced when the actual state of the economy is ambiguous.
“These perceptual biases seem most pronounced when the actual state of the economy is ambiguous (Healy & Malhotra 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Healy & Malhotra 2013 source
- Interpretationreasoning§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 15
Heightened polarization has altered the political context in important ways.
“There is a broad similarity between the current state of the Trump administration and the Watergate years, and yet, heightened polarization has altered the political context in important ways.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 14
Over the past 40 years, affective polarization as measured by feeling thermometer differences increased by about the same amount among those who held the most ideologically consistent issue positions as among those who held the least ideologically consistent issue positions.
“Furthermore, over the past 40 years, affective polarization-as measured by feeling thermometer differences-increased by about the same amount among those who held the most ideologically consistent issue positions as among those who held the least ideologically consistent issue positions (Lelkes 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lelkes 2018 source
- Interpretationreasoning§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 15
Partisanship now compromises the norms and standards we apply to our elected representatives.
“Partisanship appears to now compromise the norms and standards we apply to our elected representatives, and even leads partisans to call into question the legitimacy of election results, both of which threaten the very foundations of representative democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 15
Partisanship leads partisans to call into question the legitimacy of election results.
“Partisanship appears to now compromise the norms and standards we apply to our elected representatives, and even leads partisans to call into question the legitimacy of election results, both of which threaten the very foundations of representative democracy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 13
Political judgment is subject to a negativity bias.
“There is ample evidence that political judgment is subject to a negativity bias (Soroka 2014), implying that party polarization is driven by out-group hostility.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Soroka 2014 source
- Premisecitation§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 14
The relationship between ideological polarization, sorting, and affective polarization is weak, with sorting accounting for only about 5% of the variance in affective polarization.
“the relationship is weak, with sorting accounting for only about 5% of the variance in affective polarization (Lelkes 2018, Mason 2018a).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Lelkes 2018 source
- cites Mason 2018a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 15
There is a broad similarity between the current state of the Trump administration and the Watergate years.
“There is a broad similarity between the current state of the Trump administration and the Watergate years, and yet, heightened polarization has altered the political context in important ways.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- May combine two claims. 31
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 22
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11Republican and Democratic physicians give different advice to patients on politicized health issues such as abortion, but not on apolitical health topics.
“In medicine, Hersh & Goldenberg (2016) find that Republican and Democratic physicians give different advice to patients on politicized health issues such as abortion, but not on apolitical health topics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Hersh & Goldenberg (2016) source
The paper reports that Democratic and Republican primary care physicians recommended different treatment plans in survey vignettes about politicized issues, including abortion, but not in the other vignettes (opening summary). The claim overstates the finding as advice actually given to patients; the study measured physicians’ responses to hypothetical cases, not observed patient encounters. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 13Diverse social networks expose individuals to different political points of view and foster tolerance for opposing viewpoints, which should ameliorate affective polarization.
“This is also related to a long tradition of work showing that diverse social networks-which expose individuals to different political points of view-foster tolerance for opposing viewpoints, which should also ameliorate affective polarization (Mutz 2002).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Mutz 2002 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 13In some situations, partisan bias is prompted more by in-group love.
“However, there is also evidence that in some situations, partisan bias is prompted more by in-group love (Lelkes & Westwood 2017).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Lelkes & Westwood 2017 source
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ Figure 1 · p. 4Affective polarization (the difference between mean in-party feeling and mean out-party feeling) shows a significant increase over time, mainly due to an increase in animus against the out-party.
“We also plot affective polarization ( gray line )-the difference between mean in-party feeling and mean out-party feeling-which shows a significant increase over time (Iyengar et al. 2012), mainly due to an increase in animus against the out-party.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. 2012 source
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ Figure 1 · p. 4In-party feeling has remained high over the period plotted, though it has decreased slightly in recent years.
“In-party feeling ( green line ) has remained high over the period plotted, though it has decreased slightly in recent years.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 3Our conceptualization of polarization as rooted in affect and identity stands in contrast to a long tradition in political science of studying polarization as the difference between the policy positions of Democrats and Republicans.
“Our conceptualization of polarization as rooted in affect and identity stands in contrast to a long tradition in political science of studying polarization as the difference between the policy positions of Democrats and Republicans”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fiorina et al. 2005
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Survey Self-Reports · p. 3The change in affective polarization is not that people like their own party more over time; rather, there is an increase in out-party animus, especially in recent years.
“It is particularly noteworthy that ( a ) the change is not that people like their own party more over time; rather, there is an increase in out-party animus, especially in recent years”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. 2012 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisereasoning§ Figure 1 · p. 4If partisanship is an important social identity in its own right, partisans should be averse to entering into close interpersonal relations with their opponents.
“If partisanship is an important social identity in its own right, partisans should be averse to entering into close interpersonal relations with their opponents.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 3Affective and ideological polarization are theoretically and empirically distinct concepts.
“they are theoretically and empirically distinct concepts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Abramowitz & Webster 2016 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Survey Self-Reports · p. 3The feeling thermometer was originally created as a 'neutrally worded means of eliciting responses to a wide variety of candidates'.
“The feeling thermometer was originally created as a 'neutrally worded means of eliciting responses to a wide variety of candidates'”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Weisberg & Rusk 1970 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ Survey Self-Reports · p. 3The most central survey item is the 'feeling thermometer' question from the American National Election Study (ANES) time series.
“While scholars have relied on several different survey items, the most central is the 'feeling thermometer' question from the American National Election Study (ANES) time series.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Survey Self-Reports · p. 3Survey self-reports are the most basic and widely used measure of affective polarization in the literature.
“Survey self-reports are the most basic and widely used measure of affective polarization in the literature.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY · p. 2In the United States, partisanship means identifying with the Democrat group or the Republican group.
“In the United States, partisanship means identifying with the Democrat group or the Republican group”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ Figure 1 · p. 4The finding may reflect the well-known association between politics and disagreement.
“Alternatively, the finding may reflect the well-known association between politics and disagreement; most people prefer to be in agreeable relationships.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Most people prefer to be in agreeable relationships.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Behavioral Measures · p. 5These results held even when the out-party candidate had a significantly higher grade point average (4.0 versus 3.5); the probability of a partisan selecting the more qualified out-party candidate was never above 30%.
“These results held even when the out-party candidate had a significantly higher grade point average (4.0 versus 3.5); the probability of a partisan selecting the more qualified out-party candidate was never above 30%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar & Westwood 2015 source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Implicit Measures · p. 5Implicit measures are known to be much harder to manipulate than explicit self-reports; they are therefore more valid and less susceptible to impression management.
“Implicit measures are known to be much harder to manipulate than explicit self-reports; they are therefore more valid and less susceptible to impression management (Boysen et al. 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Boysen et al. 2006 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9Residential sorting has not increased significantly over the past few decades when one analyzes party registration data instead of presidential vote returns.
“Klinkner (2004) challenged much of this data analysis by showing that residential sorting has not increased significantly over the past few decades when one analyzes party registration data instead of presidential vote returns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klinkner (2004) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9Selection rather than convergence over time explains spousal agreement.
“and that selection rather than convergence over time explains spousal agreement”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ Behavioral Measures · p. 6Feeling thermometers and social distance measures have been asked for long periods of time, allowing researchers to document changes over time.
“Despite the limitations of feeling thermometers and social distance measures, an advantage is that they have been asked for long periods of time, allowing researchers to document changes over time.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Behavioral Measures · p. 5In the scholarship study, there was little racial bias; whites preferred the African American applicant (55.8%).
“The results indicated little racial bias; whites, in fact, preferred the African American applicant (55.8%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar & Westwood 2015 source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Implicit Measures · p. 5Implicit bias is less pronounced than explicit bias as measured through survey questions; 91% of Republicans and 75% of Democrats in the same study explicitly evaluated their party more favorably.
“Interestingly, implicit bias is less pronounced than explicit bias as measured through survey questions; 91% of Republicans and 75% of Democrats in the same study explicitly evaluated their party more favorably.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar & Westwood 2015 source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Behavioral Measures · p. 579.2% of Democrats picked the Democratic applicant and 80% of Republicans picked the Republican applicant.
“But 79.2% of Democrats picked the Democratic applicant and 80% of Republicans picked the Republican applicant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar & Westwood 2015 source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9Analogous figures for dating pairs matched by level of education and religion are 10.6% and 50.0%, respectively.
“T o put that finding into context, analogous figures for dating pairs matched by level of education and religion are 10.6% and 50.0%, respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Huber & Malhotra (2017) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Figure 1 · p. 4If the desire for political agreement has increased, it would also indicate a rise in affective polarization.
“If this is the case, it would also indicate a rise in affective polarization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Implicit Measures · p. 5The difference in the D-score across the party divide was 0.50, while the corresponding difference in implicit racial bias across the racial divide was only 0.18.
“The difference in the D-score-the operational indicator of implicit bias-across the party divide was 0.50, while the corresponding difference in implicit racial bias across the racial divide was only 0.18 (see also Theodoridis 2017 for an application of implicit measures to the study of partisanship).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 8People may perceive copartisans to be more physically attractive.
“People may also perceive copartisans to be more physically attractive (Nicholson et al. 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nicholson et al. 2016 source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9About 64% of Democrats and 55% of Republicans say they have 'just a few' or 'no' close friends from the other political party.
“about 64% of Democrats and 55% of Republicans say they have 'just a few' or 'no' close friends who are from the other political party”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pew Research Center (2017)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Figure 1 · p. 4In 1960, only 4-5% were upset with their child marrying someone from the out party, but that figure had jumped to one-third of Democrats and one-half of Republicans by 2010.
“In 1960, only 4-5% were upset with their child marrying someone from the out party, but that figure had jumped to one-third of Democrats and one-half of Republicans by 2010 (Iyengar et al. 2012, pp. 416-18).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Iyengar et al. 2012 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ Behavioral Measures · p. 6Implicit and behavioral measures lack historical survey data.
“A major limitation of implicit and behavioral measures is the lack of historical survey data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 9Counties had become more politically homogeneous over time.
“Bishop (2009), who reported descriptive statistics showing that counties had become more politically homogeneous over time.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bishop (2009)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Behavioral Measures · p. 5Copartisans consistently receive a bonus while opposing partisans are subject to a financial penalty in economic games.
“Results show that copartisans consistently receive a bonus while opposing partisans are subject to a financial penalty.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11A county that moves from 50% Democratic to 65% Democratic undergoes an increase in consumption 0.9% higher following a Democratic presidential victory compared with a Republican presidential victory.
“Gerber & Huber (2009) used data from county tax receipts to estimate that a county that moves from 50% Democratic to 65% Democratic undergoes an increase in consumption 0.9% higher following a Democratic presidential victory compared with a Republican presidential victory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gerber & Huber (2009) source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 12When Ahler & Sood (2018) correct respondents' misperceptions, respondents think the other party is less extreme, and affective polarization decreases.
“When Ahler & Sood (2018) correct respondents' misperceptions, respondents think the other party is less extreme, and affective polarization decreases (i.e., they like the other party more).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ahler & Sood (2018) source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11Only about 11% of Democrats belong to a labor union, but the average American thought that 39% of Democrats were union members; 44% of Republicans had this perception along with 37% of Democrats.
“Only about 11% of Democrats belong to a labor union, but in a large national survey, the average American thought that 39% of Democrats were union members; 44% of Republicans had this perception along with 37% of Democrats.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ahler & Sood (2018) source
- Rests on an assumption: The modal member of both parties is a middle-aged, white, nonevangelical Christian.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11Affective polarization undermines trust on the part of the party that is out of power, and hence makes governing more complex.
“Hetherington & Rudolph (2015) show that affective polarization undermines trust on the part of the party that is out of power, and hence makes governing more complex.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hetherington & Rudolph (2015) source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10Ghanaian taxi drivers accept lower prices from copartisans and demand higher prices from counter-partisans.
“Michelitch's (2015) pioneering work in this area found that Ghanaian taxi drivers accept lower prices from copartisans and demand higher prices from counter-partisans.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Michelitch's (2015) source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 13Priming partisan ambivalence and using self-affirmation techniques fail to reduce partisan animus.
“For example, Levendusky (2018b) uses a population-based survey experiment to show that priming partisan ambivalence and using self-affirmation techniques-both of which have been shown to reduce similar biases in other contexts-fail to reduce partisan animus.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levendusky (2018b)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10McConnell et al. (2018) found no evidence of out-group animus; the purchasing rate remained stable across same-party and opposite-party sellers.
“The authors found no evidence of out-group animus; the purchasing rate remained stable across same-party and opposite-party sellers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McConnell et al. (2018) source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10In the Democratic county, Democratic resumes were 2.4 percentage points more likely to receive a callback than Republican resumes; in the Republican county, the partisan preference for Republican resumes was 5.6 percentage points.
“They find that in the Democratic county, Democratic resumes were 2.4 percentage points more likely to receive a callback than Republican resumes; the partisan preference for Republican resumes in the Republican county was 5.6 percentage points.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gift & Gift (2015) source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 11Only 2.2% of Republicans earn more than $250,000 per year, but the average citizen thought that 38% of Republicans earned that much.
“Likewise, while only 2.2% of Republicans earn more than $250,000 per year, the average citizen thought that 38% of Republicans earned that much.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ahler & Sood (2018) source
- Rests on an assumption: The modal member of both parties is a middle-aged, white, nonevangelical Christian.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10People performed lower-quality work and exhibited less effort for a partisan-congruent employer.
“At the same time, they performed lower-quality work and exhibited less effort.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McConnell et al. (2018) source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 12Subjects who had their American identity primed were 25% less likely to rate the other party at 0 degrees on a feeling thermometer scale, and 35% more likely to rate the other party at 50 degrees or higher.
“For example, in his experimental results, subjects who had had their American identity primed were 25% less likely to rate the other party at 0 degrees on a feeling thermometer scale, and 35% more likely to rate the other party at 50 degrees or higher; there are similar effects for ratings of various traits”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levendusky (2018a)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 12The website had no effect on the behavior of Democrats or Independents, but had an enormous effect on Republicans.
“While the website had no effect on the behavior of Democrats or Independents, it had an enormous effect on Republicans.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerman et al. (2017) source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION · p. 10Noncoethnic counter-partisans pay 16% more and noncoethnic copartisans 6% more in taxi fares than coethnic copartisans.
“Specifically, noncoethnic counter-partisans pay 16% more and noncoethnic copartisans 6% more in taxi fares than coethnic copartisans, suggesting an interaction between ethnicity and partisanship.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Michelitch's (2015) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 13Party polarization is driven by out-group hostility.
“implying that party polarization is driven by out-group hostility”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 13Social psychologists studying group conflict have generally concluded that in-group affection is the dominant force.
“Although social psychologists studying group conflict have generally concluded that in-group affection is the dominant force, the domain of politics might be distinctive.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 15Increasing affective polarization can have grave ramifications, especially during times of political turmoil.
“In conclusion, we note that increasing affective polarization can have grave ramifications, especially during times of political turmoil.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 13Contextual effects such as competition and threat alter the degree to which people punish opponents or reward team members.
“Social psychologists have suggested that contextual effects such as competition and threat alter the degree to which people punish opponents or reward team members (Brewer 1999).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brewer 1999 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 15These phenomena threaten the very foundations of representative democracy.
“Partisanship appears to now compromise the norms and standards we apply to our elected representatives, and even leads partisans to call into question the legitimacy of election results, both of which threaten the very foundations of representative democracy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS · p. 15The current pervasive drip of scandal touching on the Trump administration has done little to weaken President Trump's popularity among Republicans, who accuse the press and investigative bodies of partisan bias.
“In contrast, the current pervasive drip of scandal touching on the Trump administration has done little to weaken President Trump's popularity among Republicans, who accuse the press and investigative bodies of partisan bias (although see Montagnes et al. 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Montagnes et al. 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
The paper relies on this without support.
Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party's members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded.
“Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party's members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded”
The paper relies on this without support.
Democrats and Republicans are unwilling to socialize across party lines.
“they are unwilling to socialize across party lines”
The paper relies on this without support.
Political campaigns recur frequently and last for many months (or even years) in the contemporary United States.
“Second, political campaigns-the formal occasions for expressing one's partisan identity-recur frequently and last for many months (or even years) in the contemporary United States.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most people prefer to be in agreeable relationships.
“most people prefer to be in agreeable relationships.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The rhetoric and actions of political leaders demonstrate that hostility directed at the opposition is acceptable and often appropriate.
“If anything, the rhetoric and actions of political leaders demonstrate that hostility directed at the opposition is acceptable and often appropriate.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Implicit attitudes are weak predictors of relevant behaviors.
“Of course, one can also critique measures of implicit attitudes, especially on the grounds that they are weak predictors of relevant behaviors.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Partisanship is an important social identity in its own right.
“If partisanship is an important social identity in its own right, partisans should be averse to entering into close interpersonal relations with their opponents.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Partisanship increasingly signals core values and worldview.
“Since partisanship increasingly signals core values and worldview, it is unsurprising that partisanship is used to screen social partners.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The modal member of both parties is a middle-aged, white, nonevangelical Christian.
“The modal member of both parties is a middle-aged, white, nonevangelical Christian, but this is not the image most people carry around in their heads when they think about Democrats and Republicans.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most people think in terms of partisan stereotypes: Democrats are urban minorities and young people, Republicans are older, wealthy, or evangelical Christians.
“Instead, most people think in terms of partisan stereotypes: Democrats are urban minorities and young people, Republicans are older, wealthy, or evangelical Christians.”
The paper relies on this without support.
No research has identified ways in which affective polarization drives both elite and mass ideological polarization.
“Fourth, no research that we are aware of has identified ways in which affective polarization drives both elite and mass ideological polarization.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Comparativists have long recognized the importance of group identity to political behavior and attitudes, even if they have not used the language of social identity theory or affective polarization.
“Comparativists have long recognized the importance of group identity to political behavior and attitudes, even if they have not used the language of social identity theory or affective polarization.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In comparative research, scholars have customarily resorted to survey-based feeling thermometers.
“When it comes to comparative research, however, scholars have customarily resorted to survey-based feeling thermometers.”
From Affective Polarization in Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective (2023) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2019
The Survey Self-Reports section (p. 3) calls feeling thermometers the central, widely used survey measure of affective polarization. But its discussion centers on the American National Election Study; the paper does not establish that comparative researchers customarily use them. Its discussion of comparative politics (p. 14) does not address measurement practices. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAnother potential consequence of the spread of moral and emotional content online is increased polarization.
“Another potential consequence of the spread of moral and emotional content online is increased polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019).”
From Social Media and Morality. (2024) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2019
The ‘Origins and Causes of Affective Polarization’ section (pp. 6–7) describes hostile partisan content and says social networks can amplify polarizing messages. It supports online content as a potential contributor to polarization, but does not specifically identify the spread of moral and emotional content online as the contributor. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredEl consumo de medios proactitudinales no genera por sí solo y como causa primaria reacciones de hostilidad afectiva, sino que intensifica las actitudes e identidades que ya se encontraban latentes o atenuadas en el individuo.
“no parece acertado afirmar que el extendido consumo de medios proactitudinales genere, por sí solo y como causa primaria, reacciones de hostilidad afectiva, sino más bien lo que hace es intensificar las actitudes e identidades que ya se encontraban de forma latente o atenuada en el individuo (Iyengar et al., 2019;Levendusky, 2013).”
From Política, uso de medios y polarización afectiva en España (2024) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2019
En «Origins and Causes of Affective Polarization» (p. 7), el artículo cuestiona que los medios partidistas causen por sí mismos polarización afectiva y señala que su exposición vuelve aún más extremas las actitudes ya extremas. Sin embargo, dice que el mecanismo preciso no está claro; no establece que estos medios únicamente intensifiquen identidades latentes ni descarta que puedan generar hostilidad afectiva. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredFeeling thermometers have been asked for long periods of time, allowing researchers to document changes over time.
“Despite their limitations, feeling thermometers “have been asked for long periods of time, allowing researchers to document changes over time” (p. 134).”
From Affective Polarization in Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective (2023) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2019
Democrats and Republicans have developed increasingly hostile feelings toward each other (affective polarization).
“both groups have also developed increasingly hostile feelings toward each other (Iyengar et al., 2019).”
From Factual belief polarization between Democrats and Republicans: source or epiphenomenon of ideological and affective polarization? (2024) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2019
Affective polarization, which reflects dislike of people in the opposing political party as compared to one's own party, has most strikingly increased in the United States.
“Affective polarization, which reflects dislike of people in the opposing political party as compared to one’s own party, has most strikingly increased (43)”
From Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media (2021) · cites this paper as [43]
Existing studies have relied on various techniques to measure affective polarization.
“Existing studies have relied on various techniques to measure affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019, pp. 131–34).”
From Affective Polarization in Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective (2023) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2019
The terms 'affective polarization', 'partisan polarization', and 'partisan affective polarization' have often been used interchangeably in the literature.
“The terms “affective polarization” (Iyengar et al. 2019; Wagner 2021), “partisan polarization” (Stoker and Jennings 2008; Levendusky and Malhotra 2016), or “partisan affective polarization” (Robison and Moskowitz 2019; Stoetzer et al. 2022) have often been used interchangeably in the literature.”
From Affective Polarization in Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective (2023) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2019
Affective polarization has substantially increased in the twenty-first century.
“It is well documented that affective polarization has substantially increased in the twenty-first century (Iyengar et al., 2019).”
From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2019
Affective polarization occurs when members of different social groups or political parties hold strong positive or negative attitudes or feelings about the groups themselves, owing to in-party love and/or out-party animus.
“Finally, affective polarization (Fig. 1c) occurs when members of different social groups (or political parties) hold strong positive or negative attitudes (or feelings) about the groups themselves (not just their policy preferences49,79), owing to ‘in-party love’ and/or ‘out-party animus’80.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [49]
Evidence on the effects of selective exposure on affective polarization is mixed or sometimes inconclusive.
“la evidencia sobre sus efectos en la polarización afectiva es mixta o, en ocasiones, poco concluyente (Aelst et al., 2017;Iyengar et al., 2019).”
From Dieta mediática y polarización afectiva en un sistema mediático pluralista polarizado: un estudio longitudinal de España (2026) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2019
El análisis de los casos europeos y estadounidenses viene siendo abundante y predominante en la literatura sobre polarización afectiva.
“El análisis de los casos europeos y estadounidenses viene siendo abundante y predominante en la literatura sobre el tema (como Iyengar et al., 2019;o Garrido, Martínez y Mora, 2021).”
From “TE AMO, TE ODIO: DAME MÁS”*Polarización afectiva en la opinión pública argentina (2023) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2019
Democrats and Republicans have negative feelings toward one another and positive sentiments toward co-partisans.
“In Experiments 2 and 3, we leveraged Democrats’ and Republicans’ negative feelings toward one another and positive sentiments toward co-partisans (Iyengar et al., 2019) to assess the role of affect in attributions of bias within a polarized group context.”
From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2019
Rising partisan antipathy, or affective polarization, mirrors these attitudes.
“These attitudes are mirrored in rising partisan antipathy; dislike toward members of the opposing ideology—a phenomenon known as “affective polarization” (3, 4, 5).”
From Troll and divide: the language of online polarization (2022) · cites this paper as [5]
Scholars have made a conceptual distinction between issue polarization (an ideological, policy-based political divide) and affective polarization (dislike, distrust, and general animosity of political partisans toward the other political side).
“Scholars have made the conceptual distinction between issue polarization—an ideological, policy-based political divide, and affective polarization, i.e. dislike, distrust, and general animosity of political partisans toward the other political side (5, 61, 62).”
From Troll and divide: the language of online polarization (2022) · cites this paper as [5]
There is evidence of growing polarization and partisan antipathy in the American public.
“Given the evidence on the growing polarization and partisan antipathy in the American public (5)”
From Troll and divide: the language of online polarization (2022) · cites this paper as [5]
Cites
The Social psychology of intergroup relations
Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 11,577 · see citing works
The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time
Brewer, M. B. (1991) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167291175001 · Cited by 5,107 · see citing works
(1978) · Cited by 5,009 · see citing works
The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?
Brewer, M. B. (1999) · Journal of Social Issues · doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00126 · Cited by 3,494 · see citing works
Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook
Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaa1160 · Cited by 3,245 · see citing works
Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross National Perspectives
Birnbaum, P., Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1968) · Revue Française de Sociologie · doi:10.2307/3320570 · Cited by 2,818 · see citing works
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfs038 · Cited by 2,748 · cited 7× · see citing works
“In 1960, only 4–5% were upset with their child marrying someone from the out party, but that figure had jumped to one-third of Democrats and one-half of Republicans by 2010 (Iyengar et al. 2012, pp. 416–18).”
InfluentialSelf-citationFear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization
Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12152 · Cited by 2,452 · see citing works
Self-citationGreenstein, F. I., & Polsby, N. W. (1975) · Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc. eBooks · Cited by 2,306 · see citing works
A Social Identity Theory of Leadership
Hogg, M. A. (2001) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0503_1 · Cited by 2,298 · see citing works
Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity
Mason, L. (2018) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226524689.001.0001 · Cited by 1,985 · see citing works
Polarized America: the dance of ideology and unequal riches
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-3551 · Cited by 1,793 · see citing works
The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans
Levendusky, M. (2009) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226473673.001.0001 · Cited by 1,698 · see citing works
Self-citationRoccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0602_01 · Cited by 1,696 · see citing works
(2004) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,673 · see citing works
The common ingroup identity model: recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias.
Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993) · European Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/14792779343000004 · Cited by 1,559 · see citing works
Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions
Bartels, L. M. (2002) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1023/a:1021226224601 · Cited by 1,468 · see citing works
Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity
HUDDY, L., MASON, L., & AARØE, L. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000604 · Cited by 1,415 · see citing works
Mason, L. (2015) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12089 · Cited by 1,367 · see citing works
Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure
Stroud, N. J. (2010) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x · Cited by 1,346 · see citing works
Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608080493 · Cited by 1,308 · see citing works
Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour
Billig, M., & Tajfel, H. (1973) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420030103 · Cited by 1,283 · see citing works
The big sort: why the clustering of like-minded America is tearing us apart
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-2303 · Cited by 1,171 · see citing works
Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice
MUTZ, D. C. (2002) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055402004264 · Cited by 1,069 · see citing works
Ideological Segregation Online and Offline *
Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr044 · Cited by 980 · see citing works
The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century
Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. (2016) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.001 · Cited by 978 · see citing works
Stroud, N. J. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755509.001.0001 · Cited by 950 · see citing works
When Groups Meet: The Dynamics of Intergroup Contact
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2011) · Cited by 715 · see citing works
Partisan bias in factual beliefs about politics
Bullock, J. G., Gerber, A. S., Hill, S. J., & Huber, G. A. (2015) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00014074 · Cited by 686 · see citing works
Retrospective Voting Reconsidered
Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212920 · Cited by 667 · see citing works
Self-citationPolitical homophily in social relationships: evidence from online dating behavior
Huber, G. A., & Malhotra, N. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/687533 · Cited by 664 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Parties in Our Heads: Misperceptions about Party Composition and Their Consequences
Ahler, D. J., & Sood, G. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/697253 · Cited by 586 · see citing works
The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. Electorate
Webster, S. W., & Abramowitz, A. I. (2017) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x17703132 · Cited by 557 · see citing works
Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities
Mason, L. (2018) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfy005 · Cited by 550 · see citing works
The Strengthening of Partisan Affect
Iyengar, S., & Krupenkin, M. (2018) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12487 · Cited by 527 · see citing works
Self-citationHow Ideology Fuels Affective Polarization
Rogowski, J. C., & Sutherland, J. L. (2016) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-015-9323-7 · Cited by 503 · see citing works
Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?
Levendusky, M. S. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/693987 · Cited by 492 · see citing works
Self-citationWhy Washington Won't Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the Governing Crisis
Hetherington, M. J., & Rudolph, T. J. (2015) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226299358.001.0001 · Cited by 486 · see citing works
The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect
Lelkes, Y., Sood, G., & Iyengar, S. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12237 · Cited by 476 · see citing works
Self-citationBoxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1706588114 · Cited by 467 · see citing works
Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign
Lee, F. E. (2016) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226409184.001.0001 · Cited by 456 · see citing works
Changing Minds or Changing Channels?: Partisan News in an Age of Choice
Arceneaux, K., & Johnson, M. (2013) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226047447.001.0001 · Cited by 450 · see citing works
The Economic Consequences of Partisanship in a Polarized Era
McConnell, C., Margalit, Y., Malhotra, N., & Levendusky, M. (2018) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12330 · Cited by 432 · see citing works
Self-citationDoes Media Coverage of Partisan Polarization Affect Political Attitudes?
Levendusky, M., & Malhotra, N. (2016) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2015.1038455 · Cited by 419 · see citing works
Self-citationPrior, M., Sood, G., & Khanna, K. (2015) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00014127 · Cited by 418 · see citing works
Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings
Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. A., & Pope, J. C. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s002238160808050x · Cited by 414 · see citing works
Life-Cycle Transitions and Political Participation: The Case of Marriage
Stoker, L., & Jennings, M. K. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082435 · Cited by 370 · see citing works
(Mis)perceptions of Partisan Polarization in the American Public
Levendusky, M. S., & Malhotra, N. (2016) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfv045 · Cited by 356 · see citing works
Self-citationGarrett, R. K., Gvirsman, S. D., Johnson, B. K., Tsfati, Y., Neo, R., & Dal, A. (2014) · Human Communication Research · doi:10.1111/hcre.12028 · Cited by 351 · see citing works
Negativity in Democratic Politics: Causes and Consequences
Soroka, S. N. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107477971 · Cited by 350 · see citing works
The tie that divides: Cross‐national evidence of the primacy of partyism
Westwood, S. J., Iyengar, S., Walgrave, S., Leonisio, R., Miller, L., & Strijbis, O. (2017) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12228 · Cited by 347 · see citing works
Self-citationThe effect of partisanship and political advertising on close family ties
Chen, M. K., & Rohla, R. (2018) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaq1433 · Cited by 321 · see citing works
Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments
Gerber, A. S., & Huber, G. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00424.x · Cited by 313 · see citing works
The Limits of Partisan Prejudice
Lelkes, Y., & Westwood, S. J. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/688223 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
Self-citationDoes Politics Influence Hiring? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment
Gift, K., & Gift, T. (2015) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-014-9286-0 · Cited by 293 · see citing works
No Need to Watch: How the Effects of Partisan Media Can Spread via Interpersonal Discussions
Druckman, J. N., Levendusky, M. S., & McLain, A. (2018) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12325 · Cited by 291 · see citing works
Self-citationNewspaper Coverage of Political Scandals
Puglisi, R., & Snyder, J. M. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381611000569 · Cited by 271 · see citing works
Why Partisans Do Not Sort: The Constraints on Political Segregation
Mummolo, J., & Nall, C. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/687569 · Cited by 269 · see citing works
Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation
Weisberg, H. F., & Rusk, J. G. (1970) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958364 · Cited by 255 · see citing works
The Home as a Political Fortress: Family Agreement in an Era of Polarization
Iyengar, S., Konitzer, T., & Tedin, K. L. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/698929 · Cited by 254 · see citing works
Self-citationGERBER, A. S., & HUBER, G. A. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990098 · Cited by 236 · see citing works
Partisan Media Exposure and Attitudes Toward the Opposition
Levendusky, M. (2013) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2012.737435 · Cited by 236 · see citing works
Self-citationLebo, M. J., & Cassino, D. (2007) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00601.x · Cited by 233 · see citing works
The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility
Berry, J., & Sobieraj, S. (2013) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.186974 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
Gimpel, J. G., & Hui, I. S. (2015) · Political Geography · doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.11.003 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
Affective Polarization or Partisan Disdain?
Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., & Ryan, J. B. (2018) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfy014 · Cited by 224 · see citing works
Berinsky, A. J. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/694258 · Cited by 217 · see citing works
The Politics of Beauty: The Effects of Partisan Bias on Physical Attractiveness
Nicholson, S. P., Coe, C. M., Emory, J., & Song, A. V. (2016) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-016-9339-7 · Cited by 210 · see citing works
MICHELITCH, K. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000628 · Cited by 186 · see citing works
The Correlates of Discord: Identity, Issue Alignment, and Political Hostility in Polarized America
Bougher, L. D. (2017) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-016-9377-1 · Cited by 179 · see citing works
Policy Uptake as Political Behavior: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act
LERMAN, A. E., SADIN, M. L., & TRACHTMAN, S. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000272 · Cited by 178 · see citing works
Self-Fulfilling Misperceptions of Public Polarization
Ahler, D. J. (2014) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381614000085 · Cited by 168 · see citing works
Democratic and Republican physicians provide different care on politicized health issues
Hersh, E. D., & Goldenberg, M. N. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1606609113 · Cited by 165 · see citing works
Partisan Interactions: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the United States
Perez-Truglia, R., & Cruces, G. (2017) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/692711 · Cited by 146 · see citing works
The Dating Preferences of Liberals and Conservatives
Klofstad, C. A., McDermott, R., & Hatemi, P. K. (2013) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-012-9207-z · Cited by 136 · see citing works
Political Competition, Partisanship and Interpersonal Trust in Electoral Democracies
Carlin, R. E., & Love, G. J. (2016) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123415000526 · Cited by 134 · see citing works
The politics of interpersonal trust and reciprocity: An experimental approach
Carlin, R. E., & Love, G. J. (2013) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-011-9181-x · Cited by 132 · see citing works
Affective Polarization and Ideological Sorting: A Reciprocal, Albeit Weak, Relationship
Lelkes, Y. (2018) · The Forum · doi:10.1515/for-2018-0005 · Cited by 132 · see citing works
Self-citationElectoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship: Global Evidence from Eighty-Six Countries
Michelitch, K. G., & Utych, S. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/694783 · Cited by 124 · see citing works
Economic Behavior and the Partisan Perceptual Screen
McGrath, M. C. (2017) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00015100 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
Theodoridis, A. G. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/692738 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
Coming to Dislike Your Opponents: The Polarizing Impact of Political CampaignsPreprint
Sood, G., & Iyengar, S. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2840225 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
Self-citationIdeological Segregation Online and Offline
Gentzkow, M. A., & Shapiro, J. M. (2010) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w15916 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Mixed partisan households and electoral participation in the United States
Hersh, E. D., & Ghitza, Y. (2018) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0203997 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
A public versus private administration of the implicit association test
Boysen, G. A., Vogel, D. L., & Madon, S. (2006) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.318 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
When Efforts to Depolarize the Electorate Fail
Levendusky, M. S. (2018) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfy036 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
Self-citationIdeological Fit Enhances Interpersonal Orientations
Chopik, W. J., & Motyl, M. S. (2016) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550616658096 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Red and Blue Scare: The Continuing Diversity of the American Electoral Landscape
Klinkner, P. A. (2004) · The Forum · doi:10.2202/1540-8884.1035 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
How Do Indifferent Voters Decide? The Political Importance of Implicit Attitudes
Ryan, T. J. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12307 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-5486
Cleavages, parties and democracy
Lipset, S. M. (n.d.) · Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited · doi:10.4324/9780203469323_chapter_1
Ideological Fit Enhances Interpersonal Orientations
Chopik, W. J., & Motyl, M. (2017) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/c5eru
Erratum to: Does Politics Influence Hiring? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment
Gift, K., & Gift, T. (2015) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-015-9314-8
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- Klinkner P, 2004, Forum, 2
- Lelkes Y, 2018, Forum, 16
- Maccoby EE, 1954, Handb. Soc. Psychol., 1, 449
- Montagnes BP, 2018, J. Politics, 81, 327
- Nelson R. 2015. The war on partisanship: how fighting polarization became its own cause. National Journal, Oct. 30. https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/91684/war-partisanship?mref=home
- Panagopoulos C, 2016, Risky business: Does corporate political giving affect consumer behavior?
- Pew Research Center., 2017, The partisan divide on political values grows even wider
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response
Bavel, J. J. V., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N., et al. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z · Cited by 4,964 · see citing works
Allcott, H., Boxell, L., Conway, J., Gentzkow, M., Thaler, M., & Yang, D. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104254 · Cited by 999 · see citing works
GRAHAM, M. H., & SVOLIK, M. W. (2020) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055420000052 · Cited by 1,044 · see citing works
Political Sectarianism in America
Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., Mason, L., McGrath, M. C., Nyhan, B., Rand, D. G., et al. (2020) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.abe1715 · Cited by 931 · see citing works
Self-citationSocial Media, News Consumption, and Polarization: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Levy, R. (2021) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20191777 · Cited by 624 · see citing works
What do we measure when we measure affective polarization?
Druckman, J. N., & Levendusky, M. S. (2019) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfz003 · Cited by 615 · see citing works
Self-citationAffective Polarization in Multiparty Systems
Wagner, M. (2021) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102199 · Cited by 593 · see citing works
Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media
Rathje, S., Van Bavel, J. J., & van der Linden, S. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2024292118 · Cited by 560 · see citing works
Grossman, G., Kim, S., Rexer, J. M., & Thirumurthy, H. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2007835117 · Cited by 564 · see citing works
Divided by the vote: Affective polarization in the wake of the Brexit referendum
Hobolt, S. B., Leeper, T. J., & Tilley, J. (2021) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123420000125 · Cited by 496 · see citing works
American Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective
Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108914123 · Cited by 481 · see citing works
Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-01012-5 · Cited by 463 · see citing works
Self-citationHow affective polarization undermines support for democratic norms
Kingzette, J., Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2021) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfab029 · Cited by 401 · see citing works
Self-citationAllcott, H., Boxell, L., Conway, J., Gentzkow, M. A., Thaler, M., & Yang, D. (2020) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w26946 · Cited by 406 · see citing works
Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization
Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. (2020) · doi:10.3386/w26669 · Cited by 359 · see citing works
Political polarization on COVID-19 pandemic response in the United States
Kerr, J. R., Panagopoulos, C., & van der Linden, S. (2021) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2021.110892 · Cited by 370 · see citing works
Kitchens, B., Johnson, S. L., & Gray, P. (2020) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2020/16371 · Cited by 376 · see citing works
A systematic review of worldwide causal and correlational evidence on digital media and democracy
Lorenz-Spreen, P., Oswald, L., Lewandowsky, S., & Hertwig, R. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-022-01460-1 · Cited by 348 · see citing works
“Participation political (78), general (29), voting (21), civic engagement (13), protest participation (13), .”
BackgroundLike-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing
Nyhan, B., Settle, J., Thorson, E., Wojcieszak, M., Barberá, P., Chen, A. Y., Allcott, H., Brown, T., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Dimmery, D., et al. (2023) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-023-06297-w · Cited by 333 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Nature of Affective Polarization: Disentangling Policy Disagreement from Partisan Identity
Dias, N., & Lelkes, Y. (2022) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12628 · Cited by 338 · see citing works
Self-citationPolitical Beliefs affect Compliance with COVID-19 Social Distancing OrdersPreprint
Painter, M., & Qiu, T. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3569098 · Cited by 322 · see citing works
Goldenberg, A., & Gross, J. J. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.01.009 · Cited by 321 · see citing works
Poverty and economic dislocation reduce compliance with COVID-19 shelter-in-place protocols
Wright, A. L., Сонин, К. И., Driscoll, J., & Wilson, J. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.008 · Cited by 297 · see citing works
Exaggerated meta-perceptions predict intergroup hostility between American political partisans
Moore-Berg, S. L., Ankori-Karlinsky, L.-O., Hameiri, B., & Bruneau, E. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2001263117 · Cited by 281 · see citing works
Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5 · Cited by 276 · see citing works
Is Deliberation an Antidote to Extreme Partisan Polarization? Reflections on “America in One Room”
Fishkin, J. S., Siu, A., Diamond, L. J., & Bradburn, N. M. (2021) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055421000642 · Cited by 277 · see citing works
Partisanship as a Social Identity: Implications for Polarization
West, E. A., & Iyengar, S. (2020) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-020-09637-y · Cited by 265 · see citing works
Self-citationDoes affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? Maybe not
Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L., & Westwood, S. J. (2023) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12719 · Cited by 297 · see citing works
Self-citationInterventions reducing affective polarization do not necessarily improve anti-democratic attitudes
Voelkel, J. G., Chu, J., Stagnaro, M. N., Mernyk, J. S., Redekopp, C., Pink, S. L., Druckman, J. N., Rand, D. G., & Willer, R. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-022-01466-9 · Cited by 255 · see citing works
Why do so few people share fake news? It hurts their reputation
Altay, S., Hacquin, A.-S., & Mercier, H. (2020) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/1461444820969893 · Cited by 244 · see citing works
(Mis)estimating Affective Polarization
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2022) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/715603 · Cited by 243 · see citing works
Self-citationWojcieszak, M., & Warner, B. R. (2020) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2020.1760406 · Cited by 232 · see citing works
The Effects of Unsubstantiated Claims of Voter Fraud on Confidence in Elections
Berlinski, N., Doyle, M., Guess, A., Levy, G., Lyons, B. A., Montgomery, J., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2021) · Journal of Experimental Political Science · doi:10.1017/xps.2021.18 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
Polarization in the contemporary political and media landscape
Wilson, A. E., Parker, V. A., & Feinberg, M. (2020) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.07.005 · Cited by 220 · see citing works
Pernicious polarization, autocratization and opposition strategies
Somer, M., McCoy, J. L., & Luke, R. E. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1865316 · Cited by 220 · see citing works
Current research overstates American support for political violence
Westwood, S. J., Grimmer, J., Tyler, M., & Nall, C. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2116870119 · Cited by 221 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Policy Basis of Measured Partisan Animosity in the United States
Orr, L., & Huber, G. A. (2019) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12498 · Cited by 208 · see citing works
Behavioral Economics of Accounting: A Review of Archival Research on Individual Decision Makers
Hanlon, M., Yeung, K., & Zuo, L. (2021) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12739 · Cited by 240 · see citing works
Link recommendation algorithms and dynamics of polarization in online social networks
Santos, F. P., Yphtach Lelkes, B., & Levin, S. A. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2102141118 · Cited by 216 · see citing works
Self-citationCultural Psychology: Beyond East and West
Kitayama, S., & Salvador, C. E. (2023) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-021723-063333 · Cited by 229 · see citing works
Bitcoin: A safe haven asset and a winner amid political and economic uncertainties in the US?
Umar, M., Su, C., Rizvi, S. K. A., & Shao, X. (2021) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2021.120680 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
The Bolsonaro Voter: Issue Positions and Vote Choice in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections
Rennó, L. R. (2020) · Latin American Politics and Society · doi:10.1017/lap.2020.13 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M. S., & Ryan, J. B. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Political Science · doi:10.1017/xps.2020.28 · Cited by 195 · see citing works
Self-citationThe “Need for Chaos” and Motivations to Share Hostile Political Rumors
PETERSEN, M. B., OSMUNDSEN, M., & ARCENEAUX, K. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422001447 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
Synthetic Replacements for Human Survey Data? The Perils of Large Language Models
Bisbee, J., Clinton, J. D., Dorff, C., Kenkel, B., & Larson, J. M. (2024) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1017/pan.2024.5 · Cited by 209 · see citing works
Fragmented foes: Affective polarization in the multiparty context of The Netherlands
Harteveld, E. (2021) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102332 · Cited by 179 · see citing works
Pandemic politics: policy evaluations of government responses to COVID-19
Altiparmakis, A., Bojár, Á., Brouard, S., Foucault, M., Kriesi, H., & Nadeau, R. (2021) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1930754 · Cited by 179 · see citing works
Megastudy testing 25 treatments to reduce antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity
Voelkel, J. G., Stagnaro, M., Chu, J., Pink, S. L., Mernyk, J. S., Redekopp, C., Ghezae, I., Cashman, M., Adjodah, D., Allen, L., et al. (2023) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/y79u5 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
Self-citationKrupnikov, Y., & Ryan, J. B. (2022) · doi:10.1017/9781108923323 · Cited by 175 · see citing works
Affective polarization and the salience of elections
Hernández, E., Anduiza, E., & Rico, G. (2020) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102203 · Cited by 182 · see citing works
Examining the consumption of radical content on YouTube
Hosseinmardi, H., Ghasemian, A., Clauset, A., Mobius, M., Rothschild, D. M., & Watts, D. J. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2101967118 · Cited by 171 · see citing works
Megastudy testing 25 treatments to reduce antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity
Voelkel, J. G., Stagnaro, M. N., Chu, J. Y., Pink, S. L., Mernyk, J. S., Redekopp, C., Ghezae, I., Cashman, M., Adjodah, D., Allen, L. G., et al. (2024) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.adh4764 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
Self-citationAffective Polarization and the Populist Radical Right: Creating the Hating?
Harteveld, E., Mendoza, P., & Rooduijn, M. (2021) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1017/gov.2021.31 · Cited by 172 · see citing works
RETRACTED: Global impacts of pre- and post-COVID-19 pandemic: Focus on socio-economic consequences
Mishra, N. T. P., Das, S. S., Yadav, S., Khan, W., Afzal, M. F., AlArifi, A. S., Kenawy, E.-R., Ansari, M. T., Hasnain, M. S., & Nayak, A. K. (2020) · Sensors International · doi:10.1016/j.sintl.2020.100042 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
RetractedWho Dislikes Whom? Affective Polarization between Pairs of Parties in Western Democracies
Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2022) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123422000394 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Partisan selective exposure in online news consumption: evidence from the 2016 presidential campaign
Peterson, E., Goel, S., & Iyengar, S. (2019) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.55 · Cited by 156 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152 · see citing works
A review and provocation: On polarization and platforms
Kreiss, D., & McGregor, S. C. (2024) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/14614448231161880 · Cited by 151 · see citing works
Interventions to reduce partisan animosity
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., Womick, J., Bail, C., Finkel, E. J., Han, H., Sarrouf, J., Schroeder, J., Sheeran, P., Van Bavel, J. J., et al. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-022-01442-3 · Cited by 171 · see citing works
Flores, A., Cole, J. C., Dickert, S., Eom, K., Jiga‐Boy, G. M., Kogut, T., Loria, R. N., Mayorga, M. W., Pedersen, E. J., Pereira, B. D. C. S., et al. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2117543119 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
Political beliefs affect compliance with government mandates
Painter, M., & Qiu, T. (2021) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.019 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Carlson, M., Robinson, S., & Lewis, S. C. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197550342.001.0001 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
College and the “Culture War”: Assessing Higher Education’s Influence on Moral Attitudes
Broćić, M., & Miles, A. (2021) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/00031224211041094 · Cited by 141 · see citing works
Polarization in America: two possible futures
Heltzel, G., & Laurin, K. (2020) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.03.008 · Cited by 152 · see citing works
Affective Polarization in Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective
Garzia, D., Ferreira da Silva, F., & Maye, S. (2023) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfad004 · Cited by 137 · see citing works
“The terms “affective polarization” (Iyengar et al. 2019; Wagner 2021), “partisan polarization” (Stoker and Jennings 2008; Levendusky and Malhotra 2016), or “partisan affective polarization” (Robison and Moskowitz 2019; Stoetzer et al.”
BackgroundAmerican Religion in the Era of Increasing Polarization
Perry, S. L. (2022) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-031021-114239 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
Preventing extreme polarization of political attitudes
Axelrod, R., Daymude, J. J., & Forrest, S. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2102139118 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
Santoro, E., & Broockman, D. E. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abn5515 · Cited by 126 · see citing works
Motivated Reasoning, Public Opinion, and Presidential Approval
Donovan, K. M., Kellstedt, P. M., Key, E. M., & Lebo, M. J. (2020) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-019-09539-8 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
Reducing affective polarization: Warm group relations or policy compromise?
Huddy, L., & Yair, O. (2021) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12699 · Cited by 124 · see citing works
Discriminatory attitudes against unvaccinated people during the pandemic
Bor, A., Jørgensen, F. J., & Petersen, M. B. (2022) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-022-05607-y · Cited by 125 · see citing works
Shared partisanship dramatically increases social tie formation in a Twitter field experiment
Mosleh, M., Martel, C., Eckles, D., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2022761118 · Cited by 123 · see citing works
“For example, Americans tend to distrust and dislike those from the opposing political party and often report that they are unwilling to be friends with members of the opposing party (2).”
BackgroundWhy voters who value democracy participate in democratic backsliding
Braley, A., Lenz, G. S., Adjodah, D., Rahnama, H., & Pentland, A. (2023) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-023-01594-w · Cited by 138 · see citing works
Goldstein, D., & Wiedemann, J. (2021) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592721000049 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
The partisan nature of support for democratic backsliding: A comparative perspective
Gidengil, E., Stolle, D., & Bergeron‐Boutin, O. (2022) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12502 · Cited by 162 · see citing works
Ideology, Not Affect: What Americans Want from Political Representation
Costa, M. (2021) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12571 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Ticking all the boxes? A comparative study of social sorting and affective polarization
Harteveld, E. (2021) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102337 · Cited by 120 · see citing works
Emotion and Reason in Political Language
Gennaro, G., & Ash, E. (2021) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1093/ej/ueab104 · Cited by 120 · see citing works
Harel, T. O., Jameson, J. K., & Maoz, I. (2020) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/2056305120913983 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Compromise in an Age of Party Polarization
Wolak, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197510490.001.0001 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
Modeling the emergence of affective polarization in the social media society
Törnberg, P., Andersson, C., Lindgren, K., & Banisch, S. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0258259 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Schöne, J. P., Parkinson, B., & Goldenberg, A. (2021) · Affective Science · doi:10.1007/s42761-021-00057-7 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
Van Bavel, J. J., Robertson, C. E., del Rosario, K., Rasmussen, J., & Rathje, S. (2024) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-022123-110258 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Flamino, J., Galeazzi, A., Feldman, S., Macy, M. W., Cross, B., Zhou, Z., Serafino, M., Bovet, A., Makse, H. A., & Szymanski, B. K. (2023) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-023-01550-8 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
Understanding and combating misperceived polarization
Lees, J., & Cikara, M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0143 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
Algorithmic Political Bias in Artificial Intelligence Systems
Peters, U. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00512-8 · Cited by 111 · see citing works
Allen, J., Martel, C., & Rand, D. (2021) · International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3491102.3502040 · Cited by 149 · see citing works
Emotion and Politics: Noncognitive Psychological Biases in Public Opinion
Webster, S. W., & Albertson, B. L. (2022) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-105353 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
Who Wants to Make America Great Again? Understanding Evangelical Support for Donald Trump
Margolis, M. F. (2019) · Politics and Religion · doi:10.1017/s1755048319000208 · Cited by 109 · see citing works
The Inseparability of Race and Partisanship in the United States
Westwood, S. J., & Peterson, E. (2022) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-020-09648-9 · Cited by 108 · see citing works
Self-citationWeber, T. J., Hydock, C., Ding, W., Gardner, M., Jacob, P., Mandel, N., Sprott, D. E., & Steenburg, E. V. (2021) · Journal of Public Policy & Marketing · doi:10.1177/0743915621991103 · Cited by 116 · see citing works
Knudsen, E. (2021) · Scandinavian Political Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12186 · Cited by 106 · see citing works
False polarization: Cognitive mechanisms and potential solutions
Fernbach, P. M., & Van Boven, L. (2022) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.06.005 · Cited by 107 · see citing works
Worldview conflict and prejudice
Brandt, M. J., & Crawford, J. T. (2019) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2019.09.002 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
Fowler, A., Hill, S. J., Lewis, J. B., Tausanovitch, C., Vavreck, L., & Warshaw, C. (2022) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422000818 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
The Fault Lines of Leadership: Lessons from the Global Covid-19 Crisis
Maak, T., Pless, N. M., & Wohlgezogen, F. (2021) · Journal of Change Management · doi:10.1080/14697017.2021.1861724 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
Hate Trumps Love: The Impact of Political Polarization on Social Preferences
Dimant, E. (2023) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4701 · Cited by 112 · see citing works
Bursztyn, L., & Yang, D. Y. (2022) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-023322 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
Nordbrandt, M. (2023) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/14614448211044393 · Cited by 112 · see citing works
Polarization and tipping points
Macy, M. W., Ma, M., Tabin, D. R., Gao, J., & Szymanski, B. K. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2102144118 · Cited by 102 · see citing works
- Authors
- Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Dartmouth College (US)
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2019-05-11
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 129-146
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W2904152473
- Semantic Scholar
- 35266513e601aed2e2707e9263b2ccd466644b60
- Cited by
- 3,317
- References
- 88
- Citations by year
- 2026: 463 · 2025: 660 · 2024: 518 · 2023: 555 · 2022: 445 · 2021: 393 · 2020: 216 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 230.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Annual Review of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Cultural Dynamics
- Keywords
- affective polarization, partisanship, partisan animosity, social identity, partisan affect, Democrats and Republicans
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-13.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-13.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
