Rationality and social norms
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
One of the most persisting cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Émile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. The former is ‘pulled’ by the prospect of future rewards, whereas the latter is ‘pushed’ from behind by quasi-inertial forces (Gambetta 1987). The former adapts to changing circumstances, always on the lookout for improvements. The latter is insensitive to circumstances, adhering to the prescribed behavior even if new and apparently better options become available. The former is easily caricatured as a self-contained, asocial atom, and the latter as the mindless plaything of social forces. In this paper I characterize this contrast more fully, and discuss attempts to reduce norm-oriented action to some type of optimizing behavior.
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Citations
Cites
Fairness and the assumptions of economics
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296367 · Cited by 2,463
A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
Akerlof, G. A. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885667 · Cited by 1,648
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality
Elster, J. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171694 · Cited by 1,577
Self-citation
Cited by
EXPLAINING EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS: TOWARDS A FORMAL RATIONAL ACTION THEORY
Breen, R., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (1997) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/104346397009003002 · Cited by 1,644
Social Traps and the Problem of Trust
Rothstein, B. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490323 · Cited by 929
Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology
Hedstrom, P. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511488801 · Cited by 816
(2005) · Cited by 772
Neyer, G., Hoem, J. M., & Andersson, G. (2017) · Demographic Research Monographs · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44667-7_9 · Cited by 31
“This process may be expected to result in a concentration of women who want to have children in specific educational and occupational fields, which may in turn promote a social environment and social norms which support childrearing (Elster 1991).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Elster, J.
- Venue
- European Journal of Sociology
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-05
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 109-129
- ISSN
- 0003-9756 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0583
- OpenAlex
- W2135255093
- Cited by
- 98
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 3.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Elster, J. (1991). Rationality and social norms. European Journal of Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003975600006172
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.