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Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model
Abstract
This article forms part of a longer-term project dealing with the impact of public choice theories in political science. The focus here is on economic models of bureaucracy, which despite their increasing theoretical significance and influence on practical politics have heretofore been little analysed, except by their exponents. I have argued elsewhere that amongst existing public choice accounts there are two seminal works, Antony Downs's pluralist treatment in Inside Bureaucracy and William Niskanen's new right thesis in Bureaucracy and Representative Government. The central innovation of economic approaches is their stress on rational officials' attachment to budget maximization strategies. In Downs's case this is a finite maximand limited by bureaucrats' conservatism and other motivations. But in Niskanen's case budget maximization is an open-ended process, constrained only by external limits on agencies' abilities to push up their budgets. None the less, despite their disparate approaches and conclusions, both these books share four failings common to almost all other public choice work in the field: (1) They operate with vague and ill-defined definitions of bureaucrats' utility functions. (2) They assume that all bureaucracies are hierarchical line agencies.
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Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Cited by
A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS
HOOD, C. (1991) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.1991.tb00779.x · Cited by 10,159
The “new public management” in the 1980s: Variations on a theme
Hood, C. (1995) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/0361-3682(93)e0001-w · Cited by 3,815
Osborne, S. P. (2006) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719030600853022 · Cited by 2,034
The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State
Barr, N. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246599.001.0001 · Cited by 517
The Theory of Government Failure
Le Grand, J. (1991) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400006244 · Cited by 333
Metadata
- Authors
- Dunleavy, P.
- Venue
- British Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1985-07
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 299-328
- ISSN
- 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2112
- OpenAlex
- W2099785552
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 10.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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