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Cited by 278

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Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders

BUENO DE MESQUITA, BRUCE, MORROW, JAMES D., SIVERSON, RANDOLPH M., SMITH, ALASTAIR·2002·British Journal of Political Science

Abstract

Institutional arrangements influence the type of policies that leaders pursue. We examine two institutional variables: size of the selectorate (S) – the set of people who have an institutional say in choosing leaders – and the size of the winning coalition (W) – the minimal set of people whose support the incumbent needs in order to remain in power. The larger the winning coalition, the greater the emphasis leaders place on effective public policy. When W is small, leaders focus on providing private goods to their small group of supporters at the expense of the provision of public goods. The size of the selectorate influences how hard leaders work on behalf of their supporters. The greater the size of the selectorate, the more current supporters fear exclusion from future coalitions. This induces a norm of loyalty that enables leaders to reduce their effort and still survive. As a first step towards a theory of endogenous selection of institutions, we characterize the institutional preferences of the different segments of society based on the consequences of these institutions for individual welfare. We conclude by examining the implication of the model for the tenure of leaders, public policy, economic growth, corruption, taxation and ethnic politics.

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Metadata

Authors
BUENO DE MESQUITA, B., MORROW, J. D., SIVERSON, R. M., & SMITH, A.
Venue
British Journal of Political Science
Published
2002-09-17
Volume
32
Issue
4
Pages
559-590
ISSN
  • 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-2112
OpenAlex
W1992708964
Cited by
278
References
1
FWCI
11.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0007123402000236
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BUENO DE MESQUITA, B., MORROW, J. D., SIVERSON, R. M., & SMITH, A. (2002). Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders. British Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123402000236

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.