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Cited by 235

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence

Wagner, R. Harrison·1988·International Organization

Abstract

Bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power. It is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones. The use of economic interdependence for political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources for political concessions make both parties to a relationship better off than they would be if they bargained over the distribution of the gains from the economic relationship alone. Whether this is true is independent of the degree of asymmetry in the economic relationship, or its direction. An explanation is given for the fact that other scholars have reached different conclusions, and the implications of these results for our understanding of a variety of types of relations among governments are derived.

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Cites

Show all 3 references

Research works printed but not linked: 25

  1. Knorr, 1975, The Power of Nations, 7
  2. 10.1017/S0020818300003854 · DOI
  3. 10.1017/S0020818300018282 · DOI · Paper page
  4. Knorr , The Power of Nations, pp. 7–8
  5. Ståhl, 1972, Bargaining Theory
  6. Beitz, 1979, Political Theory and International Relations, 160
  7. 10.1017/S0020818300003866 · DOI
  8. Hirschman, 1945, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 10.1525/9780520378179 · DOI · Paper page
  9. 10.2307/2551350 · doi:10.2307/2551350
  10. 10.1017/CBO9780511528309 · DOI · Paper page
  11. Maull, 1977, Economic Issues and National Security
  12. 10.1017/S0020818300032252 · DOI · Paper page
  13. Hirschman , National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, pp. 45–46
  14. Weintraub, 1982, Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration
  15. 10.2307/1911016 · DOI · Paper page
  16. Keohane and Nye , Power and Interdependence, pp. 13–16
  17. Binmore K.G. , “Nash Bargaining Theory II,” and “Perfect Equilibrium in Bargaining Models,” in Binmore and Dasgupta, eds., The Economics of Bargaining, pp. 61–105
  18. Hirschman , National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, pp. 26–29
  19. 10.2307/1913045 · doi:10.2307/1913045
  20. Knorr, 1977, Economic Issues and National Security, 102
  21. Baldwin, 1985, Economic Stratecraft
  22. Burdette, 1977, Nationalization in Zambia: A Critique of Bargaining Theory, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 11, 471
  23. Binmore, 1985, The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
  24. Keohane, 1977, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition
  25. Binmore, 1987, The Economics of Bargaining

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Metadata

Authors
Wagner, R. H.
Venue
International Organization
Published
1988
Volume
42
Issue
3
Pages
461-483
ISSN
  • 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5088
OpenAlex
W2168651587
Cited by
235
References
3
FWCI
13.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Wagner, R. H. (1988). Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence. International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027703

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