The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence
Abstract
Bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power. It is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones. The use of economic interdependence for political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources for political concessions make both parties to a relationship better off than they would be if they bargained over the distribution of the gains from the economic relationship alone. Whether this is true is independent of the degree of asymmetry in the economic relationship, or its direction. An explanation is given for the fact that other scholars have reached different conclusions, and the implications of these results for our understanding of a variety of types of relations among governments are derived.
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Cites
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Cited by
Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change
Checkel, J. T. (2001) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/00208180152507551 · Cited by 1,451
Gartzke, E. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00244.x · Cited by 744
Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations
Copeland, D. C. (1996) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.20.4.5 · Cited by 467
Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?
Marinov, N. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00142.x · Cited by 444
The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion
Drezner, D. W. (2003) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818303573052 · Cited by 438
Metadata
- Authors
- Wagner, R. H.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 461-483
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2168651587
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 13.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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