The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence
Abstract
If different parties control the U.S. Congress and White House, the United States may maintain higher import protection than otherwise. This proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which Congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the President. When the congressional majority party faces a President of the other party, the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the President by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up-or-down vote. This constraint forces the President to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority. Evidence confirms that (1) the institutional constraints placed on the President's trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and (2) U.S. trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949–90.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550699 · Cited by 2,521
What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge
Ruggie, J. G. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550770 · Cited by 1,402
Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms
Humphreys, M. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705277545 · Cited by 1,221
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
Metadata
- Authors
- Lohmann, S., & O'Halloran, S.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 595-632
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2089913880
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 16.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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