The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Interests, power, and multilateralism
Abstract
Multilateralism characterizes, to varying degrees, patterns of interaction among states and the formal organizations they construct. The utility of multilateral norms or organizations varies with the type of cooperation problem states confront. Thus, the functional logic of international cooperation leads to hypotheses about the conditions under which the institution of multilateralism may be a feasible and efficient solution, as in coordination problems, and those under which it will not, as in collaboration problems. Within these constraints, powerful states choose institutions that will serve their interests, with multilateral arrangements becoming more attractive as the future is valued more highly. Multilateral institutions should be stable in circumstances of changing distributions of power, relative to more hierarchical institutions. The vulnerability of patterns of international cooperation to various exogenous changes depends on the type of strategic interaction underlying state behavior.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550699 · Cited by 2,521
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
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Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2004) · Power in Global Governance · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491207.001 · Cited by 831
Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World
Keohane, R. (2003) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203218174 · Cited by 646
How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms
Cortell, A. P., & Davis, J. W. (1996) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600887 · Cited by 530
Metadata
- Authors
- Martin, L. L.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1992
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 765-792
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2101170628
- Cited by
- 511
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 33.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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