Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Students of international negotiations often examine strategic interactions among a given set of parties dealing with a specified group of issues. The issues and parties themselves are often choice variables whose ultimate configuration can have decisive effects on a bargain's outcome. Using a variety of international cases, I investigate the properties of several classes of moves that are intended to alter the issues and parties of an original negotiation. A unified approach to the analysis of such situations suggests numerous distinct means by which the “addition” or “subtraction” of issues can yield one-sided gains to the use of power; can yield joint gains that create or enhance a zone of possible agreement; and can reduce or destroy a zone of possible agreement. The effects of adding or subtracting parties are similarly analyzed. However, unintended complexity, unforeseen interrelationships, organizational considerations, transactions costs, and informational requirements may alter the analysis of such moves.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 11,956
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs.
Tsoukias, A., Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1994) · The Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.2307/2584151 · Cited by 8,370
Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1952796 · Cited by 3,387
The Art and Science of Negotiation.
Hey, J. D., & Raiffa, H. (1984) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554559 · Cited by 2,453
Fisher, R. D., & Ury, W. (1981) · Cited by 1,465
The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation
(1975) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2009-0-03146-8 · Cited by 1,108
Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions
Arrow, K. J., & Lind, R. C. (2014) · Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research · doi:10.1080/19390459.2014.867640 · Cited by 809
Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes
Haas, E. B. (1980) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010109 · Cited by 600
The art and science of negotiation
Frankel, J. (1983) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/2618810 · Cited by 487
Economic Efficiency and the Distribution of Benefits from College Instruction
Hansen, A., & Weisbrod, B. A. (1970) · DukeSpace (Duke University) · Cited by 454
An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations
Tollison, R. D., & Willett, T. D. (1979) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300032252 · Cited by 302
Studies of interpersonal bargaining
Deutsch, M., & Krauss, R. M. (1962) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200276200600107 · Cited by 275
Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs.
Fishburn, P. C., Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1977) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2286244 · Cited by 213
The Market Price of Risk, Size of Market and Investor's Risk Aversion
Lintner, J. (1970) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1927602 · Cited by 100
Stein, A. A. (1980) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010255 · Cited by 94
Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World
Nichols, T. M. (2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim250030098 · Cited by 79
Cited by
The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources
Raustiala, K., & Victor, D. G. (2004) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818304582036 · Cited by 1,417
Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program
Adler, E., & Haas, P. M. (1992) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300001533 · Cited by 1,037
Young, O. R. (1991) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033117 · Cited by 779
Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations
Scharpf, F. W. (1994) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951692894006001002 · Cited by 643
The Political Economy of the World Trading System: WTO and Beyond
Hoekman, B., & Kostecki, M. (2001) · doi:10.1093/019829431x.001.0001 · Cited by 544
Metadata
- Authors
- Sebenius, J. K.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1983
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 281-316
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2134558137
- Cited by
- 489
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 7.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.