The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform
Abstract
Current international relations theory struggles to explain both the autonomy and transformation of international organizations (IOs). Previous theories either fail to account for any IO behavior that deviates from the interests of member states, or neglect the role of member states in reforming IO institutions and behavior. We propose an agency theory of IOs that can fill these gaps while also addressing two persistent problems in the study of IOs: common agency and long delegation chains. Our model explains slippage between member states' interests and IO behavior, but also suggests institutional mechanisms—staff selection, monitoring, procedural checks, and contracts—through which states can rein in errant IOs. We evaluate this argument by examining multiple institutional reforms and lending patterns at the World Bank from 1980 to 2000.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994) · Princeton University Press · doi:10.1515/9781400821211 · Cited by 7,225
War and Change in World Politics
Gilpin, R. (1981) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511664267 · Cited by 4,020
Cited by
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics
GRANT, R. W., & KEOHANE, R. O. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051476 · Cited by 1,620
Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?
Fox, J. A. (2015) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.03.011 · Cited by 803
Barnett, M. (2005) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592705050401 · Cited by 370
D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation
Kelley, J. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309990117 · Cited by 153
Becker, M. (2019) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12250 · Cited by 71
Metadata
- Authors
- Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 241-276
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2156230442
- Cited by
- 724
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 145.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0020818303572010
- The paper
- Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2003). Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818303572010
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
