The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties
Abstract
Understanding the conditions under which state leaders are willing to honor alliance commitments in war will increase knowledge about the escalation and diffusion of conflict and about the propensity of states to fulfill agreements under anarchy. New data analysis provides evidence that alliance commitments are fulfilled about 75 percent of the time. But how can one understand the failure of alliance partners to act as promised in the remaining 25 percent of cases? Formal modelers have deduced that because of the costs associated with alliances, state leaders who form alliances are likely to fulfill them; those alliances that are formed should be fairly reliable. I argue, therefore, that one can best account for violations of alliance agreements either through an understanding of the factors that reduce the costs of violation or through changes that have occurred since the alliance was formed. Using detailed data on alliance commitments between 1816 and 1944, I find evidence commensurate with this argument. Changes in the power of states or in their policymaking processes are powerful predictors of the failure to honor past commitments; and nondemocratic states and major powers, sets of states that I argue suffer lower costs from reneging on agreements, are more likely to violate treaties.
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Cites
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
Diebold, W., & Keohane, R. O. (1984) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042201 · Cited by 3,944
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The False Promise of International Institutions
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539078 · Cited by 2,680
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Fearon, J. D. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944796 · Cited by 2,360
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Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America
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The halse Promise of International Institutions
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2017) · International Organization · doi:10.4324/9781315251981-9 · Cited by 1,579
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?
Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033427 · Cited by 1,540
Cited by
How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory
Guzman, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001 · Cited by 510
Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies
Tomz, M., Weeks, J. L. P., & Yarhi-Milo, K. (2020) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818319000341 · Cited by 303
Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior
Hill, D. W. (2010) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000599 · Cited by 303
(2010) · Cited by 130
Metadata
- Authors
- Leeds, B. A.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 801-827
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2032642423
- Cited by
- 382
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 26.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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