The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?
Abstract
Recent research on compliance in international regulatory regimes has argued (1) that compliance is generally quite good; (2) that this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement; (3) that those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems; and (4) that the management rather than the enforcement approach holds the key to the evolution of future regulatory cooperation in the international system. While the descriptive findings above are largely correct, the policy inferences are dangerously contaminated by endogeneity and selection problems. A high rate of compliance is often the result of states formulating treaties that require them to do little more than they would do in the absence of a treaty. In those cases where noncompliance does occur and where the effects of selection are attenuated, both self-interest and enforcement play significant roles.
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Cited by
Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes
Black, J. (2008) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2008.00034.x · Cited by 1,215
Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability
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Metadata
- Authors
- Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 379-406
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2093248821
- Cited by
- 1,540
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 47.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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