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Cited by 1,540

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?

Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., Barsoom, Peter N.·1996·International Organization

Abstract

Recent research on compliance in international regulatory regimes has argued (1) that compliance is generally quite good; (2) that this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement; (3) that those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems; and (4) that the management rather than the enforcement approach holds the key to the evolution of future regulatory cooperation in the international system. While the descriptive findings above are largely correct, the policy inferences are dangerously contaminated by endogeneity and selection problems. A high rate of compliance is often the result of states formulating treaties that require them to do little more than they would do in the absence of a treaty. In those cases where noncompliance does occur and where the effects of selection are attenuated, both self-interest and enforcement play significant roles.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 35 references

Research works printed but not linked: 21

  1. 1990, Arms control and disarmament agreements
  2. Abreu, 1989, Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
  3. Duffy, 1988, U.S.–Soviet Security Cooperation
  4. Grossman, 1994, American Economic Review, 84, 833
  5. 10.3998/mpub.9256 · doi:10.3998/mpub.9256
  6. 1992, Law and Policy in International Business, 23, 263
  7. Oye, 1994, Managing the world economy
  8. Kaufman, 1990, Arms control during the pre-nuclear era, 10.7312/kauf90410 · doi:10.7312/kauf90410
  9. Goldman, 1994, Sunken treaties
  10. Hudec, 1993, Enforcing international trade law: The evolution of the modem GATT legal system
  11. 10.1006/jeem.1995.1018 · doi:10.1006/jeem.1995.1018
  12. Downs, 1995, Optimal imperfection? Institutions and domestic politics in international relations
  13. Goldblat, 1993, Arms control agreements: A handbook
  14. 10.2307/2538756 · doi:10.2307/2538756
  15. Sykes, 1990, Boston University International Law Journal, 8, 301
  16. 10.2307/20029480 · doi:10.2307/20029480
  17. Mitchell, 1995, Altering consequences, opportunities, information, and values: Strategies of international social control
  18. 10.1111/j.1467-9388.1993.tb00133.x · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9388.1993.tb00133.x
  19. Burley, 1991, Preserving the Global Environment
  20. Chayes, 1993, The new sovereignty
  21. Peterson, 1993, Institutions for the earth: Sources of effective international environmental protection

Metadata

Authors
Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N.
Venue
International Organization
Published
1996
Volume
50
Issue
3
Pages
379-406
ISSN
  • 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5088
OpenAlex
W2093248821
Cited by
1,540
References
35
FWCI
47.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0020818300033427
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Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996). Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300033427

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.