The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?
Abstract
Models of trade policy often depend on the efficient aggregation of individual preferences. While much of the recent empirical work on trade focuses on whether domestic coalitions form along class or sectoral lines, the process of preference aggregation itself remains understudied. In democratic countries, voting is typically assumed to be an unproblematic mechanism for aggregating preferences, but such an assumption may be misleading when the salience of trade policy is low or heterogeneous throughout the electorate. Using data from a survey of 36,501 potential voters in the 2006 U.S. midterm congressional elections, this article explores the salience of trade policy for voters as a whole and for populations predicted to be most affected by changing trade patterns. The article offers an estimation of trade policy salience based on the degree to which voters held Senate incumbents accountable for their 2005 vote on the Central American Free Trade Agreement, relative to roll call votes on other issues of the day. The article finds trade policy salience to be relatively low in terms of stated importance, in voters' knowledge of their representatives' policy positions, and in its effect on voters' propensity to vote for the incumbent. The low salience of trade policy, particularly among highly affected groups, calls into question voter-driven models of trade policy.
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
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Making the most of statistical analyses: improving interpretation and presentation
King, G., Tomz, M., & Wittenberg, J. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669316 · Cited by 3,232
Cited by
Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote
Mutz, D. C. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1718155115 · Cited by 1,236
Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?
Rho, S., & Tomz, M. (2017) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818316000394 · Cited by 363
Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites Shape Mass Opinion across International Issues
Guisinger, A., & Saunders, E. N. (2017) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx022 · Cited by 331
Self-citationCan Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment
Butler, D. M., & Nickerson, D. W. (2011) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00011019 · Cited by 310
Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies
Tomz, M., Weeks, J. L. P., & Yarhi-Milo, K. (2020) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818319000341 · Cited by 303
Metadata
- Authors
- Guisinger, A.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-07
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 533-557
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2157248721
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 44.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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