Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The literature exploiting historical data generally supports the democratic advantage thesis, which holds that democracies can sell more bonds on better terms than their authoritarian counterparts. However, studies of more recent—and extensive—data sets find that democracies have received no more favorable bond ratings from credit rating agencies than otherwise similar autocracies; and have been no less prone to default. These findings raise the question: where is the democratic advantage? Our answer is that previous assessments of the democratic advantage have typically (1) ignored the democratic advantage in credit access; (2) failed to account for selection effects; and (3) treated GDP per capita as an exogenous variable, ignoring the many arguments that suggest economic development is endogenous to political institutions. We develop an estimator of how regime type affects credit access and credit ratings analogous to the “reservation wage” model of labor supply and treat GDP per capita as an endogenous variable. Our findings indicate that the democratic advantage in the postwar era has two components: first, better access to credit (most autocracies cannot even enter the international bond markets); and second, better ratings, once propensity to enter the market is controlled and GDP per capita is endogenized.
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Citations
Cites
Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009) · doi:10.1515/9781400829828 · Cited by 9,467
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517 · cited 4×
“…has found such variables to be highly correlated+ See, for example, Cantor and Packer 1996+ 6+ See North and Thomas 1973; North and Weingast 1989; and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001 and 2005+ racies+ Second, conditional on entering that market, democracies receive better bond ratings…”
BackgroundInfluentialNorth, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2008) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j72 · Cited by 5,051
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Jensen, N. M. (2003) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818303573040 · Cited by 1,017 · cited 2×
“…of the economic determinants of sovereign credibility, for example, Eichengreen and Mody 1998, and in some studies of foreign direct investment ~FDI!, for example, Jensen 2003+ 12+ On reputation and credibility, see Tomz 2007+ For more on credit rationing, see Ghosh,Mookherjee, and Ray 2001;…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Beaulieu, E., Cox, G. W., & Saiegh, S.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2012-10
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 709-738
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2163769467
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 16.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Beaulieu, E., Cox, G. W., & Saiegh, S. (2012). Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage. International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818312000288
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