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Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa
Open accessAbstract
Since the early 1990s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have established semi-autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs), organisationally distinct from ministries of finance, with some real operational autonomy, and with staff paid at rates substantially higher than those in comparable public sector jobs. This has been seen by some observers as a step to dilute the power of the central state executive. We demonstrate that this is a misreading of the story of revenue authorities in Africa. Both African governments and the international development agencies involved in the reforms see ARAs as a means of increasing central government revenues, and thus enlarging the authority of the (central) state. To date, there is little sign that the creation of revenue agencies has actually increased public revenues. It has, however, facilitated a range of reforms in the ways in which taxes are assessed and collected, and deflected pressures that might otherwise have emerged for substantial privatisation of tax collection.
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Generally, transactions associated with foreign development assistance are exempted.
“Generally, transactions associated with foreign development assistance are exempted (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009).”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Fjeldstad and Moore 2009
Because ARAs have been introduced in part at the urging of aid donors and international financial institutions, impressionistic interpretations of the evidence for or against them may be somewhat tainted.
“A third is that, because they have been introduced in part at the urging of aid donors and international financial institutions, impressionistic interpretations of the evidence for or against them may be somewhat tainted (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009).”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Fjeldstad and Moore 2009
The choice of the revenue authority model aims to remove the revenue collection function partly or fully from the direct control of the Ministry of Finance by integrating tax operations into a single purpose agency, and to free the tax administration from the constraints of the civil service system.
“The choice of the revenue authority model aims to remove the revenue collection function partly or fully from the direct control of the Ministry of Finance by integrating tax operations into a single purpose agency, and to free the tax administration from the constraints of the civil service system (Fjeldstad et al. 2003; Fjeldstad and Moore 2009).”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Fjeldstad and Moore 2009
Much of the new 'user friendliness' of many tax administrations is so far mainly window dressing; taxpayers continue to experience extortion, bribery and obstructiveness rather than willing, responsive service.
“Yet, it is evident that much of the new 'user friendliness' of many tax administrations is so far mainly window dressing: taxpayers continue to experience extortion, bribery and obstructiveness rather than willing, responsive service (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009).”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Fjeldstad and Moore 2009
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Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries
Fjeldstad, O. (2014) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.1676 · Cited by 96
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Moore, M.
- Affiliations
- Chr. Michelsen Institute (NO)
- University of Sussex (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge
- Moore, Mick
- ORCID
- Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge
- Venue
- The Journal of Modern African Studies
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-02-18
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-18
- ISSN
- 0022-278X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-7777
- OpenAlex
- W2160076061
- Cited by
- 128
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 11.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- The Journal of Modern African Studies (publishedVersion)
- BIBSYS Brage (BIBSYS (Norway)) (acceptedVersion)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Local Government Finance and Decentralization
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Keywords
- tax authorities, tax administration, tax collection, tax assessment, government revenue, state capacity, central government authority, fiscal decentralization, public sector employees, sub-Saharan Africa, tax reform
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