The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?
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Weak and often corrupt revenue administration remains a fundamental barrier to effective and fair taxation and to building wider trust between government and citizens in many countries.
“But there is no doubt that weak and often corrupt revenue administration remains a fundamental barrier to effective and fair taxation and to building wider trust between government and citizens in many countries (Fjeldstad and Tungodden 2003; Fjeldstad 2009).”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Fjeldstad and Tungodden 2003
The Introduction links corruption in tax collection to lost revenue, and Sections 3 and 4 describe how corrupt or unfair treatment can undermine compliance and government trustworthiness. The claim is broader and more certain than the paper: it calls weak revenue administration a fundamental barrier to fair taxation and wider trust, whereas the paper focuses on fiscal corruption and generally describes its longer-term effects as possible or likely. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)
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Citations
Cites
Political Trust and Trustworthiness
Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.475 · Cited by 2,190
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Research works printed but not linked: 25
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Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries
Fjeldstad, O. (2014) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.1676 · Cited by 96
“But there is no doubt that weak and often corrupt revenue administration remains a fundamental barrier to effective and fair taxation and to building wider trust between government and citizens in many countries (Fjeldstad and Tungodden, 2003).”
Self-citationCorruption, governance and tax revenues in Africa
Epaphra, M., & Massawe, J. (2017) · Business and Economic Horizons · doi:10.15208/beh.2017.31 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Tungodden, B.
- Affiliations
- Chr. Michelsen Institute (NO)
- Venue
- World Development
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-08
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1459-1467
- ISSN
- 0305-750X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2128942533
- Cited by
- 93
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 7 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 11.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- World Development (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- BIBSYS Brage (BIBSYS (Norway)) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Norges Forskningsråd
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
- Keywords
- tax administration, tax evasion, tax revenue, democracy, good governance, developing countries
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