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A Model of the Endogenous Development of Judicial Institutions in Federal and International Systems
Abstract
Why do sets of sovereign governments create judicial institutions and grant these institutions the power to rule their actions invalid? Once such a court is created, under what conditions is that court able to rule against these governments and get compliance with their rulings? Finally, how might the influence of the court change over time? This study presents a general theory of judicial institutions that provides a unified answer to these three questions. I argue that governments create judicial institutions to help solve collective action problems endemic to operating under a common regulatory regime. Once established, a court in its institutional “infancy” is capable of facilitating compliance with that regulatory regime's rules but only consistent with the purpose for which the governments created the court. And finally, once the court has earned the trust of a government's public, its ability to enforce the regulatory regime's rules qualitatively expands. In demonstrating this last point, I derive how and why publics can rationally come to believe that supporting a court, if there was a conflict between its government and the court, would be in that public's interest.
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Cited by
An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression
HILL, D. W., & JONES, Z. M. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000306 · Cited by 450
The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy
Clark, T. S. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x · Cited by 320
A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948–2012
Linzer, D. A., & Staton, J. K. (2015) · Journal of Law and Courts · doi:10.1086/682150 · Cited by 308
Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective
Helmke, G., & Rosenbluth, F. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.121521 · Cited by 283
Metadata
- Authors
- Carrubba, C. J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2009-01
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 55-69
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2145005545
- Cited by
- 211
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 126.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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