The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits
Open accessAbstract
We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimate two separate effects of elections on government performance. Holding tenure in office constant, differences in performance by reelection-eligible and term-limited incumbents identify an accountability effect: reelection-eligible governors have greater incentives to exert costly effort on behalf of voters. Holding term-limit status constant, differences in performance by incumbents in different terms identify a competence effect: later-term incumbents are more likely to be competent both because they have survived reelection and because they have experience in office. We show that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under term-limited incumbents (accountability), and under reelected incumbents than under first-term incumbents (competence), all else equal. In addition to improving our understanding of the role of elections in representative democracy, these findings resolve an empirical puzzle about the disappearance of the effect of term limits on gubernatorial performance over time.
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Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
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The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
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Retrospective Voting Reconsidered
Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212920 · Cited by 667
Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
Ashworth, S. (2012) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823 · Cited by 535
Sheffer, L., & Loewen, P. J. (2019) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912918775252 · Cited by 33
Social Media Data Reveal Patterns of Policy Engagement in State Legislatures
Casas, A., Payson, J., Nagler, J., Bonneau, R., & Tucker, J. A. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3698990 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Alt, J., Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Rose, S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2011-01
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 171-186
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2170793548
- Cited by
- 297
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 86.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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