The Indispensability of Character
Abstract
Gilbert Harman has argued that it does not make sense to ascribe character traits to people. The notion of morally virtuous character becomes particularly suspect. How plausible this is depends on how broad character traits would have to be. Views of character as entirely invariant behavioural tendencies offer a soft target. This paper explores a view that is a less easy target: character traits as specific to kinds of situation, and as involving probabilities or real possibilities. Such ascriptions are not undermined by Harman's arguments, and it remains plausible that the agent's character often is indispensable in explanation of behaviour. Character is indispensable also as processes of control that impose reliability where it really matters.
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Kupperman claims that Harman's arguments target an excessively simple view of character and make two false assumptions: that character requires near-perfection and that there is one right action for every virtuous person in the same situation.
“Kupperman claims that Harman's arguments target ''an excessively simple view of what character is'' and make two false assumptions about the nature of character traits (Kupperman 2001, p. 240).First, Harman assumes an extreme view of character, which requires near-perfection and precludes the possibility that a virtuous person might occasionally err.Second, Harman assumes there is one right action”
From Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate (2009) · cites this paper as Kupperman 2001
Kupperman argues that character is conceptually indispensable and pragmatically indispensable.
“Kupperman concludes by arguing that character is conceptually indispensable since we often know that certain people are reliably virtuous and since self-ascriptions of virtue are often resolutions as much as they are descriptions, and he argues that character is pragmatically indispensable since it can constrain our behavior and choices in a range of morally vexing situations.”
From Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate (2009) · cites this paper as Kupperman 2001
Kupperman, Sreenivasan, and Miller all lodge the same basic challenge to the Harman-Doris situationist critiques.
“Kupperman, G. Sreenivasan, and C. Miller all lodge the same basic challenge to the Harman-Doris situationist critiques.9”
From Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate (2009) · cites this paper as Kupperman 2001
Cited by
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Doris, J. M., & The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 · Cited by 227 · see citing works
Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate
Upton, C. L. (2009) · The Journal of Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10892-009-9054-2 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
- Authors
- Kupperman, J. J.
- Corresponding author
- Kupperman, Joel J.
- Venue
- Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 239-250
- ISSN
- 0031-8191 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-817X
- OpenAlex
- W2132755746
- Cited by
- 122
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 8.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- character, character traits, moral virtues, Gilbert Harman, moral responsibility, explanation of behavior, reliability, control
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