Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate

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Aristotle's moral psychological claims were not produced by rigorous scientific methodology but likely arose from decades of observation, discussion, and reflection.

“Aristotle's compendium of moral psychological claims was not informed by rigorous, scientific methodology.”

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In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes at least ten explicit empirical claims about the actual psychological states and abilities of moral agents.

“In his brief discussion of bravery in the Nicomachean Ethics, he makes at least ten explicit empirical claims about the actual psychological states and abilities of moral agents (Aristotle 1985).”

• cites Aristotle 1985Not checked yet

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Situationism is the empirical thesis that variance in human behavior is typically a function of the situation a person inhabits or takes herself to inhabit rather than her putative character traits, and that the situation better predicts and explains behavior than those traits.

“Situationism is the empirical thesis, supported by the research of several hundred social psychologists, that variance in human behavior is typically a function of the situation a person inhabits, or takes herself to inhabit, rather than any traits of character she putatively possesses.”

• Also stated in: § Abstract · plain

  “Articulated in epistemic terms, situationism claims that the situation a human being inhabits, or takes herself to inhabit, better predicts and explains her behavior than her putative traits of character.”

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In Zimbardo's Prison Experiment, guards who showed no detectable signs of psychopathy or cruelty engaged in brutish and vile behavior, and the only apparent explanation is the situation they inhabited.

“The guards, who displayed no detectable signs of psychopathy, any other psychological malady, or even any tendency to behave so cruelly (one guard claimed prior to the experiment that he was a pacifist), nonetheless, engaged in brutish and vile behavior; the only explanation for their behavior seems to be the nature of the situation they inhabited.”

• cites Haney et al. 1973Not checked yet

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Harman concludes that there is no empirical basis for character traits and that we must renounce all talk and thought of character.

“Harman draws the respectively weaker and stronger conclusions that ''it may…be the case that there is no such thing as character, no ordinary character traits of the sort people think there are'' (Harman 1999, p. 1) and ''there is no empirical basis for the existence of character traits'' (Harman 1999, p. 1); hence, we must renounce all talk and thought of character.”

• cites Harman 1999Not checked yet

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Milgram's Obedience Experiment, Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment, and Darley and Batson's Princeton Theological Seminary Experiment are notable for methodological rigor and for the morally disturbing behavior their subjects displayed.

“S. Milgram's Obedience Experiment, P. Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment, and J. Darley and C. Batson's Princeton Theological Seminary Experiment are all notable not only for their methodological rigor, but also for the morally disturbing behavior their subjects display (Milgram 1974;Haney et al. 1973;Darley and Batson 1973).”

• cites Milgram 1974Not checked yet

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• cites Haney et al. 1973Not checked yet

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• cites Darley and Batson 1973 sourceNot checked yet

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Kupperman's primary thesis is that lay observations of human behavior and psychology are superior to professional observations and can accurately reflect actual human states and tendencies.

“His primary thesis holds that lay observations of human behavior and psychology are superior to those of professional observations; lay observation, if tempered appropriately, can produce information that is not only subtle and propitious, but also accurately reflects the actual states and tendencies of humans.”

• cites Kupperman 1991Not checked yet

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No empirical fact about the world can by itself yield substantive normative conclusions without argumentative supplementation.

“After all, even introductory students of ethics should be sufficiently familiar with the normative/ descriptive distinction to note that no mere empirical fact about the actual condition of the world or its inhabitants can alone, without argumentative supplementation, yield any substantive normative conclusions.”

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Kupperman argues that character is conceptually indispensable and pragmatically indispensable.

“Kupperman concludes by arguing that character is conceptually indispensable since we often know that certain people are reliably virtuous and since self-ascriptions of virtue are often resolutions as much as they are descriptions, and he argues that character is pragmatically indispensable since it can constrain our behavior and choices in a range of morally vexing situations.”

• cites Kupperman 2001 sourceNot checked yet

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According to situationists, the only plausible explanation of Milgram's subjects' behavior is the nature of the situation, including an authority figure prompting them to shock another person.

“The only plausible explanation of the subjects' behavior, according to situationists, is the nature of the situation (and its impact on complex personality features), which included an authority figure prompting them to shock another human being.”

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Flanagan concludes that skepticism about cross-situational traits suggested by situationist findings is not ultimately warranted.

“Notably, while he suggests that situationist findings might engender skepticism about the existence of cross-situational traits he concludes that this skepticism is not ultimately warranted.”

• cites Flanagan 1991Not checked yet

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Badhwar argues that the virtues manifest a limited unity and are domain-specific.

“Badhwar appeals to anecdotal observational findings, not unlike those uncovered by situationists, to argue that the virtues manifest a limited unity (Badhwar 1996).”

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Doris concludes that traditional virtue ethics should be abandoned or at least conceptually supplemented with a system of empirically adequate local traits of character.

“Doris's bottom line is that traditional virtue ethics, since it endorses empirically inadequate global traits of character, should be, if not abandoned altogether, at least conceptually supplemented with a system of empirically adequate local traits of character.”

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Harman argues that the empirical foundation for character traits in most human beings is absent because, if we had character traits, behavior would not covary so highly with situations.

“First, he argues that the empirical foundation that would substantiate the existence of character traits in most human beings is manifestly absent: if we possessed character traits, our behavior would not covary so highly with the situation.”

• cites Harman 1999Not checked yet

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In Darley and Batson's experiment, 63% of early students helped the confederate, 45% of on-time students helped, and 10% of hurried students helped.

“Sixtythree percent of students who were early helped the confederate, but only 45% of students who were on time helped, while a paltry 10% of students who were in a hurry helped.”

• cites Darley and Batson 1973 sourceNot checked yet

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Milgram's subjects were demographically diverse, making it unlikely that they were psychopaths or individuals with antecedent cruel tendencies.

“The subjects' broad demographic distribution precludes any likelihood that Milgram attracted a group of psychopaths, or other individuals who antecedently possessed a tendency to inflict cruel behavior, as subjects.”

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Situationist research uncovers situation-indexed moral impairments in most human beings: most would not behave compassionately under authority pressure, would not help when hurried or in a group, and would not help in cold temperatures, grating noises, or harsh lighting.

“Situationist research, however, uncovers situation-indexed moral impairments in the behavior of most human beings.”

• Also stated in: § Like Milgram's Obedience Experiment, Zimbardo's Prison Experiment focuses on harming behavior. Zimbardo chose twenty-one college-age males for the experiment. · hedged

  “Most people would not behave compassionately in the presence of an authority goading them to behave cruelly; most people would not help an obviously ailing individual when they are in a hurry or in a group; and most people would not help another person in the presence of cold temperatures, grating noises, or harsh lighting.”

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Sreenivasan concludes that the Hartshorne and May honesty experiments challenge only an implausible conception of character traits.

“Hence, Sreenivasan concludes that the 1928 honesty experiments challenge only an implausible conception of character traits, which disregards the subject's conceptualization of the situation she inhabits, which mistakes behavior that is”

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• cites Hartshorne and May 1982Not checked yet

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Harman and Doris launch the second phase of the situationism debate, arguing that situationist findings vitiate traditional virtue ethics and suggest strategies for moral and social improvement.

“Both Harman and Doris argue that, properly applied, situationist findings vitiate traditional virtue ethics and also suggest a range of illuminating strategies for moral and social improvement.”

• cites Harman 1999Not checked yet

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• cites Doris 1998 sourceNot checked yet

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Flanagan concludes that situationist research provides tools for moral self-improvement by cultivating awareness of situational factors and establishing a social life that precludes or cripples their causal efficacy.

“After setting forth the particulars of several now well-known situationist experiments, he prudently concludes that situationist research outfits us with several tools morally to embetter ourselves.”

• cites Flanagan 1991Not checked yet

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Doris argues that empirically adequate traits of character are necessary for moral agents to guide their moral reasoning, choices, and behavior appropriately.

“Third, Doris argues that empirically adequate traits of character are necessary for moral agents appropriately to guide their moral reasoning, choices, and behavior.”

• cites Doris 1998 sourceNot checked yet

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Kupperman claims that Harman's arguments target an excessively simple view of character and make two false assumptions: that character requires near-perfection and that there is one right action for every virtuous person in the same situation.

“Kupperman claims that Harman's arguments target ''an excessively simple view of what character is'' and make two false assumptions about the nature of character traits (Kupperman 2001, p. 240).First, Harman assumes an extreme view of character, which requires near-perfection and precludes the possibility that a virtuous person might occasionally err.Second, Harman assumes there is one right action”

• cites Kupperman 2001 sourceNot checked yet

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