The moral psychology of obligation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the sense of obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key features: First, it has a peremptory, demanding force, with a kind of coercive quality, and second, it is often tied to agreement-like social interactions (e.g., promises) in which breaches prompt normative protest, on the one side, and apologies, excuses, justifications, and guilt on the other. Drawing on empirical research in comparative and developmental psychology, I provide here a psychological foundation for these unique features by showing that the human sense of obligation is intimately connected developmentally with the formation of a shared agent “we,” which not only directs collaborative efforts but also self-regulates them. Thus, children's sense of obligation is first evident inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner, and it is later evident in attitudes toward in-group, but not out-group, members connected by collective agency. When you and I voluntarily place our fate in one another's hands in interdependent collaboration – scaled up to our lives together in an interdependent cultural group – this transforms the instrumental pressure that individuals feel when pursuing individual goals into the pressure that “we” put on me (who needs to preserve my cooperative identity in this “we”) to live up to our shared expectations: a we > me self-regulation. The human sense of obligation may therefore be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000129 · Cited by 4,882
Self-citationA Natural History of Human Thinking
Tomasello, M. (2014) · doi:10.4159/9780674726369 · Cited by 1,923
Self-citationA Natural History of Human Morality
Tomasello, M. (2016) · doi:10.4159/9780674915855 · Cited by 924
Self-citationMaternal emotional signaling: Its effect on the visual cliff behavior of 1-year-olds.
Sorce, J. F., Emde, R. N., Campos, J. J., & Klinnert, M. D. (1985) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/0012-1649.21.1.195 · Cited by 885
The hidden structure of overimitation
Lyons, D. E., Young, A. G., & Keil, F. C. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0704452104 · Cited by 734
Engineering cooperation in chimpanzees: tolerance constraints on cooperation.
Melis, A. P., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2006) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.09.018 · Cited by 427
Young Children See a Single Action and Infer a Social Norm: Promiscuous Normativity in 3-Year-Olds
Schmidt, M. F. H., Butler, L. P., Heinz, J., & Tomasello, M. (2016) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797616661182 · Cited by 181
Self-citation
Cited by
The sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2020.01.004 · Cited by 201
Five-year-old children show cooperative preferences for faces with white sclera
Wolf, W., Thielhelm, J., & Tomasello, M. (2023) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532 · Cited by 19
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Tomasello, M.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2019-05-28
- Volume
- 43
- Pages
- e56-e56
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2947532825
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 12.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The moral psychology of obligation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0140525x19001742
- The paper
- Tomasello, M. (2020). The moral psychology of obligation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19001742
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.