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Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

Tomasello, Michael, Carpenter, Malinda, Call, Josep, Behne, Tanya, Moll, Henrike · 2005 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 433 of the 433 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x05000129

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Metadata

Authors
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H.
Affiliations
Max Planck Society (DE)
Corresponding author
  • Tomasello, Michael
  • Carpenter, Malinda
  • Call, Josep
  • Behne, Tanya
  • Moll, Henrike
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2005-10
Volume
28
Issue
5
Pages
675-691
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2106980598
Cited by
4,882
References
433
Citations by year
2026: 172 · 2025: 184 · 2024: 208 · 2023: 228 · 2022: 263 · 2021: 228 · 2020: 319 · 2019: 322 · 2018: 245 · 2017: 214 · 2016: 219 · 2015: 337 · 2014: 234 · 2013: 304 · 2012: 353
FWCI
209.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
Keywords
shared intentionality, cultural cognition, intention inference, cultural learning, theory of mind, great apes, autism spectrum disorder, joint attention, social cognition development, human cognitive evolution, social norms, social institutions, linguistic symbols
MeSH terms
Aging, Animals, Autistic Disorder, Cognition, Cooperative Behavior, Culture, Biological Evolution, Goals, Humans, Primates, Social Behavior, Volition

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0140525x05000129
The paper
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05000129

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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