The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Team preferences.
Abstract
When my family discusses how we should spend a summer holiday, we start from certain common understandings about our preferences. We prefer self-catering accommodation to hotels, and hotels to campsites. We prefer walking and looking at scenery and wildlife to big-city sightseeing and shopping. When it comes to walks, we prefer walks of six miles or so to ones which are much shorter or much longer, and prefer well-marked but uncrowded paths to ones which are either more rugged or more popular. And so on. These common understandings greatly simplify the task of choosing between holiday destinations and activities, by allowing us quickly to eliminate many options. But what does it mean to say that we prefer one thing to another?
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In such commons failure, members adopt the group's perspective but fail to reason as team reasoners and to act in terms of team preferences.
“Even though the members adopt the group’s perspective they fail to reason as “team reasoners” and to act in terms of “team preferences” (Sugden, 2000; Bacharach, 2006)—to wit,”
From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Sugden, 2000
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Hodgson, G. M. (2006) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2006.11506879 · Cited by 2,320
Joint Actions and Group Agents
Pettit, P. N., & Schweikard, D. P. (2006) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393105284169 · Cited by 296
Sugden, R. (2003) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/10002003098538748 · Cited by 238
“In decision theory, these ideas have been developed by Hurley (1989, p. 136-170), Sugden (1991, 1993, 1995, 2000) and Bacharach (1993, 1999).”
Self-citationGender Analysis of Land: Beyond Land Rights for Women?
Jackson, C. (2003) · Journal of Agrarian Change · doi:10.1111/1471-0366.00062 · Cited by 229
Economics and Social Interaction
(2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154 · Cited by 218
Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties
Collins, S. (2012) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2012.717533 · Cited by 178
“Ample attention has been paid in recent years to collective agents, collective action, and collective responsibility [Bratman 1992; Gilbert 2001, 2006; Kutz 2000; List and Pettit 2011; Mellema 2006; Pettit 2007, 2010; Pettit and Schweikard 2006; Sugden 2000; Tuomela 2006].”
BackgroundThe Empirics of Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical PerspectivePreprint
Sabatini, F. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.879712 · Cited by 157
Hakli, R., Miller, K., & Tuomela, R. (2010) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267110000386 · Cited by 134
“The question where such group preferences come from is a problem for a theory of collective reasoning, and it is an important lacuna that accounts of team reasoning have not yet properly addressed (see e.g. Sugden 2000).”
BackgroundCollective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning
Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Rose, J. (2007) · Acta Psychologica · doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.08.003 · Cited by 126
“In these games, players may not even attempt to maximize their individual expected utilities but may prefer instead to maximize the collective utility of the group of players involved in the game (Gilbert, 1987, 1994; Hurley, 1989, 2005; Sugden, 2000).”
BackgroundParadigmatic experiments: The Dictator Game
Guala, F., & Mittone, L. (2009) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.007 · Cited by 128
Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite
Pacherie, É. (2013) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0263-7 · Cited by 129
Borzaga, C., & Depedri, S. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.007 · Cited by 109
Group membership, team preferences, and expectations
Guala, F., Mittone, L., & Ploner, M. (2012) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.003 · Cited by 91
Social Projection Can Solve Social Dilemmas
Krueger, J. I., DiDonato, T. E., & Freestone, D. M. (2012) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.641167 · Cited by 80
From Outcome-Based to Language-Based Preferences
Capraro, V., Halpern, J. Y., & Perc, M. (2024) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20221613 · Cited by 93
“Team-reasoning models (Gilbert 1987; Bacharach 1999; Sugden 2000) and equilibrium notions such as cooperative equilibrium (Halpern and Rong 2010; Capraro 2013) also take social welfare maximization seriously.”
BackgroundChapter 1 Introduction to the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity
Kolm, S. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01001-3 · Cited by 75
Rationality in Joint Action: Maximizing Coefficiency in Coordination
Török, G., Pomiechowska, B., Csibra, G., & Sebanz, N. (2019) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797619842550 · Cited by 70
“The motor system often performs comparably with an optimal decision maker (Wolpert & Landy, 2012), selecting the most beneficial solutions in the given circumstances.”
Jackson, C. (2002) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(01)00113-9 · Cited by 71
On the emergence of descriptive norms
Muldoon, R., Lisciandra, C., Bicchieri, C., et al. (2013) · Politics Philosophy & Economics · doi:10.1177/1470594x12447791 · Cited by 61
From transactions to encounters: the joint generation of relational goods and conventional values
Gui, B. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.003 · Cited by 58
Creating a space for young women's voices: using ‘participatory video drama’ in Uganda
Waite, L., & Conn, C. (2011) · Gender Place & Culture · doi:10.1080/0966369x.2011.535297 · Cited by 52
“It also links to the idea of multiply constituted rather than individually oriented subjectivities (Sugden 2000).”
BackgroundHédoin, C. (2021) · Journal of Social Ontology · doi:10.1515/jso-2020-0001
“Such a perspective is notably explicitly argued for by philosophers like John Searle (2010), Raimo Tuomela (2013) or Brian Epstein (2015). The foundationalist view clearly gives social ontology a conceptual priority, in the sense that an appropriate scientific understanding of the social world cannot be attained witho…”
BackgroundThe dismal queen of the social sciences
Mäki, U. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511493317.002 · Cited by 46
A Neurolinguistic Approach to Performativity in Economics
Herrmann‐Pillath, C. (2010) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2010.500739 · Cited by 43
The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of FinancePreprint
Herrmann‐Pillath, C. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1289588 · Cited by 43
The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and Empirical
Guala, F. (2007) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00095.x · Cited by 41
On the possible conflict between economic growth and social development
Antoci, A., Sacco, P. L., & Vanin, P. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.008 · Cited by 41
Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration
Newton, J. (2017) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.001 · Cited by 35
“All rights reserved. gesturing, or alternative forms of reasoning such as ‘team reasoning’ (Bacharach, 1999, 2006; Sugden, 2000) people form shared intentions.”
BackgroundDekel, S., Fischer, S., & Zultan, R. (2017) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.12.007 · Cited by 38
“19 The effect of harmed minorities in Potential Pareto Public Goods is related to the two main issues that arise in theories of team reasoning, namely what is a team? and what is the team’s objective? (Bacharach, 2006; Sugden, 2000).”
BackgroundWe-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory
Smerilli, A. (2012) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-012-9294-7 · Cited by 37
“Within this body of literature, Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003) and Bacharach (1995, 1997, 1999, 2006)1 have developed analytical frameworks from an economic point of view.”
MethodChapter 6 Reciprocity: Its Scope, Rationales, and Consequences
Kolm, S. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01006-2 · Cited by 36
Hédoin, C. (2016) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2016.1218530 · Cited by 36
“See the emerging literature on ‘team-reasoning’ in game theory which points to this possibility (Bacharach, 2006; Sugden, 2000).”
BackgroundWhy interpersonal relations matter for economics
Gui, B., & Sugden, R. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.002 · Cited by 34
Self-citationThe economic and evolutionary basis of selves
Ross, D. (2006) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.003 · Cited by 38
Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared?
Butterfill, S., & Sebanz, N. (2011) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-011-0062-3 · Cited by 36
Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games
Gold, N., & Colman, A. M. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9575-z · Cited by 33
“Sugden (2000) takes a line very close to Bacharach’s, saying that the team utility function represents the preferences of the group and “It does seem possible in fact for people to construe themselves as members of a plural agent whose collective objective is contrary to the unanimous preferences…”
BackgroundTeams, Team Motivation, and the Theory of the Firm
Foss, N. J., & Lindenberg, S. M. (2012) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.2559 · Cited by 36
“On the contrary, they adopt what (Sugden, 2003) calls “team reasoning,” adopting “team preferences” (Sugden, 2000), leading to the formation of a We frame.”
Feeling Up to It – The Sense of Ability in the Phenomenology of Action
Schmid, H. B. (2011) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1266-9_12 · Cited by 32
The Effect of Group Identity On Distributive Choice: Social Preference or Heuristic?
Guala, F., & Filippin, A. (2015) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12311 · Cited by 31
“…(2007); Chen and Li (2009); Cooper and Kagel (2005); Eckel and Grossman (2005); Efferson et al. (2008); Filippin and Guala (2013); Goette et al. (2010); Guala et al. (2013); Güth et al. (2009); Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009); Ruffle and Sosis (2006); Sutter (2009); Sugden (2000); Zizzo (2011).”
Social information processing in strategic decision-making: Why timing matters
Abele, S., Bless, H., & Ehrhart, K. (2003) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2003.08.001 · Cited by 31
Rational Choice Epistemology and Belief Formation in Mass Politics
Dickson, E. S. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951629806067454 · Cited by 30
“Beyond the obvious case of group unanimity, Sugden (2000) provides a useful account of ‘team preferences’ that describes a coherent group preference in situations when individuals take themselves to be acting as members of a ‘team’ with a clearly understood objective.”
BackgroundBounded self‐interest: a basis for constructive organizational politics
Gotsis, G., & Kortezi, Z. (2011) · Management Research Review · doi:10.1108/01409171111117889 · Cited by 34
Under trusting eyes: the responsive nature of trust
Pelligra, V. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.006 · Cited by 29
Responsibility Voids and Cooperation
Duijf, H. (2018) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393118767084 · Cited by 29
“In addition, Sugden (2000, 193) writes, “If two or more different combinations of strategies yield exactly the same utility for the team, this decision rule fails to determine what each individual should do.””
Team reasoning, framing and cooperation
Gold, N. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511792601.010 · Cited by 29
You are not in my boat: common fate and discrimination against outgroup members
Zizzo, D. J. (2010) · International Review of Economics · doi:10.1007/s12232-010-0108-3 · Cited by 29
Institutional Foundations for Shared Growth in Sub‐Saharan Africa*
Nissanke, M. K., & Sindzingre, A. N. (2006) · African Development Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8268.2006.00149.x · Cited by 29
Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes
Attanasi, G., Hopfensitz, A., Lorini, E., et al. (2016) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.02.006 · Cited by 25
“Coordination on the (B,B) outcome in the baseline game, and on the ((In,B),B) outcome in the entrance game can however be explained by theories of team reasoning (Bacharach, 1999; Sugden, 2000, 2003).”
BackgroundHappiness and Individualism: A Very Difficult Union
Zamagni, S. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199286280.003.0013 · Cited by 26
The normativity of Lewis Conventions
Guala, F. (2012) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0131-x · Cited by 24
“Sugden (2000) and Bacharach (2006) theories of “team reasoning” also reject Gilbert’s notion of commitment and restrict normativity to the “ought” of logical inference.”
BackgroundRules, Social Ontology and Collective Identity
Martins, N. O. (2009) · Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00406.x · Cited by 24
Hodgson, G. M. (2007) · Voprosy Ekonomiki · doi:10.32609/0042-8736-2007-8-28-48 · Cited by 24
What have we learnt from 20 years of economic research into culture?
Herrmann‐Pillath, C. (2010) · International Journal of Cultural Studies · doi:10.1177/1367877910369966 · Cited by 22
The Multidimensionality of Poverty: An Institutionalist Perspective
Sindzingre, A. N. (2013) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230592407_4 · Cited by 22
Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-Following as Performative ActionPreprint
Herrmann‐Pillath, C. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1745437 · Cited by 23
Institutions, distributed cognition and agency: rule-following as performative action
Herrmann‐Pillath, C. (2012) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2012.661066 · Cited by 20
Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?
Schmid, H. B. (2003) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/10002003098538750 · Cited by 20
“In Sugden’s view, “a team exists to the extent that its members take themselves to be members of it“; Sugden (2000), p. 192. ality.”
BackgroundInvisible-hand explanations: From blindness to lack of we-ness
Tieffenbach, E. (2013) · Social Science Information · doi:10.1177/0539018413482536 · Cited by 18
“An individual engaged in team-directed reasoning appraises alternative arrays of action by members of the team in relation to [the] team-directed preferences’ (Sugden, 2000: 187).”
An intersubjective model of agency for game theory
Brown, V. (2020) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267119000294 · Cited by 17
TEAM REASONING AND A MEASURE OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE IN GAMES
Karpus, J., & Radžvilas, M. (2017) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267117000153 · Cited by 17
Team reasoning and group identification
Hindriks, F. (2012) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463111429274 · Cited by 16
“Sugden (2000) emphasizes this by using the term ‘team-directed reasoning’ rather than the more established term ‘team reasoning’.”
BackgroundInfluentialCOLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS, GROUP PLANS AND INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS
Tamminga, A., & Duijf, H. (2016) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267116000213 · Cited by 15
“Therefore, if we think of acting rationally as performing those actions that best promote deontic ideality, our theorem would establish a connection between collective rationality and individual rationality.”
Sugden, R. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.004 · Cited by 15
Self-citationHegel’s 'Objective Spirit' and its Contemporary Relevance for the Philosophy of Economics
Boldyrev, I. A., & Herrmann‐Pillath, C. (2012) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1007/s11299-012-0111-3 · Cited by 15
Financial inclusion in rural Uganda: The role of social capital and generational values
Bongomin, G. O. C., Munene, J. C. K., Mpeera, J. N., et al. (2017) · Cogent Business & Management · doi:10.1080/23311975.2017.1302866 · Cited by 15
“Recently, considerable body of research has been devoted to the role of trust in shaping different kinds of transactions, especially in rural financial development (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Sudgen, 2000).”
BackgroundCollective Actors without Collective Minds
Salas, J. G. D. P., & Bonilla, J. Z. (2014) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393113520397 · Cited by 14
“To count as a rational agent, it is enough that a 23See, for example, Sugden (2000).”
BackgroundClassical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions
Ross, D. (2008) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9028-1 · Cited by 13
Capabilities and social cohesion
Lanzi, D. (2011) · Cambridge Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/cje/ber015 · Cited by 13
Coordinación y acción colectiva
Miller, L. (2007) · Revista Internacional de Sociología · doi:10.3989/ris.2007.i46.8 · Cited by 13
Schmid, H. B. (2003) · American Journal of Economics and Sociology · doi:10.1111/1536-7150.t01-1-00003 · Cited by 13
Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation
Szanto, T. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02002 · Cited by 12
“…Irving Janis in terms of a paradigmatic instance of what he famously coined “groupthink” 13Cf. also Gilbert (2001), who convincingly argues against Sugden (2000) for the stronger claim that “collective preferences” give sufficient normative reasons for the members of a group to act in the light…”
BackgroundMotor representation in acting together
Sinigaglia, C., & Butterfill, S. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03539-8 · Cited by 12
“…of knowledge (Blomberg, 2016; Rödl, 2018; Roessler, 2020; Satne, 2020), of norms (Bicchieri, 2016), of awareness (Schmid, 2013), of temporal coordination (Issartel et al., 2007; Oullier et al., 2008), of reasoning (Gold & Sugden, 2007; Pacherie, 2013; Sugden, 2000), and of agents (Helm, 2008).”
The irreducibility of collective obligations
Tamminga, A., & Hindriks, F. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-01236-2 · Cited by 12
“22 In the theoretical economics literature, the preferred term is team reasoning (Bacharach 1999, 2006; Sugden 1993, 2000, 2003).”
BackgroundInterpersonal relations and economics: comments from a feminist perspective
Nelson, J. A. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.013 · Cited by 14
Postema, G. J. (2008) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9031-6 · Cited by 12
The Structure of Group Identification
Taipale, J. (2019) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9463-y · Cited by 9
“2007, p. 431); in terms of the self seeing itself as a distinct individual influenced by the group (Sugden 2000, p. 184; Self and Chatman 2010, p. 413; Ellemers 2010, p. 798); or as an extension of the self beyond the individual level (Brewer 1991, p. 476).”
BackgroundApproaching Collectivity Collectively: A Multi-Disciplinary Account of Collective Action
Thonhauser, G., & Weichold, M. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.740664 · Cited by 13
“The answer seems obvious: each should choose right” (Sugden, 2000, p. 179).”
BackgroundLet's meet up! The role of relational goods in promoting cooperation
Becchetti, L., Antoni, G. D., & Faillo, M. (2010) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2010.06.011 · Cited by 11
What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours
Lecouteux, G. (2018) · Revue d économie politique · doi:10.3917/redp.283.0311 · Cited by 11
“The relevance of TR for game theory was first highlighted by Sugden (1991), who then suggested a game theoretical analysis of unselfish behaviours based on TR (Sugden 1993, 2000, 2003).”
BackgroundHic sunt leones: interpersonal relations as unexplored territory in the tradition of economics
Bruni, L. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.011 · Cited by 11
The effects of social ties on coordination: conceptual foundations for an empirical analysis
Attanasi, G., Hopfensitz, A., Lorini, E., et al. (2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9320-4 · Cited by 10
“Team-directed reasoning is the kind of reasoning that people use when they perceive themselves as acting as members of a group or team (Sugden 2000).”
BackgroundCostless discrimination and unequal achievements in an experimental tournament
Filippin, A., & Guala, F. (2012) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-012-9334-8 · Cited by 11
“…(2009), Zizzo (2011). the effect of ethnic identity, race, and religion in economic contexts.3 This empirical work was partly stimulated by a budding theoretical literature that aims at incorporating group identity into economic modeling (e.g. Sugden 2000; Bacharach 2006; Akerlof and Kranton 2010).”
On virtual communities: individual motivations, reciprocity and we-rationality
Aréna, R., & Conein, B. (2008) · International Review of Economics · doi:10.1007/s12232-007-0033-2 · Cited by 10
Beyond rationality: Rigor without mortis in game theory
Colman, A. M. (2003) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0350005x · Cited by 11
Diversity, identity, and the indeterminacy of the size of nations
Herrmann‐Pillath, C. (2008) · European Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1007/s10657-008-9060-z · Cited by 9
Making our ends meet: shared intention, goal adoption and the third-person perspective
Tummolini, L. (2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9318-y · Cited by 8
“They argue that the distinctive mode of reasoning that generates a collective intention is team reasoning in which agency is attributed to groups and not to individuals (see also Sugden 2000, 2011 and Bacharach 2006).”
BackgroundThe Samaritan’s Curse: moral individuals and immoral groups
Basu, K. (2021) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267121000067 · Cited by 9
“We can of course talk of shared preferences, as exemplified by expressions like ‘we prefer’ (Sugden 2000), or the use of what is referred to as the ‘we mode’ approach (Tuomela 2006), but it is arguable that this is distinct from group agency.”
BackgroundSugden, R. (2005) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230523203_9 · Cited by 9
Self-citationCollective intention, social identity, and rational choice
de Boer, J. (2008) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/13501780801919139 · Cited by 9
“Examples of economists/economic methodologists involved include Robert Sugden (1993, 2000), John Davis (2003a,b, 2006), and Michael Bacharach (1999), and some of the philosophers working on this subject are Margaret Gilbert (1989, 1996, 2000), Raimo Tuomela (1995, 1988 with Miller), Michael Bratman (1992, 1993) and Jo…”
BackgroundFrom Individual Responsibility to 'Shared' Social Responsibilities: Concepts for a New ParadigmPreprint
Sacconi, L. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1778108 · Cited by 9
Coordination, Team Reasoning, and Solution Thinking
Guala, F. (2018) · Revue d économie politique · doi:10.3917/redp.283.0355 · Cited by 8
Solving the Hi-lo Paradox: Equilibria, Beliefs, and Coordination
Guala, F. (2020) · Studies in the philosophy of sociality · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_9 · Cited by 8
The long-term viability of team reasoning
Amadae, S. M., & Lempert, D. B. (2015) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2015.1024880 · Cited by 7
“Bacharach (1999, 2006) and Sugden (1993, 2000) propose team reasoning as an alternative account of how people make decisions when interacting with others.”
BackgroundTeti, S. L. (2023) · Metamedicine · doi:10.1007/s11017-023-09608-4 · Cited by 7
Stone Age Minds and Group Selection – What difference do they make?
Vromen, J. (2002) · Constitutional Political Economy · doi:10.1023/a:1015325919459 · Cited by 7
What Mutual Assistance Is, and What It Could Be in the Contemporary World
Nalli, F. (2021) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-021-04936-8 · Cited by 7
“A similar idea can be found in the expression buon costume, that is, the “customary standards of acceptable or decent behaviour” or the “basic level of virtue which everyone is entitled to expect of everyone else” (Bruni & Sugden, 2000, 38).”
BackgroundInfluentialHamlin, A. (2014) · Constitutional Political Economy · doi:10.1007/s10602-014-9153-3 · Cited by 7
“Se e, for example, Sugden, R. (2000) 'Team preferences ', Economics and Philosophy, 16(02), 175-204.”
A Theoretical Framework for the Understanding of Teams
Gilbert, M. P. (2005) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230523203_2 · Cited by 7
Buyer Beware: A Critique of Leading Virtue Ethics Defenses of Markets
Fumagalli, R. (2020) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12336 · Cited by 6
Equilibrium as compatibility of plans
Hudík, M. (2020) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-020-09753-5 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Sugden, R.
- Affiliations
- University of East Anglia (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Sugden, Robert
- ORCID
- Sugden, Robert
- Venue
- Economics and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 175-204
- ISSN
- 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0028
- OpenAlex
- W4239546423
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 16
- FWCI
- 2.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Economics and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- preference aggregation, group decision making, decision making under uncertainty
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review