The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Modeling Rational Players: Part I
Abstract
Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can be made that here is the “right” solution concept for such games.
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Cites
A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE
Simon, H. A. (1955) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884852 · Cited by 15,877
Nash, J. (1951) · The Annals of Mathematics · doi:10.2307/1969529 · Cited by 7,002
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511806292 · Cited by 6,922
The Foundations of Statistics.
Good, I. J., & Savage, L. J. (1955) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2343133 · Cited by 4,582
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery
(1976) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171472 · Cited by 2,343
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159 · Cited by 2,147
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912767 · Cited by 1,692
Foundations of the Theory of Probability
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Cited by
Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions
DENZAU, A. T., & NORTH, D. C. (1994) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02246.x · Cited by 2,194
Agent-based computational models and generative social science
Epstein, J. M. (1999) · Complexity · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0526(199905/06)4:5<41::aid-cplx9>3.0.co;2-f · Cited by 1,103
Asset Pricing Under Endogenous Expectations in an Artificial Stock Market
Arthur, W. B., Holland, J. H., LeBaron, B. D., Palmer, R. G., & Tayler, P. (1997) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2252 · Cited by 817
Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
Aumann, R. J. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80015-6 · Cited by 588
Sugden, R. (1989) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.4.85 · Cited by 572
Metadata
- Authors
- Binmore, K.
- Venue
- Economics and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1987-10
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 179-214
- ISSN
- 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0028
- OpenAlex
- W4235581472
- Cited by
- 477
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 9.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
