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Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental
Abstract
‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist.’ Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl's phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano's: that intentionality, the mind's ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano's originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which derives from scholastic discussions of concepts or intentiones. Rather, his originality consists in his claim that the concept of intentionality marks out the subject matter of psychology: the mental. His view was that intentionality ‘is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything like it.’ This is Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental.
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Cites
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Tye, M. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001 · Cited by 1,718
The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
Shoemaker, S. (1996) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624674 · Cited by 934
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Gallagher, S. (2013) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.008 · Cited by 378
The biogenic approach to cognition
Lyon, P. (2006) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-005-0016-8 · Cited by 259
Metadata
- Authors
- Crane, T.
- Venue
- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-03
- Volume
- 43
- Pages
- 229-251
- ISSN
- 1358-2461 (ISSN-L)
- 1755-3555
- OpenAlex
- W2148705114
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 1.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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