The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
Abstract
Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like to have them. Amongst the other topics covered are the unity of consciousness, and the idea that the 'first-person perspective' gives a privileged route to philosophical understanding of the nature of mind. This major collection is sure to prove invaluable to all advanced students of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
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Different phenomenal colors dispose the subject to correspondingly different beliefs.
“and different phenomenal colors dispose to correspondingly different beliefs.”
From Panpsychism and Russellian Monism (2019) · cites this paper as Shoemaker 1996
Phenomenal colors can be identified at least in part by the beliefs they dispose the subject to form.
“For example, as defenders of functionalist analyses stress, phenomenal colors can be identified (at least in part) by the beliefs they dispose the subject to form”
From Panpsychism and Russellian Monism (2019) · cites this paper as Shoemaker 1996
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Sorted by citations
Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness.
Blanke, O. (2012) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3292 · Cited by 1,147 · see citing works
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception
Matthen, M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001 · Cited by 333 · see citing works
Self‐knowledge of personality: Do people know themselves?
Vazire, S., & Carlson, E. N. (2010) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00280.x · Cited by 265 · see citing works
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference
Metzinger, T. (2003) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1023/b:phen.0000007366.42918.eb · Cited by 162 · see citing works
Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership
Lane, T. (2012) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Panpsychism and Russellian Monism
Alter, T., & Coleman, S. (2019) · The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism · doi:10.4324/9781315717708-20 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self
Howell, R. J. (2010) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2010.10716731 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
- Authors
- Shoemaker, S.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shoemaker, Sydney
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1996-09-13
- OpenAlex
- W1561778405
- Cited by
- 934
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 57 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 39 · 2023: 76 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 71 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 19
- FWCI
- 9.70
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- first-person perspective, qualia, perceptual states, unity of consciousness, inner sense, nature of mind, conscious awareness, Sydney Shoemaker
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