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The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology

Open access
Daniel D. Hutto · 2007 · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Cited by 101

The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.

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Registry

OpenAlex · 10.1017/s1358246107000033

Cites

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Citations

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Hutto, D. D.
Venue
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Published
2007-05-01
Volume
60
Pages
43-68
ISSN
1358-2461 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1991968479
Cited by
101
References
7
FWCI
6.67
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s1358246107000033
The paper
Hutto, D. D. (2007). The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1358246107000033

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.