Cited by 1,512Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyMental Health and Psychiatry

The Phenomenological Mind

Gallagher, Shaun, Zahavi, Dan·2007·Routledge eBooks

Abstract

The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.4324/9780203086599

Cites

104 of 104 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Axiom four of IIT 3.0 confounds integration with the unity of conscious experience.

    “Axiom four of IIT 3.0, the axiom of integration, confounds integration with what phenomenologists call the unity of conscious experience [11–13].”
  • The second part of the axiom of information is Tononi's addition of information exclusion and is not part of phenomenology.

    “the second part of the definition (an experience is what it is by differing from an immense number of other possible experiences) is clearly Tononi’s addition of information exclusion to this axiom and is not a part of phenomenology [11–13].”
  • The subjective experiencing body is the fundamental basis for all feelings, sensations, perceptions or object manipulation, which in turn actively underlies cognition and meaning-making.

    “The subjective experiencing body (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007), whether engaging with the world's affordances (Gibson, 1979) through the tactile sense, movement or in stillness, is the fundamental basis for all feelings, sensations, perceptions or object manipulation which in turn actively underlies cognition and meaning-making (Merleau-Ponty, 1962& 1965;Dewey, 1991).”

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Authors
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D.
Affiliations
University of Copenhagen (DK)
Venue
Routledge eBooks
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2007-11-12
OpenAlex
W571383449
Cited by
1,512
References
106
Citations by year
2026: 66 · 2025: 128 · 2024: 129 · 2023: 129 · 2022: 127 · 2021: 114 · 2020: 113 · 2019: 120 · 2018: 98 · 2017: 92 · 2016: 75 · 2015: 69 · 2014: 73 · 2013: 53 · 2012: 40
FWCI
13.91
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
  • Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
phenomenology, philosophy of mind, consciousness, self-consciousness, perception, intentionality, embodied mind, extended mind, situated cognition, personal identity, cognitive science, William James, time and consciousness, phantom limb, blindsight, schizophrenia

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