“Thugs-for-Hire”: Subcontracting of State Coercion and State Capacity in China
Open accessAbstract
Using violence or threat of violence, “thugs-for-hire” (TFH) is a form of privatized coercion that helps states subjugate a recalcitrant population. I lay out three scope conditions under which TFH is the preferred strategy: when state actions are illegal or policies are unpopular; when evasion of state responsibility is highly desirable; and when states are weak in their capacity or are less strong than their societies. Weak states relative to strong ones are more likely to deploy TFH, mostly for the purpose of bolstering their coercive capacity; strong states use TFH for evasion of responsibility. Yet the state-TFH relationship is functional only if the state is able to maintain the upper hand over the violent agents. Focusing on China, a seemingly paradoxical case due to its traditional perception of being a strong state, I examine how local states frequently deploy TFH to evict homeowners, enforce the one-child policy, collect exorbitant exactions, and deal with petitioners and protestors. However, the increasing prevalence of “local mafia states” suggests that some of the thuggish groups have grown to usurp local governments’ autonomy. This points to the cost of relying upon TFH as a repressive strategy.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Subsequent research has shown the utility of Earl's typology.
“Subsequent research has shown the utility of this typology.”
From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [22]
Private actors, whom traditional repression research has relatively ignored to its detriment despite some recent rising interest, also have been overtly coercive online.
“Private actors, whom traditional repression research has relatively ignored to its detriment (40) despite some recent rising interest in the topic (22), also have been overtly coercive online (Table 1, cell 9).”
From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [22]
Subsequent research revealed that some of Earl's distinctions may be more complicated and/or empirically fuzzier than at first glance.
“It also revealed that some of its distinctions may be more complicated and/or empirically fuzzier than at first glance (22).”
From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [22]
Boundaries between state actors and private actors may be fuzzy, with private actors sometimes acting on their own and sometimes acting in league with or on behalf of regimes.
“For instance, boundaries between state actors and private actors may be fuzzy, with private actors sometimes acting on their own and sometimes acting in league with or on behalf of regimes.”
From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [22]
Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366 · see citing works
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353 · Cited by 3,459 · see citing works
State Repression and Political Order
Davenport, C. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 · Cited by 1,564 · cited 1× · see citing works
“4 Davenport 2007.”
The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective
Bellin, E. (2004) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.2307/4150140 · Cited by 1,020 · see citing works
Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring
Bellin, E. (2011) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041512798838021 · Cited by 877 · see citing works
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
Miller, G. J. (2005) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104840 · Cited by 867 · see citing works
Avant, D. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490866 · Cited by 706 · see citing works
Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression
Earl, J. (2003) · Sociological Theory · doi:10.1111/1467-9558.00175 · Cited by 515 · see citing works
Cheibub, J. A. (1998) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100012843 · Cited by 409 · see citing works
High‐Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina
Loveman, M. (1998) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/210045 · Cited by 404 · see citing works
Mueller, J. E. (2000) · International Security · doi:10.1162/016228800560381 · Cited by 391 · see citing works
The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome
de Rouen, K. R., & Sobek, D. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043771 · Cited by 384 · see citing works
Dictators and their Secret Police
Greitens, S. C. (2016) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316489031 · Cited by 365 · see citing works
Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China
Tsui, K., & Wang, Y. (2004) · The China Quarterly · doi:10.1017/s0305741004000050 · Cited by 353 · see citing works
Pei, M. (2016) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/9780674974340 · Cited by 296 · see citing works
States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence
Carey, S. C., Mitchell, N. J., & Lowe, W. (2013) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343312464881 · Cited by 210 · see citing works
Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability
Carey, S. C., Colaresi, M. P., & Mitchell, N. J. (2015) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002715576747 · Cited by 192 · see citing works
Fertility Policy and Implementation in China, 1986-88
Hardee-Cleaveland, K., & Banister, J. (1988) · Population and Development Review · doi:10.2307/1973572 · Cited by 153 · see citing works
Mitchell, N. J. (2004) · Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks · doi:10.1057/9781403973696 · Cited by 149 · see citing works
The Hollow State: Rural Governance in China
Smith, G. (2010) · The China Quarterly · doi:10.1017/s0305741010000615 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the Cold War
Way, L. A., & Levitsky, S. (2006) · Communist and Post-Communist Studies · doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001 · Cited by 142 · see citing works
Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early and Mid-Qing China
Ownby, D. (1996) · Stanford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780804764841 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Repression, Response, and Contained Escalation Under "Liberalized" Authoritarianism in Jordan
Moss, D. (2014) · Mobilization: An International Quarterly · doi:10.17813/maiq.19.3.q508v72264766u92 · Cited by 107 · see citing works
Between Developmental and Clientelist States: Local State-Business Relationships in China
Ong, L. H. (2011) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041512798838030 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
Self-citationMartin, B. G. (1996) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520916432 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
The Face of "Grassroots Democracy" in Rural China: Real Versus Cosmetic Elections
Kennedy, J. J. (2002) · Asian Survey · doi:10.1525/as.2002.42.3.456 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda
Roessler, P. G. (2005) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.2307/20072883 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Coercive capacity and the durability of the Chinese communist state
Wang, Y. (2014) · Communist and Post-Communist Studies · doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.01.009 · Cited by 57 · see citing works
Biddulph, S. (2015) · University of British Columbia Press eBooks · doi:10.59962/9780774828826 · Cited by 57 · see citing works
Empowering the Police: How the Chinese Communist Party Manages Its Coercive Leaders
Wang, Y. (2014) · The China Quarterly · doi:10.1017/s0305741014000769 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Politics of Revenue Extraction in Post-communist States: Poland and Russia Compared
Easter, G. M. (2002) · Political Theory · doi:10.1177/0090591702030004005 · Cited by 52 · see citing works
Human Rights Violations, Corruption, and the Policy of Repression
Bohara, A. K., Mitchell, N. J., Nepal, M., et al. (2008) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2007.00250.x · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Day, A. F. (2013) · The Journal of Peasant Studies · doi:10.1080/03066150.2013.859138 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Crime, politics and business in 1990s Ukraine
Kuzio, T. (2014) · Communist and Post-Communist Studies · doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.04.011 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Assessing and Explaining the Resurgence of China's Criminal Underworld
Xia, M. (2006) · Global Crime · doi:10.1080/17440570601014420 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
The Chinese mafia: private protection in a socialist market economy
Wang, P. (2011) · Global Crime · doi:10.1080/17440572.2011.616055 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Ong, L. H. (2012) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/cornell/9780801450624.001.0001 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Self-citationFinance and rural governance: centralization and local challenges
Kennedy, J. J. (2013) · The Journal of Peasant Studies · doi:10.1080/03066150.2013.866096 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Revolution and repression in Tiananmen square
Calhoun, C. J. (1989) · Society · doi:10.1007/bf02700237 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
PUBLIC ORDERING OF PRIVATE COERCION: URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA
Porteux, J. N., & Kim, S. (2016) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/jea.2016.20 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Land Developers, States, and Collusive Clientelism in Marketizing C hina
Paik, W. (2014) · Pacific Focus · doi:10.1111/pafo.12021 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Joshua Oppenheimer (dir.), The Act of Killing
Rafter, N. (2014) · Theoretical Criminology · doi:10.1177/1362480613506645 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Earl, J. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abl8198 · Cited by 250 · see citing works
- Authors
- Ong, L. H.
- Affiliations
- University of Toronto (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Ong, Lynette H.
- ORCID
- Ong, Lynette H.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2018-04-06
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 680-695
- ISSN
- 1537-5927 (ISSN-L)
- 1541-0986
- OpenAlex
- W2796131283
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 6
- FWCI
- 22.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- autopapers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Perspectives on Politics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
- Keywords
- state capacity, state weakness, local autonomy
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review