The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The motivated use of moral principles
Open accessAbstract
Five studies demonstrated that people selectively use general moral principles to rationalize preferred moral conclusions. In Studies 1a and 1b, college students and community respondents were presented with variations on a traditional moral scenario that asked whether it was permissible to sacrifice one innocent man in order to save a greater number of people. Political liberals, but not relatively more conservative participants, were more likely to endorse consequentialism when the victim had a stereotypically White American name than when the victim had a stereotypically Black American name. Study 2 found evidence suggesting participants believe that the moral principles they are endorsing are general in nature: when presented sequentially with both versions of the scenario, liberals again showed a bias in their judgments to the initial scenario, but demonstrated consistency thereafter. Study 3 found conservatives were more likely to endorse the unintended killing of innocent civilians when Iraqis civilians were killed than when Americans civilians were killed, while liberals showed no significant effect. In Study 4, participants primed with patriotism were more likely to endorse consequentialism when Iraqi civilians were killed by American forces than were participants primed with multiculturalism. However, this was not the case when American civilians were killed by Iraqi forces. Implications for the role of reason in moral judgment are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
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Rationalizing meat consumption. The 4Ns
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Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Dispositions of Self-Identified Libertarians
Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Graham, J., Ditto, P., & Haidt, J. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0042366 · Cited by 669
Self-citationDitto, P. H., Liu, B. S., Clark, C. J., Wojcik, S. P., Chen, E. E., Grady, R. H., Celniker, J. B., & Zinger, J. F. (2019) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691617746796 · Cited by 535
Self-citationKahan, D. M. (2016) · Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0417 · Cited by 341
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Farias, M., & Savulescu, J. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.005 · Cited by 315
Metadata
- Authors
- Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., Tannenbaum, D., & Ditto, P. H.
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-10
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 479-491
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4313425143
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 3.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., Tannenbaum, D., & Ditto, P. H. (2009). The motivated use of moral principles. Judgment and Decision Making. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500004022
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.