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Cited by 535Social and Intergroup PsychologyAcademic Freedom and PoliticsElectoral Systems and Political Participation

At Least Bias Is Bipartisan: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and Conservatives

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Ditto, Peter H., Liu, Brittany S., Clark, Cory J., Wojcik, Sean P., Chen, Eric E., Grady, Rebecca H., Celniker, Jared B., Zinger, Joanne F.·2019·Perspectives on Psychological Science
DOI 10.1177/1745691617746796
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Abstract

Both liberals and conservatives accuse their political opponents of partisan bias, but is there empirical evidence that one side of the political aisle is indeed more biased than the other? To address this question, we meta-analyzed the results of 51 experimental studies, involving over 18,000 participants, that examined one form of partisan bias—the tendency to evaluate otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports one’s political beliefs or allegiances than when it challenges those beliefs or allegiances. Two hypotheses based on previous literature were tested: an asymmetry hypothesis (predicting greater partisan bias in conservatives than in liberals) and a symmetry hypothesis (predicting equal levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives). Mean overall partisan bias was robust ( r = .245), and there was strong support for the symmetry hypothesis: Liberals ( r = .235) and conservatives ( r = .255) showed no difference in mean levels of bias across studies. Moderator analyses reveal this pattern to be consistent across a number of different methodological variations and political topics. Implications of the current findings for the ongoing ideological symmetry debate and the role of partisan bias in scientific discourse and political conflict are discussed.

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  • All of these mechanisms, sometimes grouped under 'myside bias', can contribute to issue polarization, insofar as individuals often become more extreme in their opinions after selectively processing the evidence on specific topics such as capital punishment, immigration, healthcare policy or climate change.

    “All of these mechanisms, which are sometimes grouped under the general rubric of ‘myside bias’111–113, can contribute to issue polarization, insofar as individuals often become more extreme in their opinions after selectively processing the evidence on specific topics such as capital punishment, immigration, healthcare policy or climate change114,115.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [115]

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  • People may evaluate the same information more favourably when it supports (versus contradicts) the beliefs, opinions and values of one's political in-group.

    “For example, people may evaluate the same information more favourably when it supports (versus contradicts) the beliefs, opinions and values of one’s political in-group103,115,120.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [115]

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Authors
Ditto, P. H., Liu, B. S., Clark, C. J., Wojcik, S. P., Chen, E. E., Grady, R. H., Celniker, J. B., & Zinger, J. F.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Irvine (US)
  • Kalamazoo College (US)
  • Florida State University (US)
Corresponding author
Ditto, Peter H.
ORCID
Venue
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Publisher
SAGE Publications
Published
2018-05-31
Volume
14
Issue
2
Pages
273-291
ISSN
  • 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
  • 1745-6924
DOI
10.1177/1745691617746796
OpenAlex
W2611901353
Cited by
535
References
17
Citations by year
2026: 64 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 70 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 71 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 71 · 2019: 40 · 2018: 11
FWCI
113.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Perspectives on Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Durham Research Online (Durham University) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Academic Freedom and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
partisan bias, liberals, conservatives, political ideology, confirmation bias, information evaluation, political conflict, scientific discourse
MeSH terms
Group Processes, Humans, Motivation, Politics, Prejudice, Thinking

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