The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Machines, Plants and Animals: the Origins of Agency
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“A more substantive notion of agency can be defined by adding three conditions to Russell and Norvig's account.”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Dretske 1999
Citations
Cites
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes
Dretske, F. (1988) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2927.001.0001 · Cited by 1,512
Self-citationExplaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes
(1988) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-0865 · Cited by 1,189
The Hidden Dimensions of Spacetime
Freedman, D. Z., & van Nieuwenhuizen, P. (1985) · Scientific American · doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0385-74 · Cited by 43
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- McFarland, D. (ed.): 1987, Animal Behavior. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Paige, K. N. and T. G. Whitham: 1985, Report of research published in Science. Scientific American 252(4), 74.
Cited by
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence*
Camp, E. (2009) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00245.x · Cited by 211
Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence
List, C. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-021-00454-7 · Cited by 173
Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts
Newen, A., & Bartels, A. (2007) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080701358096 · Cited by 130
“Fred Dretske (1999) suggests an account which characterizes conceptual content by means of causal correlations to some real entities and its causal relevance to the behavior of the system.”
BackgroundUnderstanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
“Third, connections of autonomy, efficacy and planning to agency are also commonly drawn (Butlin 2022; Chan et al. 2023; Dretske 1999).”
BackgroundThe transition to experiencing II. The evolution of associative learning based on feelings.
Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2007) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1162/biot.2007.2.3.231 · Cited by 47
“The importance of associative learning in ontogeny and evolution has not escaped the notice of philosophers (Dennett 1995; Beisecker 1999; Dretske 1999), and psychologists consider associative learning to be the most fundamental form of learning.”
BackgroundReinforcement learning and artificial agency
Butlin, P. (2024) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12458 · Cited by 40
Writing the Lives of Plants: Phytography and the Botanical Imagination
Ryan, J. C. (2020) · a/b Auto/Biography Studies · doi:10.1080/08989575.2020.1720181 · Cited by 36
Amaya, S. (2011) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00838.x · Cited by 50
Trigg, J. L., Thompson, K. R., Smith, B. P., & Bennett, P. C. (2016) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12233 · Cited by 28
I’m just sitting around doing nothing: on exercising intentional agency in omitting to act
Buckareff, A. A. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1424-x · Cited by 25
Distributed cognition criteria: Defined, operationalized, and applied to human-dog systems
Amon, M. J., & Favela, L. H. (2019) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2019.03.001 · Cited by 18
Pollon, S. C. (2007) · UWSpace (University of Waterloo) · Cited by 16
Thinking ET: A discussion of exopsychology
Döbler, N. A., & Raab, M. H. (2021) · Acta Astronautica · doi:10.1016/j.actaastro.2021.09.032 · Cited by 12
Are Animals Capable of Concepts?
Stephan, A. (1999) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1023/a:1005509828398 · Cited by 18
Biological Mistakes: What They Are and What They Mean for the Experimental Biologist
Oderberg, D. S., Hill, J., Austin, C. J., Bojak, I., Cinotti, F., & Gibbins, J. M. (2023) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/724444 · Cited by 8
The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?
Hofmann, F., & Schulte, P. (2014) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-014-0218-8 · Cited by 7
Montminy, M. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500229837 · Cited by 5
“This criterion sees a thinker as a ‘consumer’ of representations (see Dretske, 1999; Millikan, 1989).”
BackgroundDennett’s Overlooked Originality
Beisecker, D. (2006) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-006-9017-3 · Cited by 3
“See in particular Dretske (1988, 1999) and Bennett (1990, 1991).”
BackgroundFacing the mirror: A relativist account of immune nonconceptual self-representations
Lafraire, J. (2016) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1259467 · Cited by 3
“introduction by Evans (1982). The aim of the present paper is not to provide an”
BackgroundBehavioural Explanation in the Realm of Non-mental Computing Agents
Aguilera, B. (2015) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-015-9362-1 · Cited by 2
“Dretske (1999) gives the example of machines as a paradigmatic case of mindless information-processing systems.”
BackgroundPendlebury, M. (2002) · South African Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.4314/sajpem.v21i3.31346 · Cited by 2
Oswald, D. (2021) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-021-01339-1 · Cited by 2
“(Dretske 1999) Shannon and Weaver talked of machines that "communicate" to exchange "information".”
BackgroundMisselhorn, C. (2025) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781394238651.ch29 · Cited by 1
Session IV: The Evolutive Mind: The uniqueness of human social ontology
Runehov, A. L. C. (2011) · Pensamiento Revista de investigación e información filosófica · Cited by 1
Explicaciones intencionales y explicaciones teleológicas de la conducta animal
Danón, L. (2011) · Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento ( RACC ) · doi:10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5233 · Cited by 1
“…1990; Brittan, 1999); para representarse objetos, estados de cosas, situaciones, etc., distanciándose de su aquí y ahora inmediato (Brittan, 1999; Dretske, 1999); para actuar siguiendo razones (Bermúdez, 2003; Drestke, 1999) y, finalmente, para cometer errores en lo que se piensa acerca del…”
BackgroundDifferent Roots of Human Intentionality in Mammalian Mentality
Hendrichs, H. (1999) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1023/a:1005501626581 · Cited by 1
Mindedness : on the minimal conditions for possessing a mind
Aguilera, B. (2013) · White Rose eTheses Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York)
Information: In-form to perform
Beynon‐Davies, P. (2011) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230295025_8
Una visión naturalista de la ontología de las entidades técnicas
Badallo, A. C. (2021) · Humanidades revista de la Universidad de Montevideo · doi:10.25185/10.6 · Cited by 2
Osman, M. (2010) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781444328226.refs
Runehov, A. L. C. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44392-8_3
Webb, J. R. (2023) · University of North Texas Digital Library (University of North Texas) · doi:10.12794/metadc2179235
The Human Capacity for Measurement with a Unit
Bayırlı, İ. K. (2025) · Journal of Logic Language and Information · doi:10.1007/s10849-025-09432-0
“Dretske (1999) discusses some birds that distinguish between different kinds of butterflies and learn to avoid eating the members of the Monarch (sub-)family, which are typically poisonous to them.”
On the Nature of Mistakes in Nature
Austin, C. J., Oderberg, D. S., & Hill, J. (2025) · Global Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10516-025-09762-5
“…higher-order animals, the intrinsic environmentally responsive capabilities of plants are often characterised agentially (Maher 2017; Marder 2013; Dretske 1999), and this ‘minimal’ sense of ‘agent’ has also – rightly we think – recently been argued by Shapiro (2020) to extend to all living…”
Large language models belong in our social ontology as social agents
AbuMusab, S. (2024) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
Illocutionary Complexity: An Approach to the Nature and Origins of Dependent Illocutionary ActsPreprint
Gómez, J. B. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6591389
The folk concept of moral agency
Demaree‐Cotton, J., & Semler, J. (2026) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106753
Metadata
- Authors
- Dretske, F. I.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Dretske, Fred I.
- Venue
- Erkenntnis
- Published
- 1999-09
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 523-535
- ISSN
- 0165-0106 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8420
- OpenAlex
- W396987303
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 7.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Erkenntnis (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- agency, machines, plants, animals, animal agency, artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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