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Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games
Open accessAbstract
In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others’ actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects’ preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.
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Cited by
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On the Nature of Fair Behavior
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1093/ei/41.1.20 · Cited by 728
Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis
Barr, A., & Serra, D. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.006 · Cited by 493
Driving forces behind informal sanctions
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x · Cited by 451
Understanding Social Preference with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.224577 · Cited by 439
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Metadata
- Authors
- Brandts, J., & Charness, G.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-03
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 227-238
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W3124889794
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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