On the Nature of Fair Behavior
Abstract
This article shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means in particular that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs.
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Altruistic punishment is a prominent solution to the challenge of free riding.
“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [10]
Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance.
“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [10]
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Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 · Cited by 2,416 · see citing works
Self-citationFehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00027 · Cited by 1,061 · see citing works
Self-citationPositive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659 · see citing works
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2000) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203115 · Cited by 293 · see citing works
Self-citationAlgorithm exploitation: Humans are keen to exploit benevolent AI
Karpus, J., Krüger, A., Verba, J. T., Bahrami, B., & Deroy, O. (2021) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.102679 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
The other side of the coin: oxytocin decreases the adherence to fairness norms
Radke, S., & de Bruijn, E. R. A. (2012) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00193 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
Considerations of fairness in the adolescent brain
Crone, E. A. (2013) · Child Development Perspectives · doi:10.1111/cdep.12022 · Cited by 48 · see citing works
Radke, S., Schäfer, I. C., Müller, B. W., & de Bruijn, E. R. A. (2013) · Psychiatry Research · doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2013.07.017 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Cooperation without punishment
Battu, B., & Rahwan, T. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-28372-y · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Zanolie, K., & Crone, E. A. (2021) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2021.108020 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
- Authors
- Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (US)
- Corresponding author
- Falk, Armin
- Fehr, Ernst
- Fischbacher, Urs
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 20-26
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W3122927161
- Cited by
- 728
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 38 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 45 · 2012: 57
- FWCI
- 76.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Economic Inquiry (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- ultimatum game, consequentialism, alternatives, negative reciprocity, distributional preferences
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