Cited by 728Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsGame Theory and Voting Systems

On the Nature of Fair Behavior

Falk, Armin, Fehr, Ernst, Fischbacher, Urs·2003·Economic Inquiry

Abstract

This article shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means in particular that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs.

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Crossref · 10.1093/ei/41.1.20

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  • Altruistic punishment is a prominent solution to the challenge of free riding.

    “Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [10]

  • Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance.

    “Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [10]

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Authors
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
Affiliations
  • University of Zurich (CH)
  • John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (US)
Corresponding author
  • Falk, Armin
  • Fehr, Ernst
  • Fischbacher, Urs
Venue
Economic Inquiry
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2003-01
Volume
41
Issue
1
Pages
20-26
ISSN
  • 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
  • 0095-2583
  • 1465-7295
OpenAlex
W3122927161
Cited by
728
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 38 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 45 · 2012: 57
FWCI
76.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Economic Inquiry (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
ultimatum game, consequentialism, alternatives, negative reciprocity, distributional preferences

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