Emergent Properties of a Market-based Digital Library with Strategic Agents
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Claims the paper makes
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- Findingreasoning
The p-strategy seller works well when the auction is dynamic and the negotiation zone between the buyer and the seller is wide.
“the p-strategy seller works well when the auction is dynamic and the negotiation zone between the buyer and the seller is wide.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The total profit eventually decreases with increasing numbers of p-strategy agents.
“The total profit eventually decreases with increasing numbers of p-strategy agents”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
A simple strategy is sometimes as effective.
“and that a simple strategy is sometimes as effective.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
When the number of p-strategy agents increases, the number of matches decreases.
“When the number of p-strategy agents increases, the number of matches decreases”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
When competing with FM-sellers with various markups, the p-seller always gets a higher profit.
“When competing with FM-sellers with various markups, the p-seller always gets a higher profit.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingnone given
The p-strategy works better than other types of sellers.
“Having established that the p-strategy works better, we have then examined the market and allocation efficiency with varying numbers of p-strategy agents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
In the UMDL, an agent in its lifetime meets many different agents, and as a result its model of other agents is incomplete.
“In the UMDL, an agent in its lifetime meets many different agents, and as a result its model of other agents is incomplete.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The total profit does not decrease as sharply as expected.
“The total profit, however, does not decrease as sharply as we had expected.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The market efficiency of the UMDL represented by total profit will not decrease sharply with increasing number of strategic agents.
“the market efficiency of the UMDL represented by the total profit will not decrease sharply with increasing number of strategic agents.”
- Also stated in: § 7. Conclusion and future work · plain
“It is reassuring from the system designers' viewpoints that the market efficiency of the UMDL does not decrease sharply”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 7. Conclusion and future work · plain
- Findingreasoning
The CP-seller works better when getting more matches does not increase its cost much (e.g., when beta is zero).
“the CP-seller works better when Ž .getting more matches does not increase its cost much e.g., when  is zero .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The p-strategy works well in the dynamic UMDL auction.
“the p-strategy works well in the dynamic Ž .UMDL auction”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The introduction of more strategic agents does not make a significant difference.
“Hence, the introduction of more strategic agents does not make a significant difference.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
When the number of standing sellers is five, the p-strategy seller bids a lower price when there is one buyer than when there is no buyer.
“When the number of standing sellers is five at the .right end of the graph , however, the p-strategy seller bids a lower price when there is one buyer than when there is no buyer.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Having multiple p-strategy agents increases market efficiency slightly up to some point.
“As shown in Figure 12, having multiple p-strategy agents increases the market efficiency slightly up to some point.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
In general, the seller raises its best offer price when there are more standing buyers to increase the profit of a possible match.
“In general, the Ž seller raises its best offer price when there are more standing buyers to increase .Ž the profit of a possible match .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The profit of the p-strategy smart agent decreases as the number of p-strategy equally smart agents increases.
“the profit of the p-strategy smart Ž .agent decreases as the number of p-strategy equally smart agents increases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Strategic thinking is not always beneficial.
“Our experiments show that strategic thinking is not always beneficial”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The advantage of being strategic decreases with the arrival of equally strategic agents.
“the advantage of being strategic decreases with the arrival of equally strategic agents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
If all other agents use the p-strategy, an agent with a simple strategy can do just as well, while incurring less overhead.
“if all the other agents use the p-strategy, an agent with a simple strategy Ž .e.g., fixed markup can do just as well, while incurring less overhead to gather information and compute bids.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: A self-interested agent in the UMDL system has the capability of complex strategic reasoning.
- Findingown data
The p-seller usually gets a higher profit when competing with the CP-seller.
“the p-seller usually gets a higher profit when competing Ž with the CP-seller.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The advantage of being smart decreases with the arrival of equally smart agents.
“As shown in Figure 9, the advantage of being smart decreases with the arrival of equally smart agents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: A self-interested agent in the UMDL system has the capability of complex strategic reasoning.
- Findingown data
Such reasoning is not always beneficial.
“our experiments show that such reasoning is not always beneficial.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: A self-interested agent in the UMDL system has the capability of complex strategic reasoning.
- Findingnone given
Using the p-strategy does not always pay off.
“agent designers learn that using the p-strategy does not always pay off”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A simpler strategy can be as effective when enough other agents use the p-strategy.
“a simpler strategy can be as effective when enough other agents use the p-strategy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
The UMDL auction is a continuously-clearing double auction (CDA).
“The UMDL auction is a continuously-clearing double auction CDA .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Incentive engineering is unsuccessful in the UMDL system because of the system's complexity and dynamics.
“Incentive engineering, however, is unsuccessful in the UMDL system because of the system's complexity and dynamics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The agents in the auctions are self-interested and will try to maximize their utilities in all possible ways given the current interaction protocols.
- Premisecitation
The Vickrey auction mechanism makes rational agents bid their true reservation prices.
“the Vickrey auction mechanism makes rational agents bid their true reservation prices”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [24] W. Vickrey, ''Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders,'' Journal of Finance, vol. 16, pp. 8–37, 1961. source
- Interpretationreasoning
An agent may want to switch between using the p-strategy and using a simpler strategy depending on what the other agents are doing.
“an agent may want to switch between using the p-strategy and using a simpler strategy depending on what the other agents are doing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Profit-seeking behavior of agents risks inefficient allocation of goods and services, as agents take strategic stances that might backfire.
“The profit-seeking behavior of agents, however, risks inefficient allocation of goods and services, as agents take strategic stances that might backfire.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The profit-seeking behavior of self-interested agents will keep the UMDL agent population mixed with agents of various strategies.
“Moreover, the profit-seeking behavior of self-interested agents will keep the UMDL agent population mixed with agents of various strategies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The agents in the auctions are self-interested and will try to maximize their utilities in all possible ways given the current interaction protocols.
- Interpretationown data
The disadvantage of being 'less smart' decreases as the number of smart agents increases.
“the disadvantage of being ''less smart'' decreases as the number of smart agents increases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The UMDL is likely to evolve to a point where some agents use simpler strategies while some use more complex strategies.
“we expect the UMDL is likely to evolve to a point where some agents use simpler strategies while some agents use more complex strategies that are more Ž .knowledge intensive such as the p-strategy .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The CDA, even without strategic agents, is not very efficient because it continuously clears rather than batching offers and finding the most efficient matches possible.
“It turns out that the CDA, even without strategic agents, is not very efficient because it continuously clears rather batching offers and finding the most efficient matches possible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The market becomes inefficient due to strategic misrepresentation of p-strategy agents and missed opportunities of matches.
“the market becomes inefficient due to strategic misrepresentation of p-strategy agents Ž .and, therefore, missed opportunities of matches”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The number of matches is not an exact indication of market efficiency, as average profit per match differs across settings.
“The number of matches is not an exact indication of the market efficiency, as the average profit per match differs across the different settings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
An agent may want to switch between a complex strategy and a simple one depending on the behavior of other agents.
“This result indicates that an agent may want to switch between a complex strategy and a simple one depending on the behavior of other agents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The worst-case market inefficiency is not likely to be realized since not all self-interested agents will behave strategically.
“the worst-case market inefficiency is Ž not likely to be realized since even though self-interested agents have the .capability of complex strategic reasoning, not all of them will behave so .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The agents in the auctions are self-interested and will try to maximize their utilities in all possible ways given the current interaction protocols.
- Interpretationreasoning
A periodic, clearing-house style double auction is unrealistic for the UMDL system where participants change and matches should be made quickly.
“A periodic, clearing-house style double auction is unrealistic for the UMDL system where the participants of the auction change and matches should be made quickly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In the UMDL auction where the clearing price is determined at the seller's offer price, sellers have somewhat stronger incentives to bid above cost, as they always set the market price and this affects their tradeoff between the probability of trading and the profit earned.
“in the UMDL auction where the clearing price is determined at the seller's offer price, sellers have somewhat stronger incentives to bid above cost, as they always set the market price and this affects their tradeoff between the w x probability of trading and the profit earned 11, p. 288 .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites 11, p. 288
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
The UMDL is likely to evolve to a point where some agents use simpler strategies and some use the p-strategy.
“we expect the UMDL is likely to evolve to a point where some agents use simpler strategies and some use the p-strategy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
The University of Michigan Digital Library (UMDL) is designed as an open system that allows third parties to build and integrate their own profit-seeking agents into the marketplace of information goods and services.
“The University of Michigan Digital Library UMDL is designed as an open system that allows third parties to build and integrate their own profit-seeking agents into the marketplace of information goods and services.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The p-strategy seller lowers its offer to increase the probability of a match instead of increasing the profit of a match.
“the p-strategy seller lowers its Ž offer to increase the probability of a match instead of increasing the profit of a .match”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
The UMDL does not yet have an incentive-compatible mechanism that makes strategic reasoning unnecessary.
“Unfortunately, we do not have such a mechanism yet for the UMDL system”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Standing offers ordered by lowest to highest bid are always in a bbb...bsss...s sequence.
“standing offers ordered by lowest to highest bid are always in a bbb . . .bsss . . .s sequence”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If enough other agents use complex reasoning, an agent can achieve additional profit even when it continues using a simple strategy.
“It follows from the above observation that if enough other agents use complex reasoning, an agent can achieve additional profit even when it continues using a simple strategy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
By dynamically switching to a simpler strategy, an agent can achieve a similar profit to that of using the p-strategy, while exerting less effort (time and computation) on computing bids.
“By dynamically switching to a simpler strategy, an agent can achieve a Ž similar profit to that of using the p-strategy, while exerting less effort time and .computation on computing bids.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
Buyers have incentives, although somewhat weaker, to behave strategically as well (i.e., to bid below valuation).
“buyers have incentives, although somewhat weaker, to behave strategically as well Ž .i.e., to bid below valuation”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- May combine two claims. 11
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 21
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe FM-seller's profit is generally less than that of the p-seller, but the difference decreases with an increase in the number of p-strategy agents.
“The FM-seller's profit is generally less than that of the p-seller, but the difference decreases with an increase in the number of p-strategy agents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe best markup will vary depending on the auction situations, but seven is the best markup for this particular auction setting.
“The best markup will vary depending on the auction situations, but seven is the best markup for this particular auction setting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe CP-seller gets more matches than the p-seller but its profit per match is smaller on average.
“the CP-seller gets more matches than the p-seller but its .profit per match is smaller on average”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe ZI-seller works poorly against the p-seller, which indicates the randomization strategy does not work.
“The ZI-seller works poorly against the p-seller, which indicates the randomization strategy does not work.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenp-strategy agents usually get fewer matches but more profit per match.
“the p-strategy agents usually get fewer matches but more profit per match”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
PremisecitationIn MAS with self-interested agents, system architects need to design a proper rule to ensure some desired property rather than assuming it.
“In MAS with self-interested agents, system architects need to design a proper rule Ž .to ensure some desired property honesty of agents, for example rather than assuming it.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [11] J. H. Kagel and W. Vogt, ''Buyer's bid double auctions: Preliminary experimental results,'' in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, D. Friedman and J. Rust (Eds.), Addison-Wesley: Reading, MA, 1993, pp. 285–305.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisereasoningThe clearing price is hypothetical, since it changes when new offer(s) arrive during the time between the clearing-price quote and the CP-seller's offer.
“Note that the clearing price is hypothetical, since it changes Ž .when new offer s arrive during the time between the clearing-price quote and the CP-seller's offer.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe open multi-agent architecture and market infrastructure create dynamics (agents participating in an auction change, matches between buyers and sellers vary, and auctions themselves evolve), which adds additional complexity to mechanism design.
“the open multi-agent architec-Ž ture and market infrastructure create dynamics agents participating in an auction .change, matches between buyers and sellers vary, and auctions themselves evolve , which adds additional complexity to mechanism design.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenThe UMDL is structured as a collection of agents that buy and sell services from each other using an auction infrastructure (the Service Market Society).
“the UMDL is structured as a collection of agents that buy and sell services from each other using an auction infrastructure.We refer to this Ž .infrastructure as the Service Market Society SMS .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Study design and conductnone givenThe value of the clearing interval does not affect the results from our experiments, provided that on average at most one offer arrives at the auction each interval.
“The value of the clearing interval does not affect the results from our experiments, provided that on average at most one offer arrives at the auction each interval.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThe p-strategy models the auction process stochastically and thus ignores the fact that the other agents in the auction may also behave strategically.
“The p-strategy models the auction process stochastically and thus ignores the fact that the other agents in the auction may also behave strategically.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenIn the UMDL, the Auction Agent continuously matches the highest buyer to the lowest seller, given that the buy price is greater than the sell price.
“In the UMDL, the Auction Agent continuously matches the highest buyer to the lowest seller, given that the buy price is greater than the sell price.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Interpretationnone givenThe p-strategy agent is able to use extra information about the auction.
“the p-seller is able to use Ž .extra information about the auction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThe cost function represents economies of scale.
“The cost function represents economies of scale.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningEven though market efficiency eventually decreases with an increase in the number of p-strategy agents, because of its mixed agent population, the UMDL will not suffer market inefficiency of the worst case.
“Even though the market efficiency eventually decreases with an increase in the number of p-strategy agents, because of its mixed agent population, the UMDL will not suffer market inefficiency of the worst case.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The agents in the auctions are self-interested and will try to maximize their utilities in all possible ways given the current interaction protocols.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe UMDL auction is too complex to model and we cannot assume rationality in the game-theoretic sense.
“We do not use game theory because the UMDL auction is too complex to model and because we cannot assume rationality in the game-theoretic sense.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenIt is not possible to impose mechanisms to remove incentives for strategic reasoning in the UMDL.
“While it would be good if we could impose mechanisms to remove incentives for strategic reasoning, this is not possible in the UMDL.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThe clearing price is based on the seller's offer price (buyers receive the entire surplus).
“The clearing price is based on the seller's offer Ž .3 price i.e., buyers receive the entire surplus .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
PremisereasoningSince the UMDL is open, all agents are treated as self interested.
“Since the UMDL is open, all agents are treated as self interested.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenAgents with complete models of other agents will always do better in the auction.
“agents with complete models of other agents will always do better in the auction”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationIn large markets with significant uncertainty, taking ones' effect on prices into account does not pay off.
“Some results show that in large markets with significant uncertainty, taking ones' effect on prices into account does not pay off.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [9] J. E. Hanson, and J. O. Kephart, ''Spontaneous specialization in a free-market economy of agents,'' in Autonomous Agents '98 Workshop, Artificial Societies and Computational Markets, Minneapolis/St. Paul, 1998, pp. 19–26.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites [10] J. Hu, and M. P. Wellman, ''Online learning about other agents in a dynamic multiagent system, in Second International Conference on Autonomous Agents, 1998, 239–246. source
- cites [12] J. O. Kephart, et al., ''Dynamics of an information-filtering economy,'' in Second International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, Paris, 1998. source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe p-strategy can be viewed as 1-level RMM, as it models the behavior of other agents but not the other agents' interior reasoning processes.
“Our p-strategy can be viewed as 1-level RMM, as it models the behavior of other Ž .agents but not the other agents' ''interior'' reasoning processes .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenThe UMDL is designed as a multi-agent system where agents representing users, collections, and services sell and buy information goods and services through auctions.
“The UMDL is de-Ž signed as a multi-agent system, where agents representing users, collections, and .services of the digital library sell and buy information goods and services through auctions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningSession 1 gets the most matches and serves as a benchmark for comparing market efficiency because traders honestly report their reservation prices.
“Since traders honestly report their reservation prices, Session 1 gets the most matches and serves as a benchmark for comparing market efficiency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationown dataMany different, complex interactions among agents are hard to predict, as shown in this paper.
“At the same time, we can expect many different, complex interactions among agents that are hard to predict, as shown in this paper.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningAs the overhead of complex reasoning becomes more costly, an adaptive strategy that dynamically decides on which strategy to use will be more desirable.
“As the overhead of complex reasoning becomes more costly, an adaptive strategy that dynamically decides on which strategy to use will be more desirable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAn adaptive p-strategy will be beneficial not only to a self-interested agent but also to the overall system efficiency.
“An adaptive p-strategy will be beneficial not only to a self-interested agent but also to the overall system efficiency.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenDesigning a good mechanism that exhibits certain properties (incentive engineering) is difficult, especially for dynamic systems where the participants and their interactions evolve over time.
“designing a good mechanism that exhibits certain propertiesᎏwhich is called incentive engineeringᎏis difficult, especially for dynamic systems where the participants and their interactions evolve over time.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenWithout repeated encounters, complete models of other agents are unattainable.
“without repeated encounters complete models are unattainable”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
Agents have found the right auction and are ready to buy and sell in an auction; other issues are ignored.
“Since the focus of this paper is on multi-agent auctions, we assume that agents have found the right auction and are ready to buy and sell in an auction, while ignoring other issues.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Offers arrive at most one at a time.
“If we assume that offers arrive at most one at a time, the auction can go to any of the following”
The paper relies on this without support.
A large number of agents who bid infrequently have the same effect on the auction as a small number of agents who bid more frequently.
“It is also the case that a large number of agents who bid infrequently have the same effect on the auction as a small number of agents who bid more frequently.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The agents in the auctions are self-interested and will try to maximize their utilities in all possible ways given the current interaction protocols.
“The agents in the auctions are assumed to be self-interested ᎏagents will try to maximize their utilities in all possible ways given the current interaction protocols.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A self-interested agent in the UMDL system has the capability of complex strategic reasoning.
“although a self-interested agent in the UMDL system has the capability of complex strategic reasoning”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rust tournament citation points to another work
MinorThe tournament is attributed to Rust and colleagues with citation 18, but reference 18 is a book by Rosenschein and Zlotkin. The Rust tournament work appears as reference 19.
“w x Rust et al. 18 have carried out a double auction tournament to investigate appropriate agent strategies.”
“18. J. S. Rosenschein and G. Zlotkin, Rules of Encounter: Designing Con¨entions for Automated Negotiation among Computers, The MIT Press, 1994.”
FM-seller comparison names the wrong figure
MinorThe note directs readers to Figure 9 for an FM-seller versus p-seller comparison, whereas the text identifies Figure 10 as the figure showing both sellers' profits.
“The FM-seller's profit exceeds that of the p-seller in Session 5 in Figure 9”
“Figure: 10 Figure 10 . Figure 10.Profits of FM-seller and p-seller.”
Vickrey citation points to a different author
MinorThe discussion attributes the auction analysis to Vickrey and cites reference 24, but reference 24 is by Varian. Vickrey's paper is listed as reference 25.
“As he w x analyzed 24 , the Vickrey auction mechanism makes rational agents bid their true reservation prices”
“24. H. R. Varian, ''Economic mechanism design for computerized agents,'' in USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, New York, NY, 1995, pp. 13᎐21.”
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COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
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Online learning about other agents in a dynamic multiagent system
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Self-citationConjectural Equilibrium in Multiagent Learning
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Lower Bounds for Efficiency of Surplus Extraction in Double Auctions
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Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market
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The Impact of Nested Agent Models in an Information Economy
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The agent architecture of the University of Michigan Digital Library
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Brafman, R. I., & Tennenholtz, M. (1996) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.318 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Price and Niche Wars in a Free-Market Economy of Software Agents
Kephart, J. O., Hanson, J. E., & Sairamesh, J. (1998) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/106454698568413 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
On social laws for artificial agent societies: off-line design
Shoham, Y., & Tennenholtz, M. (1996) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2026.003.0017 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Price-war dynamics in a free-market economy of software agents
Kephart, J. O., Hanson, J. E., & Sairamesh, J. (1998) · Cited by 40 · see citing works
Emergent properties of a market-based digital library with strategic agents
Park, S., Durfee, E. H., & Birmingham, W. P. (2002) · International Conference on Multi Agent Systems · doi:10.1109/icmas.1998.699054 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Self-citationAdvantages of Strategic Thinking in Multiagent Contracts (A Mechanism and Analysis)
Park, S., Durfee, E. H., & Birmingham, W. P. (1996) · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Self-citationThe dynamics of the UMDL service market society
Durfee, E. H., Mullen, T., Park, S., et al. (1998) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/bfb0053675 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Self-citationBuyer’s Bid Double Auctions: Preliminary Experimental Results
Kagel, J. H., & Vogt, W. B. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429492532-12 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Research Priorities in Electronic Commerce
Qin, Z. (2000) · Zhongguo ruankexue · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
2 of the 32 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- J. E. Hanson, and J. O. Kephart, ''Spontaneous specialization in a free-market economy of agents,'' in Autonomous Agents '98 Workshop, Artificial Societies and Computational Markets, Minneapolis/St. Paul, 1998, pp. 19–26.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Objective versus Subjective Coordination in the Engineering of Agent Systems
Omicini, A., & Ossowskí, S. (2003) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-36561-3_9 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
“[ 21 ]). Still, very little can be done in the general case, so that the main focus of design comes to be placed on other issues, such as security, and often at a lower level of analysis.”
BackgroundA Classification Structure for Automated Negotiations
Büttner, R. (2006) · IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT) · doi:10.1109/wi-iatw.2006.7 · Cited by 57 · see citing works
“Another way to represent bounded rationality was provided by probability-based models, for example [75, 132].”
MethodThe State of the Art in Automated Negotiation Models of the Behavior and Information Perspective
Buettner, R. (2006) · International transactions on systems science and applications · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Coordination knowledge engineering
Ossowskí, S., & Omicini, A. (2002) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888903000596 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
“Also, in certain “parts” of the open system it may be possible to influence the frequencies of behaviours by spawning new agents with desired characteristics, so as to improve the quality of coordination at the macro level (e.g. Park et al. , 2000).”
BackgroundELECTRONIC NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TRANSACTIONAL COSTS PERSPECTIVE
Buettner, R. (2007) · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Use of Markov Chains to Design an Agent Bidding Strategy for Continuous Double Auctions
Park, S., Durfee, E. H., & Birmingham, W. P. (2004) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.1466 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
“The CDA is an auction variant (Friedman, 1993, page 8) in which buyers and sellers post their buy and sell offers asynchronously, and the auction will match a buy and a sell offer at any moment as long as the buy bid is higher than or equal to the sell offer.”
BackgroundSelf-citationDistributed and reactive query planning in R-MAGIC: an agent-based multimedia retrieval system
Ghosh, H., & Chaudhury, S. (2004) · IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering · doi:10.1109/tkde.2004.40 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
A dynamic mechanism for time-constrained trading
Choi, S. P. M., & Liu, J. (2001) · doi:10.1145/375735.376449 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Improving Water Allocation Using Multi-agent Negotiation Mechanisms
Chiewchan, K., Anthony, P., Birendra, K. C., et al. (2019) · Smart innovation, systems and technologies · doi:10.1007/978-981-13-8679-4_9 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Honhaga, I., & Szabo, C. (2024) · International Conference on Advances in System Simulation · doi:10.1177/00375497241232432 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Optimizing Communication Strategies in Contested and Dynamic Environments
Szabo, C., Radenovic, V., Judd, G., Craggs, D., Lee, K. L., Chen, X., & Chan, K. (2020) · IEEE International Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS) · doi:10.1109/iceccs51672.2020.00030 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“There are numerous approaches that design complex systems with emergent properties across communities of agent-based simulation [4], [17], [13], [23], [15], systems-of-systems design [9], [14] and mechanism design and game theory [18] research.”
BackgroundUse Of Reinforcement Learning for Prioritizing Communications in Contested and Dynamic Environments
Craggs, D., Lee, K. L., Radenovic, V., et al. (2022) · Winter Simulation Conference · doi:10.1109/wsc57314.2022.10015325
“2008), mechanism design and game theory (Park et al. 2000), and agent-based simulation (Bernon et al.”
Method
- Authors
- Park, S., Durfee, E. H., & Birmingham, W. P.
- Affiliations
- Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
- University of Michigan (US)
- Venue
- Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
- Published
- 2000-03
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33-51
- ISSN
- 1387-2532 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7454
- OpenAlex
- W2908248576
- Cited by
- 12
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 1.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (publishedVersion)
- Deep Blue (University of Michigan) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (9411287, 9872057)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- digital libraries, strategic agents, auction mechanisms, stochastic market model, collective behavior, emergent properties, multi-agent systems
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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