The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Efficiency in Marriage
Open accessAbstract
Economists usually assume that bargaining in marriage leads to efficient outcomes.The most convincing rationale for this assumption is the belief that efficient allocations are likely to emerge from repeated interactions in stationary environments, and that marriage provides such an environment.This paper argues that when a current decision affects future bargaining power, inefficient outcomes are plausible.If the spouses could make binding commitments --in effect, commitments to refrain from exploiting the future bargaining advantage --then the inefficiency would disappear.But spouses seldom can make binding commitments regarding allocation within marriage.To investigate the efficiency of bargaining within marriage when choices affect future bargaining power, we consider the location decisions of two-earner couples.These location decisions are transparent and analytically tractable examples of choices likely to affect future bargaining power, but the logic of our analysis applies to many other decisions.For example, decisions about education, fertility, and labor force participation are also potential sources of inefficiency.
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Cites
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Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market
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Self-citationMincer, J. (1978) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260710 · Cited by 1,211
Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.4.139 · Cited by 1,205
Self-citationPower Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the College Educated, 1940-1990
Costa, D. L., & Kahn, M. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555079 · Cited by 544
Marriage and divorce: informational constraints and private contracting
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Cited by
Iversen, T., & Rosenbluth, F. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00166.x · Cited by 424
Bobonis, G. J. (2009) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/600076 · Cited by 321
Public Transfers and Domestic Violence: The Roles of Private Information and Spousal Control
Bobonis, G. J., González-Brenes, M., & Castro, R. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.5.1.179 · Cited by 316
Cooke, T. J. (2008) · Population, Space and Place · doi:10.1002/psp.500 · Cited by 300
Smaller differences in bigger cities? Assessing the regional dimension of the gender wage gap
Nisic, N. (2017) · European Sociological Review · doi:10.1093/esr/jcx037 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A.
- Venue
- Review of Economics of the Household
- Published
- 2003-09
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 153-167
- ISSN
- 1569-5239 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7152
- OpenAlex
- W1589172910
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 13.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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