Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 1,205

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage

Open access
Lundberg, Shelly, Pollak, Robert A·1996·Journal of Economic Perspectives

Abstract

The standard economic model of the family is a ‘common preference’ model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources. In recent years, this model has been challenged by game-theoretic models of marriage that do not impose ‘pooling’ and are, therefore, consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior. In this paper, the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence, and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/jep.10.4.139

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 2 references

Cited by

See all 1,205

Metadata

Authors
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A.
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Published
1996-11-01
Volume
10
Issue
4
Pages
139-158
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2161186418
Cited by
1,205
References
2
FWCI
46.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/jep.10.4.139
The paper
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1996). Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage. Journal of Economic Perspectives. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.10.4.139

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.