The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: A review and theoretical analysis.
Abstract
Arguably, all judgments and decisions are made in 1 (or some combination) of 2 basic evaluation modes—joint evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple options are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or separate evaluation mode (SE), in which options are presented in isolation and evaluated separately. This article reviews recent literature showing that people evaluate options differently and exhibit reversals of preferences for options between JE and SE. The authors propose an explanation for the JE/SE reversal based on a principle called the evaluability hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that it is more difficult to evaluate the desirability of values on some attributes than on others and that, compared with easy-to-evaluate attributes, difficult-to-evaluate attributes have a greater impact in JE than in SE.
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Citations
Cites
Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior
Loewenstein, G. (1996) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0028 · Cited by 2,610 · cited 2×
“The original demonstration of JE/SE reversal was provided by Bazerman, Loewenstein, and White (1992). Participants read a description of a dispute between two neighbors and then evaluated different potential resolutions of the dispute.”
Self-citationWhen More Pain Is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End
Kahneman, D., Fredrickson, B. L., Schreiber, C. A., & Redelmeier, D. A. (1993) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00589.x · Cited by 1,502
Negotiating with Yourself and Losing: Making Decisions with Competing Internal Preferences
Bazerman, M. H., Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Wade-Benzoni, K. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259372 · Cited by 510
Self-citation
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Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 · Cited by 2,254
Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment
Logg, J. M., Minson, J. A., & Moore, D. A. (2019) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.12.005 · Cited by 2,061
Resistance to Medical Artificial Intelligence
Longoni, C., Bonezzi, A., & Morewedge, C. K. (2019) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1093/jcr/ucz013 · Cited by 2,015
"Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences
Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535153 · Cited by 1,452
Self-citationJustification effects on consumer choice of hedonic and utilitarian goods.
Okada, E. M. (2005) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.42.1.43.56889 · Cited by 1,069
Metadata
- Authors
- Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., Blount, S., & Bazerman, M. H.
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 1999-09
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 576-590
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W3123484738
- Cited by
- 778
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 6.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., Blount, S., & Bazerman, M. H. (1999). Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: A review and theoretical analysis. Psychological Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.5.576
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