Cited by 2,254Linguistics and Discourse AnalysisDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

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Mercier, Hugo, Sperber, Dan·2011·Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Abstract

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected o…

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  • Human explanations may be geared more towards convincing others or supporting their own beliefs, rather than accurately reflecting the true causes of decisions.

    “Human explanations may be geared more towards convincing others or supporting their own beliefs, rather than accurately reflecting the true causes of decisions (Mercier and Sperber, 2011).”

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Authors
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D.
Affiliations
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2011-03-29
Volume
34
Issue
2
Pages
57-74
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2104256533
Cited by
2,254
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 110 · 2025: 140 · 2024: 144 · 2023: 130 · 2022: 177 · 2021: 221 · 2020: 175 · 2019: 256 · 2018: 162 · 2017: 135 · 2016: 148 · 2015: 103 · 2014: 96 · 2013: 97 · 2012: 82
FWCI
248.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Linguistics and Discourse Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
argumentation, persuasion, confirmation bias, epistemic distortion, decision-making, misinformation, motivated reasoning, belief persistence
MeSH terms
Choice Behavior, Cognition, Concept Formation, Decision Making, Biological Evolution, Humans, Problem Solving, Psychological Theory, Thinking, Knowledge

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