The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency, subjective time, and other minds.
Abstract
Intentional binding refers to a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects. So far, it has solely been investigated using judgments of the perceived time of actions or their effects. The authors report 3 experiments using an alternative method: the estimation of a time interval between a voluntary action and its subsequent effect. Interval estimates were obtained for intervals bounded by different kinds of actions and effects: The actions were either performed by the participants themselves or by the experimenter. The effects, in turn, were movements either applied to the body of the participant or to the experimenter. First, the results validated interval estimation as a method for exploring action awareness. Second, intentional binding was stronger for self-generated compared with observed actions, indicating that private information about the action contributes to action awareness. In contrast, intentional binding did not depend on whether a somatic effect was applied to the participant's or to another person's body. Third, for self-generated actions, external events gave rise to a stronger intentional binding than did somatic effects. This finding indicates that intentional binding especially links actions with their consequences in the external world.
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Cites
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410
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Somatosensory activations during the observation of touch and a case of vision–touch synaesthesia
Blakemore, S.-J., Bristow, D., Bird, G., Frith, C., & Ward, J. (2005) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awh500 · Cited by 614
Cited by
Intentional binding and the sense of agency: A review
Moore, J. W., & Obhi, S. S. (2012) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002 · Cited by 563
Hughes, G., Desantis, A., & Waszak, F. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0028566 · Cited by 365
Gallagher, S. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846345.001.0001 · Cited by 359
The Senses of Agency and Ownership: A Review
Braun, N., Debener, S., Spychala, N., Bongartz, E., Sörös, P., Müller, H. H. O., & Philipsen, A. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00535 · Cited by 333
The Feeling of Agency: Empirical Indicators for a Pre-Reflective Level of Action Awareness
David, N., Stenzel, A., Schneider, T. R., & Engel, A. K. (2011) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00149 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Engbert, K., Wohlschläger, A., Thomas, R., & Haggard, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1261-1268
- ISSN
- 0096-1523 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1277
- OpenAlex
- W2074039143
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 2.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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