Individual differences in rational thought.

Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West·1998·Journal of Experimental Psychology General

Abstract

Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and the false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic-level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict

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  5. The trouble with overconfidence.
    Moore, Don A., Healy, Paul J. · 2008 · Psychological Review

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Individual differences in rational thought. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0096-3445.127.2.161
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Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought. Journal of Experimental Psychology General. https://doi.org/10.1037//0096-3445.127.2.161

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