Prospect relativity: How choice options influence decision under risk.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In many theories of decision under risk (e.g., expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, and prospect theory), the utility of a prospect is independent of other options in the choice set. The experiments presented here show a large effect of the available options, suggesting instead that prospects are valued relative to one another. The judged certainty equivalent for a prospect is strongly influenced by the options available. Similarly, the selection of a preferred prospect is strongly influenced by the prospects available. Alternative theories of decision under risk (e.g., the stochastic difference model, multialternative decision field theory, and range frequency theory), where prospects are valued relative to one another, can provide an account of these context effects.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
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Cited by
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
Zizzo, D. J. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z · Cited by 1,194
Mindful Judgment and Decision Making
Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163633 · Cited by 745
Stewart, N., Chater, N., & Brown, G. D. A. (2006) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.10.003 · Cited by 737
Self-citationCumulative prospect theory's functional menagerie
Stott, H. P. (2006) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/s11166-006-8289-6 · Cited by 482
Self-citationNew paradoxes of risky decision making.
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.115.2.463 · Cited by 386
Metadata
- Authors
- Stewart, N., Chater, N., Stott, H. P., & Reimers, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 132
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-46
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2160947404
- Cited by
- 140
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 4.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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