The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The probabilistic nature of preferential choice.
Abstract
Previous research has developed a variety of theories explaining when and why people's decisions under risk deviate from the standard economic view of expected utility maximization. These theories are limited in their predictive accuracy in that they do not explain the probabilistic nature of preferential choice, that is, why an individual makes different choices in nearly identical situations, or why the magnitude of these inconsistencies varies in different situations. To illustrate the advantage of probabilistic theories, three probabilistic theories of decision making under risk are compared with their deterministic counterparts. The probabilistic theories are (a) a probabilistic version of a simple choice heuristic, (b) a probabilistic version of cumulative prospect theory, and (c) decision field theory. By testing the theories with the data from three experimental studies, the superiority of the probabilistic models over their deterministic counterparts in predicting people's decisions under risk become evident. When testing the probabilistic theories against each other, decision field theory provides the best account of the observed behavior.
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Citations
Cites
A Simplex Method for Function Minimization
Nelder, J. A., & Mead, R. (1965) · The Computer Journal · doi:10.1093/comjnl/7.4.308 · Cited by 28,905
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice
Tversky, A. (1972) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0032955 · Cited by 3,365
Adaptive strategy selection in decision making.
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1988) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.14.3.534 · Cited by 1,955
The aging decision maker: Cognitive aging and the adaptive selection of decision strategies.
Mata, R., Schooler, L. J., & Rieskamp, J. (2007) · Psychology and Aging · doi:10.1037/0882-7974.22.4.796 · Cited by 366
Self-citation
Cited by
(2013) · Cited by 1,351
Risk preference shares the psychometric structure of major psychological traits
Frey, R., Pedroni, A., Mata, R., Rieskamp, J., & Hertwig, R. (2017) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.1701381 · Cited by 526
Self-citationA choice prediction competition: Choices from experience and from description
Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A. E., Haruvy, E., Herzog, S. M., Hau, R., Hertwig, R., Stewart, T., West, R., & Lebiere, C. (2010) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.683 · Cited by 329
Instance-based learning: Integrating sampling and repeated decisions from experience.
Gonzalez, C., & Dutt, V. (2011) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0024558 · Cited by 255
Thermodynamics as a theory of decision-making with information-processing costs
Ortega, P. A., & Braun, D. A. (2013) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2012.0683 · Cited by 255
Metadata
- Authors
- Rieskamp, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Published
- 2008-11
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1446-1465
- ISSN
- 0278-7393 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1285
- OpenAlex
- W2030142386
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 5.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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