Rational learning and information sampling: On the “naivety” assumption in sampling explanations of judgment biases.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent research has argued that several well-known judgment biases may be due to biases in the available information sample rather than to biased information processing. Most of these sample-based explanations assume that decision makers are "naive": They are not aware of the biases in the available information sample and do not correct for them. Here, we show that this "naivety" assumption is not necessary. Systematically biased judgments can emerge even when decision makers process available information perfectly and are also aware of how the information sample has been generated. Specifically, we develop a rational analysis of Denrell's (2005) experience sampling model, and we prove that when information search is interested rather than disinterested, even rational information sampling and processing can give rise to systematic patterns of errors in judgments. Our results illustrate that a tendency to favor alternatives for which outcome information is more accessible can be consistent with rational behavior. The model offers a rational explanation for behaviors that had previously been attributed to cognitive and motivational biases, such as the in-group bias or the tendency to prefer popular alternatives.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundBeware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases.
Fiedler, K. (2000) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.107.4.659 · Cited by 482
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Navigating Into the Future or Driven by the Past
Seligman, M. E. P., Railton, P., Baumeister, R. F., & Sripada, C. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612474317 · Cited by 720
“We note with interest an emerging literature in which various familiar heuristics and biases are accounted for by adaptations that could figure in optimal learning strategies (Denrell, 2007; Le Mens & Denrell, 2011; March, 1996).”
BackgroundChasing a Moving Target: Exploitation and Exploration in Dynamic Environments
Posen, H. E., & Levinthal, D. A. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1420 · Cited by 380
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Metadata
- Authors
- Le Mens, G., & Denrell, J.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 379-392
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2160354983
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 2.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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