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The energetics of motivated cognition: A force-field analysis.

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 129 of the 129 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

A force-field theory of motivated cognition is presented and applied to a broad variety of phenomena in social judgment and self-regulation. Purposeful cognitive activity is assumed to be propelled by a driving force and opposed by a restraining force. Potential driving force represents the maximal amount of energy an individual is prepared to invest in a cognitive activity. Effective driving force corresponds to the amount of energy he or she actually invests in attempt to match the restraining force. Magnitude of the potential driving force derives from a combination of goal importance and the pool of available mental resources, whereas magnitude of the restraining force derives from an individual's inclination to conserve resources, current task demands, and competing goals. The present analysis has implications for choice of means to achieve one's cognitive goals as well as for successful goal attainment under specific force-field constellations. Empirical evidence for these effects is considered, and the underlying theory's integrative potential is highlighted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/a0025488

Cites

129 of 129 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Verification

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Citations

Cites

Show all 129 references

Cited by

Items 301–317 of 317

Metadata

Authors
Kruglanski, A. W., Bélanger, J. J., Chen, X., Köpetz, C., Pierro, A., & Mannetti, L.
Affiliations
  • University of Maryland, College Park (US)
  • Sapienza University of Rome (IT)
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2012
Volume
119
Issue
1
Pages
1-20
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W1999747242
Cited by
318
References
128
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 64 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 7
FWCI
18.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • IRIS Research product catalog (Sapienza University of Rome) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Human Behavior and Motivation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
motivated cognition, driving factors, restraining forces, cognitive effort, goal importance, cognitive resources, self-regulation, social judgment, competing goals, goal achievement
MeSH terms
Aptitude, Attitude, Choice Behavior, Cognition, Decision Making, Drive, Goals, Humans, Models, Psychological, Motivation, Neuropsychological Tests, Psychological Theory, Review Literature as Topic, Thinking

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.